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INTRODUCTION

Senate Joint Resolution 671 proposes to alter the fundamental
allocation of power in our constitutional scheme. If passed by Congress and ratified by the states, it would provide for a national statutory initiative process. 2 The Resolution echoes in many ways the
call for direct democracy at a national level that emerged with the
Progressive Movement's introduction of the initiative, referendum 3 and recall 4 in a number of states early this century.5 Not
much came of these early suggestions for national initiative, referendum and recall procedures, and wisely so. In a matter as important as the constitutional allocation of legislative power, wisdom
dictates caution. Serious doubts as to the effect of the trilogy of
reforms were raised 6 when the reforms were first introduced, and
the Progressive Movement's adherents in response could only
speculate. 7 It was not until 1898 that the first state-South Da1. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Appendix, infra, at 1051 for the
text of the resolution. There are other similar proposals. See, Joint Resolution Proposingan Amendment to the Constitution of the United States With
Respect to the Proposaland the Enactment of Laws by Popular Vote of the
People of the United States: Hearingson S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
24-27, 30-33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Because hearings have
been held on S.J. Res. 67, but not on any of the other proposals, and because
it is the most carefully drafted of the various proposals, I have emphasized it
in this article more than the other proposals. But see note 13 infra. S.J. Res.
67 was reintrodaced into the 96th Congress, by Senator DeConcini as S.J.
Res. 33. It was again referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
2. The statutory initiative is a process by which voters may place proposed laws
on the ballot and either accept or reject the proposal at the polls. Under S.J.
Res. 67, it would probably take close to four million signatures on petitions in
order to obtain sufficient valid signatures to place a measure on the ballot.
See note 395 infra. If a sufficient number of voters (usually a majority of
those voting on the measure, but see note 395 infra) vote for it, it becomes

law.
3. A referedum is a process by which citizens or the legislature may place on
the ballot a statute enacted by the legislature and signed by the governor and
vote it up or down. See, e.g., MASS. CONST., as amended, art. 48, pt. 1; MD.
CONST., as amended, art. XVI, § 1.
4. A recall is a method of allowing voters to decide whether an elected official
should be permitted to stay in office. See IDAHO CONsT. art. 6, § 6; IDAHO
ELECTION CODE, Ch. 17, §§ 34.1701-.1715; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
5. See J. POLLOCK, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN MICHIGAN 2-4 (1940). For
proposals of direct democracy at a national level, see D. WiLcox, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE 305-12 (1912). See also J. BOYLE, THE INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM (1912); Lowell, The Referendum in the United States, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 126 (W. Munro ed. 1912); Everett, Federal
Initiative and Referendum, 11 S. AWL. Q. 350 (1912).
6. See generally,J. BOYLE, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., D. WiLCox, supra note 5. For summaries of the theoretical positions
that are still current, see Sen. Owens's remarks, 49 CONG. REC. 4713-50 (1913),
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kota-explicitly embraced any of the reforms;8 thus there was no
significant body of experience by which to test the trilogy when
they were first proposed at the national level. 9
Wisdom still dictates caution, of course. In light of the tremendous increase in the responsibilities of the federal government, the
allocation of legislative power is more important now than ever.
Yet, that very same expansion demands that we reconsider
whether the present distribution of responsibilities remains the
one most likely to fulfill our fundamental goals. A contemporary
evaluation of the federal law-making machinery also makes sense
apart from the growth in the power and responsibility of the central government. The Founding Fathers had virtually no experience with federated constitutional democracies. Theirs was a
creation based more upon extrapolation from theory rather than
fact.' 0 We, by contrast, have had nearly two hundred years of experience with their theoretical constructs and can now test their
creation by that experience.
The renewal of interest in one of the Progressives' reforms-the
initiative--comes, then, at a most propitious time. It comes at a
time when it makes good sense to reconsider our basic law-making
scheme, a reconsideration which can effectively be accomplished
through an exploration of the wisdom of the national initiative proposal.'- More importantly, it comes at a time when the major difficulty that originally inhibited serious consideration of a national
initiative process may in large part be overcome. We no longer
and the debates on admitting Arizona to the Union, 47 CONG. REC. 2793-2803,
3633-46 (1911).
8. S.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; 1897 S.D. Sess. Laws, Ch.XXXIX.
9. Prior to the adoption of the initiative and referendum in South Dakota, a
number of states had used popular referenda on an ad hoc basis for various
purposes. For a history of popular law-making that is not limited to the initiative, referendum, and recall, see C. LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW (1909). The
progressive movement was heavily influenced by the use of national referenda in Switzerland. See L. TALiUAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 9-21 (1977). For an

account of the Swiss experience, or more precisely, the experience of the
Swiss canton of Graubiinden, see B. BARBER, THE DEATH OF COMMUNAL LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF FREEDOM IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN CANTON (1974).
10. Their experience under the Articles of Confederation was surely of value,
however.
11. I will assume throughout this article that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order to provide for a national initiative process. An argument to
the contrary could be constructed based on the ninth and tenth amendments
and on the specific language of art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein
granted ....'), but I doubt it would be very convincing. At the state level,
the cases have held that a constitutional amendment is necessary, although a
legislature may condition the implementation of a bill, especially at the local

level, upon a contingency. See Note, The Constitutionalityof a Delegationof
Legislative Power to the People, 17 IowA L. REV. 239 (1932).
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have merely the insignificant experience of a handful of unrepresentative states from which to draw our inferences. We now have
close to a century of experience in an impressive variety of states
that ranges from some of the least to the most populated, industralized and urbanized. In addition, the political theory that we
can draw on to aid the analysis is richer than ever before and, more
importantly, our understanding of political institutions has advanced dramatically. Accordingly, we are in a position where the
proposal for a national initiative procedure can be evaluated in a
depth and fashion unattainable when it was first advanced. My
purpose here is to make what contribution I presently can to that
evaluation.
Before proceeding, however, I wish to emphasize that this is indeed a preliminaryevaluation. The range of issues relevant to the
national initiative proposal is wide and the relevant scholarship
and experience extensive-too wide and too extensive, I fear, to be
captured fully by a single individual trained in a single discipline.
Thus, my effort here is limited to placing the national initiative
proposal in its proper perspective and beginning the process of analyzing the various issues it raises, relying on whatever materials
appear relevant. What subsequently will result, hopefully, will be
corrections and refinements of the analysis as those from other
disciplines bring their particular expertise to bear on the issues
within their special competence. In that spirit, then, in full awareness that the views expressed herein will be towards the first
this preliminary evaluation of the
rather than the last word, I offer
2
national initiative proposal.'
12. This analysis is limited to the initiative for a number of reasons. One is that
S.J. Res. 67 only involves the initiative. Another, more important, reason is
that there is little that can be gained by a referendum that cannot be gained
by an initiative, whereas the reverse is not true. A referendum can only accept or reject a policy of the legislature. An initiative can accomplish those
ends and more by enacting a proposal or repealing a bill passed by the legislature.
There is one noteworthy difference between initiative and referenda, however; with most referendum procedures the legislative bill does not go into
effect until after the election. Thus, a referendum can stop an enactment
from ever being implemented, whereas a repealing initiative usually can only
repeal an enactment at some time after it has been implemented. This timegap problem is a two-edged sword, however. Although it is superficially appealing to allow the legislative policy choices to be held in abeyance pending
approval by the electorate, the result is also to allow a small minority of persons-whatever the petition process calls for-to disrupt what may be important governmental services. An example of this occurred in Oregon, where
the funding for the state university was twice suspended pending the outcome of a referendum. Holman, The Unfavorable Results of Direct Legislation in Oregon, in THE LNriTIATrIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 279, 287-88 (W.
Munro ed. 1912).

1979]

NATIONAL INITIATIVE PROPOSAL

The analysis begins in Part II with an examination of the potential contribution of a national initiative process to our system of
government. The issues addressed are the deficiencies in the federal legislative process, the potential ameliorative effects of a national statutory initiative procedure, and the risks such a
procedure entails. Part III examines the experience of the states
that employ initiatives to determine whether that experience either confirms or disposes of any of the aspirations for, or the objections raised to, the initiative process. Part IV concludes the
analysis with a brief consideration of the specific proposal contained in Senate Joint Resolution 67, and a few modifications are
3
suggested.'
II. THE INITIATIVE'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
An examination of the potential contribution of the initiative requires a complex analysis. First, the primary objectives of the federal legislative process need to be articulated, which can only be
done through an examination of the development of democratic
theory in the United States. 14 Next, the performance of Congress
must be gauged by our political ideals to determine where ideal
and fact have diverged.15 Finally, the initiative process must be
examined to see if it might further the pursuit of our ideals-and if
so, at what risk.16
A.

Democratic Theory and the Federal Government

As Robert Dahl has commented, in any analysis of democratic
government, "[o] ne of the difficulties one must face at the outset is
that there is no democratic theory-there are only democratic theThere is also a potential cost to not allowing referenda-that cost is that
the electorate may repeal a statute and some harm may occur from the time
of the effective date of the statute to its repeal See generally J. ComY &H.
ABRAHM,ELEMENTS OF DEMOcRATIC GOVERNmENT 379 (4th ed. 1964). None-

13.

14.
15.
16.

theless, the potential costs of a referendum procedure are significant enough
to dissuade me from extending this analysis to argue for it.
As for the recall, it may be a very good idea at the national level, but it is
an idea independent of the initiative and deserving of treatment in its own
right.
Whether the idea of a national initiative proposal is worth pursuing must be
addressed before the merits of any specific proposal can be examined in
depth. Thus, §§ II & III of text proceed without any significant reference to
S.J. Res. 67, and § IV of text discusses only those aspects of it that are directly
related to the analysis in §§ 11 & III of text.
See § Il-A of text infra.
See § Il-B of text infra.
See § I1-C of text infra.
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7

Nonetheless, one can distill from the dominant patterns
of democratic thought in this country many common concerns and
insights helpful in analyzing the national initiative proposal.
The progression of American democratic theory can be crudely
classified into three, perhaps four, stages. The stages are Madisonian democracy, populistic democratic theory, elitism, and the
present period that is probably best characterized as one of reaction. Since no simplistic classification scheme could encompass
the complexities of democratic theory, this taxonomy is proferred
simply as a useful way of looking at the general development of
democratic theory in order to further the process of drawing inferences from that development that are relevant to the analysis of
the initiative process.
Madisonian democratic theory probably has had the greatest
impact of all political theories on our national psyche. Its basic
tenets, and its fundamental flaws, are so well known as to not require complete recitation here. 18 Nonetheless, a general consideration of the structure that was heavily influenced by Madisonian
concepts should prove quite useful.
Simply put, our forebears faced a difficult dilemma. They recognized a need for a central government, but they also knew of the
risks that attend the creation of any authority empowered to exercise coercive control. After all, they experienced both sides of the
dilemma-from their perspective the English government had
been oppressive, 19 and the institutions created by the Articles of
Confederation proved to be ineffectual. 20 Accordingly, they viewed
their task as the creation of a government sufficiently strong to be
effective but sufficiently restricted so as to reduce the chances of
an oppressive regime developing, 2 1 and their views were colored
by a fundamental bias in favor of personal autonomy and against
17. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1956). Throughout this article
I will use the term "democracy" and its derivatives as generic terms whose
referents are governments that are expected to act to a large degree consistent with the views of a significant portion of the electorate, and whose officers are chosen, directly or indirectly, by the electorate. For helpful
discussions of "democracy," see J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12; R.
DAHL, supra; THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
18. See generally R. DAHL, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. If the conditions of the colonists are compared to the conditions of other nations, however, it becomes
quite clear that the colonists enjoyed extraordinary freedoms. S. MORRISON,
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 172 (1965); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 3

(1969).

20. J. HOWE, THE CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS 150 (1966); 2 D.
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 161 (1951); C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (1964).
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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governmental interference in private affairs. 22 All of this was qualified by a concern that rights of minorities not be trampled in a
rush to majority rule,2 3 and by a recognition that a constitution can
do little more than create a basic framework. 24
To accomplish their task, widely shared value judgments were
specifically incorporated into the Constitution, to the extent possible, to protect those interests deemed so important as to deserve
explicit protection from governmental interference. Thus, we have
the specific provisions in the body of the Constitution 25 as well as
those in the Bill of Rights. Beyond that the task became more difficult, and all that could be done was to create the conditions of acceptable government and leave its development to the character of
the nation.
A basic postulate was that the citizenry would not, in the long
run, voluntarily act against its own interests. 26 Thus, Congress
was to be selected by the people-the House directly, the Senate
indirectly-and frequent elections were mandated. The bias
against governmental action was implemented by making legislation difficult to enact. Not only must a bill receive approval in the
House, it must also receive approval by the less representative
Senate. And even if the Senate does not guarantee protection of
any identifiable. interests, 27 its mere existence makes legislation
more difficult to enact. Thus, the Senate should preserve individthe staual freedom from governmental oppression by preserving
28
tus quo, as is also true of the presidential veto.
The question of the protection of minorities in less random
fashion than that provided by the Senate 2 9 and by presidential
veto30 provided more intractable problems, however. The solution
lay for the most part in the makeup of the House and in reliance on
the character of the nation. 31 By providing for a relatively large
H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON 176-84 (1977).
See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
H. COMMAGER, supra note 22, at 232-33; J. HowE, supra note 20, at 158-59.
In particular, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; art. III, § 2; art. rV, §§ 1, 2.
See, e.g., THE FEDERAIIST No. 55 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
27. Although the Senate, as a result of its structure, on occasion may act to protect minority rights, it does so in a completely random fashion determined
entirely by the fortuity of demographics. See R. DAM, supra note 17, at 11219.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. The difficulties with the presidential veto as a means of protecting minority
interests are, first, that it can only operate after Congress has affirmatively
acted; and, second, as the conditions calling for its use become more egregious, its exercise becomes politically more costly.
31. The method of electing the Senate was viewed as providing a further check
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legislative chamber with Representatives having a fairly small constituency, 32 conditions were created by which minority interests
would often be represented, either directly or indirectly. 33 The result is not a guarantee that the interests of minorities will be
respected, since their representatives can be outvoted. Rather, the
result is to provide minorities access to legislative deliberations. If
bills are proposed that would adversely affect the interests of a significant portion of a representative's constituency, he would be
able to argue for alternatives. Thus, one of the primary functions
of popular representation in the House is to provide a forum for
the expression of views where the representatives of those interests adversely affected by legislation could argue the unfairness of
the measure. 34 More importantly, however, the implicit assumption must have been that often those views would be accorded respect. The assumption must have been, in other words, that it
would be a significant check upon oppressive legislation to allow
its oppressive characteristics to be exposed in the deliberative
process. While minority views may be overridden at times, it appears that the Framers anticipated, or at least hoped, that our government would generally proceed on the basis of a search for
equitable resolutions of problems and conflicts in an atmosphere
35
charged with a philosophical bias against governmental activity
rather than solely on the basis of constituent self-interest narrowly
conceived.
Thus, the primary concerns of Madisonian theory appear to be
representativeness and access to the legislative process by all legitimate groups in order to minimize the chances of abusive legislation being enacted:3 6 concerns that were influenced by a healthy,

32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

on undesirable legislation. Given its longer terms of office, it would be in a
better position, politically, to kill hasty, ill-conceived legislation sparked by
the heat of the moment that further consideration would prove to be unwise.
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62, 63 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
Each Representative was to have a constituency of approximately 30,000 people. See THE FEDERALJST No. 56 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961). Some felt even that was too large. Id.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
For now it was not government seeking, usually in vain, to limit
and control the conflicting ingredients of the social order, but society
limiting government through 'charters of power granted by liberty.'
John Adams and Alexander Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris might
conjure up dangers from the people, but what the vast majority of
Americans feared was danger from government.
H. COMMAGER, supra note 22, at 212. See also J. HOWE, supranote 20, at 93-95.
There are many other concerns of lesser importance, of course, as a quick
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although not unabashed, respect for the citizenry.37 These same
concerns are woven throughout the mutations that democratic political theory has undergone over the past two centuries. In fact,
the primary distinguishing trait of the various phases through
which democratic political theory has passed is the view held of
the electorate. The roles of representativeness and access to the
legislative process have generally held their place, although the
view of the appropriate contours of those roles has varied somewhat. What has caused this variance is the dramatically different
views of the populace that have been held from time to time. The
progression of political theory from Madisonian concepts through
populism to elitism demonstrates this clearly.
The predominant tendency in democratic thought from the
time of Madison until the middle of this century was one of everincreasing confidence in the citizenry. The view of the "common
man," in the words of Professor Peter Bachrach, was that he "inherently was capable of good judgment and that his occasional
manifestations of irrationality and hostility toward the democratic
process were symptomatic of a malfunctioning society." 38
More important than the judgment, however, is its justification.
Events reaffirmed the faith of the liberal democrat. Especially in England and America, it was the great mass of people, first the middle and
then the working classes, who were the major force in extending democracy and constitutional liberties. In exerting continuous pressure for the
expansion of the franchise, they were instrumental in building the foundations of modern democratic constitutionalism .... And if the working
classes had not waged a long and bitter struggle for essential economic
and social reform, it is doubtful that even a remnant of constitutionalism
would have survived in the world today.... [I]t appeared... that Jefferson was basically right: that in the last analysis, it is the
mass of the peo39
ple, not the elite, who are the true guardian of liberty.

It appeared, in other words, as though the rhetoric of the
revolution was being translated into reality. The "common man"
reading of the Federalist Papers or the debates in the constitutional conventions makes abundantly clear.
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 14 (J. Madison), 49, 55, 63 (A. Hamilton or J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Each of the assertions in the text could be
qualified endlessly, of course. To paraphrase Prof. Dahl, there is no "View" of
the Founding Fathers; there are only 'vews." Moreover, there is no way of
knowing what to them was a substantive argument and what was political
rhetoric. Thus, if the text at times appears somewhat simplistic or idealized
at points, I have no defense except that my purpose here is broad outlines,
not a historical treatise on political ideas.
38. P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC EnrisM 27 (1967) (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). For examples of this perspective, see C. BECKER,
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1941); M. LERNER, IT Is LATER THAN You THINK (1943).
But see B. CRICK,AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLrrcs (1956).
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was proving more trustworthy than the "uncommon men" who
represented him. Talk of "representativeness" in this context
seemed to miss the point. To the extent our institutions were unrepresentative they were perceived as tyrannical, oppressive, or, at
the very least, engaged in a rearguard action to preserve the position of favored elites for as long as possible. 40 Similarly, the "people" seemed less inclined to abuse the interests of minorities than
was the government. Thus, the Democratic Populist saw the problem as one of furthering essentially the same interests of Madisonian theory-representation and protection of minority
interests-by increasing
the involvement of the citizenry in the
41
governmental process.
The faith of the Populist in the "common man" was sorely
tested, however, by developments in this century. The result was
the demise of the beneficent view of the man on the street as a
foundation for democratic thought. The rise of fascism in Italty
and Germany, as well as the atrocities of Stalinist Russia, began
the process of turning the political theorists from their faith in the
people. The rise of McCarthyism in America during a time of affluence apparently concluded it. Even if Hitler and Mussolini could
be explained, in part, as the result of unique historical forces, and
Russia's toleration of Stalin explained by her sad history of virtual
enslavement, McCarthyism could not be explained in a way consistent with populistic theory. Forthwith, democratic theory was
modified. No longer was the common man trumpeted as the protector of constitutional democracy. He was no longer viewed as
the solution but as the problem. 42
The result of the revised view of the populace 43 was the resur40. See C. BECKER, supra note 39.
41. Classical democratic theory also conceived of participation in civic affairs as
necessary to the full attainment of one's intellectual and moral capabilities.
Davis, Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatement of Democracy, 17 W. POL.
Q. 37 (1964); Duncan & Lukes, New Democracy, 2 POL. STUD. 156 (1963);
Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 Am. POL. SCL REV.'
285 (1966), at 458-62. This perspective goes at least as far back as J. S. MiLL,
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 203-05 (Everyman ed. 1975), cited in P. BACHRACH, supra note 38, at 3-4.
42. For an example of this shift in view, compare M. LERNER, supranote 39, with
M. LERNER, AMERICA AS CIVILIZATION (1957).

See also F. NEUMAN, THE DEMO-

AND AuTHORITARIAN STATE (1957). It is not at all clear, however, that
McCarthy drew most of his strength from the masses. See, e.g., M. ROGIN,
THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER (1967).
CRATIC

43.

All elite theories are founded on two basic assumptions: First, that
the masses are inherently incompetent, and second that they are, at
best, pliable, inert stuff or, at worst, aroused unruly creatures possessing an insatiable proclivity to undermine both culture and liberty.
P. BACHRACH, supra note 38, at 2.
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rection of elite theories of democracies. Harkening back to the
work of Mosca, 44 Pareto, 45 and the more recent work of
Schumpeter, 46 democratic theorists began to argue that democracy's only hope of survival was elite leadership. 47 The masses had
proven themselves uncommitted to democratic government; and if
any significant powers were placed in their hands, the result would
be to risk the destruction of democratic constitutionalism. 48 Thus,
the elite theorists urged that the role of the masses be limited to
choosing among competing elites for leadership positions. The
elites, in turn, would be expected to preserve democratic constituto it resulting from
tionalism due to their greater commitment
49
their greater understanding of it.
A number of serious problems with elite theory were soon perceived, however. Perhaps the most disturbing is that it is basically
unrealistic.5 0 Its conception of the the American electorate is remarkably wide of the mark, as are its twin notions of public opinion formation and the relationship between the masses and the
elites.5 1 There is another major difficulty as well-who are those
44. G. MoscA, THE RULNG CLASS (1896).
45. V. PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY (1883).
46. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SocIAusM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). See also H.
LAssWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
47. See, e.g., G. SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1962). For an account of this development, see P. BACHRACH, supra note 38.
48. See, e.g., T. DYE & L. ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY 14 (1975). The destruction was thought most likely to come from the rise of a demagogue,
which demonstrates the implicit influence of the Italian and German experience. See, e.g., G. SARTORI, supra note 47, at 102. See also Truman, The American System in Crisis, 74 PoL SCL Q. 481 (1959).
49. For a more detailed account of elite theory, see P. BACHRACH, supra note 38.
In discussing elite theory, normative judgments must be kept distinct from
empirical observations. Much of elite theory is premised on the view that, in
an ever more complex world, more and more decisions of necessity will have
to be made by specialists. As Suzanne Keller has said: "Itlhe democratic
ethos notwithstanding, men must become accustomed to bigger, more extensive and specialized elites in their midst as long as industrial societies keep
growing and becoming more specialized, and as the technical need for formal
organizations increases." S. KELLER, BEYOND THE RULING CLASS 71-72 (1963).
See generally C. MmLs, THE POWER ELITE (1956). See also P. BACHRACH,
supra note 38, at 1. Although Keller is surely correct, that does not dispose of
the issue of wider participation in decision-making when circumstances permit it.
50. See P. BACHRACH, supra note 38, at 62-63; Walker, supra note 41. For normative criticisms, see the authorities cited in Walker, supra note 41, at 457 n.17.
51. See § III of text infra. The discrepancy between theory and fact may result
from an insuperable barrier
The difference between government as reported by the political
scientist and government as it actually takes place is much like the
difference between learned descriptions of amour and amour itself.... Even more than the theoreticians of amour,who sometimes
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informed, beneficent elites who so magnanimously will act to preserve constitutional democracy? Unfortunately, there were, and
are, no obvious candidates for the position. Thus, elite theory began to toy with various schemes to correct the deficiency, ranging
from "intellectuals" arguing for intellectuals, "university professors" for university professors,5 2 to schemes so complex as to esa reconciliation between elite theory and its
sentially work
53
precursors.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, elite theory is helpful to this
analysis due to its conception of the system the elites were to preserve. It was not a system which primarily secured the interests of
the elites, as the cynic might think.5 4 Quite to the contrary, the
system that the elites were to protect is one which embraces the
primary goals of Madisonian theory. Elite accountability to the
masses at periodic elections, in order to preserve a rough congruence between governmental actions and the wishes of the people,
is an accepted tenet, although the elites are also viewed as having
the further burden of influencing public opinion through their dis55
cussions of the alternative policies available at the moment.
Still, the primary objective of elite theorists is the construction of a
system that is designed to resist the demands of the populace in
primarily one area-those demands that would lead to the destruction of democratic constitutionalism and toward the creation of a
totalitarian state. 56 Thus elite theory does not reject the basic
goals of Madisonian theory. Indeed, elite theory arose as a rehave the advantage of being tentative practitioners themselves, the
political scientist is at a disadvantage. . . . The terrain, clearly, belongs in the particular jurisdiction of someone else, as amour lies in
the jurisdiction of the poet or madman.
F. LUNDBERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH 514 (1968).
52. See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); C. MILLS, CAUSES
OF WORLD WAR THREE (1958); C. MILLS, SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959).
53.

See, e.g., R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); R. DAHL, supra
note 17; D. RICCI, COMMUNITY POWER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1971); A.

ROSE, THE POWER STRUCTURE (1967); P. TRUMAN, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN
CRISIS, in POLITICAL ELITES IN A DEMOCRACY (P. Bachrach ed. 1971).
54. It is difficult not to become skeptical. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
See also note 58 infra.
55. See, e.g., Plamenatz, Electoral Studies and DemocraticTheory, 6 PoL. STUD. 1
(1958). There are more extreme views occasionally expressed that suggest
utter contempt for the general populace. See, e.g., H. FERRY, ECONOMY UNDER
LAW 51-58 (1960). There are also those who are not concerned with representativeness and would prefer to see the elites immunized from mass influence
almost entirely. See, e.g., G. SARTORI, supra note 47, at 107-09.
56. See, e.g., W. KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY (1959). Apart from
the electoral process, the elites were to be kept in check by intra-elite competition, and by overlapping memberships. See, e.g., S. KELLER, supra note 49,
at 273-74 (1963); P. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 514 (1951). See generally R. DAHI, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
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sponse to perceived conditions that would undermine the political
institutions capable of achieving those ends. 57 Once again we see
political theory undergoing mutations in order to justify institutional arrangements designed to preserve a generally representative government that is dedicated to the equitable treatment of all
parties. 58
Characterizing the present mood of political theorists is difficult. It seems as though we are now either in a general phase of
reaction, where the assumptions of previous views are being questioned and where there is an emphasis on attempting to substantiate empirical assertions, 59 or we may be in a transition from older
theories to ones not yet formulated. Whatever the case, to my
knowledge our political theorists are not now engaged in the process of forsaking the primary goals of Madisonian theory.
Thus, throughout our history the concern for representation
and minority interests has remained fairly dominant as well as
fairy constant in our political thought. We cannot say in detail or
with certainty what we mean by the phrase "respect for minority
interests"--beyond the equally ambiguous notion of fairness.
There is widespread agreement that those words encapture a notion of political relationships that a civilized nation of the sort we
wish to live in must accommodate. This accommodation is
achieved primarily by guaranteeing that minority viewpoints have
access to governmental deliberations. Thus, "[a] central guiding
thread of American constitutional development has been the
evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some
crucial stage in the process of decisions. '60 At the same time, we
57. The "time-boundedness" of the theory has been noted in the literature. See,
e.g., Walker, A Reply to "FurtherReflections on 'the Elitist Theory of Democracy,"' 60 AM. PoL. SC. REV. 391 (1966). In fact, the progression of political
theory generally has been tied to perceived conditions of society, making it
less "theory" and more "reaction."
58. The thrust of elite theory is made clear not only by its adherents but also by
its critics, who argue that the result of elite decision-making is that the values
underlying policy choices are those of the elites rather than the populace.
See, e.g., T. DYE & L. ZEIGLER, supra note 48; E. GREENBERG, SERVING THE
FEW (1974); D. LOCKARD, THE PERVERTED PRIORITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS

(1971); F. LUNDBERG, supra note 51.
59. See generally R. AmACHER, R. ToLLSON & T. WILLET, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY (1976); P. BACHRACH, supra note 38; I. BELL, D.
EDWARDS & R. WAGNER, POLITICAL POWER (1969); H. HAHN, PEOPLE AND
PoLIrIcs IN URBAN SOCIETY (1972); N. LUTrBERG, PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC

PoLICY (1968); Pomper, From Confiusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968, 66 AM. POL. SCL REV. 415 (1972); Walker, supra note 41.
60. R. DAHL, supra note 17, at 137. The definition of "legitimate groups" assumes
major importance of course. See Gamson, Stable Unrepresentationin American Society, 12 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (No. 2) 15 (1967).
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have consistently believed that our government must proceed with
the consent of the governed; that "at a minimum ... democratic
theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary
citizens ex'61
ert a relatively high degree of control over leaders.
It is in this context that the national initiative must be placed.
In order to do so requires that we address two related considerations: first, how well does our present political structure meet our
fundamental goals; and second, what effect would a national initiative process have?
B.

The Unrepresentative Tendencies of the Federal Government

Congressional decision-making can be examined, and an initiative procedure justified, in either of two ways. One is to specify the
congressional policy choices that are inconsistent with the wishes
of at least a majority of the electorate. Alternatively, the forces
that tend to immunize representatives from the electoral process
can be isolated, with examples given of where undesirable results
may have occurred. The primary difference of the two approaches
is that the former looks to anti-majoritarian decisions and the latter to anti-majoritarian tendencies of government. If either analytical method results in the conclusion that Congress is
inappropriately unrepresentative, 6263 an initiative procedure could
conceivably correct the deficiency.
There are, however, a number of difficulties with the first
61. Id. at 3. See also J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 379, 683.
62. I have put aside for the moment the concern for protecting minority interests.
I return to that in § HI-B-5 of text infra.
63. There is a third, more structural, argument for a national initiative. The original conception of the federal government anticipated that it could be controlled effectively by the states:
The state governments will have the advantage of the federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence
which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in
them; to the predilection and probable support of the people; to the
disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of
each other.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The superior position of the states was a function of their claim to the
loyalty of their citizens; their greater financial and military strength, and certain structural aspects of the Constitution. The states directly controlled the
Senate through the appointment power, indirectly controlled the Presidency,
and probably had a significant influence on the House.
The original conception no longer is very accurate, however. But see
Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L.
REv.543 (1954). The Senate is now elected directly; the Presidency is now
elected in a way that almost eliminates the role of the states, and we can
argue over the view our Representatives have of their job description. Fur-
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method. It treats policy choices as tangible data existing only in
the present. Yet, what may appear as today's unrepresentative
law may simply be yesterday's best answer and tomorrow's repealed statute. 64 Furthermore, the fact that Congress may have
enacted a number of statutes that were ill-considered or inconsistent with the views of its constituency argues more for reconsideration of those statutes rather than institutional change. Only if
mistakes are endemic or if reconsideration is precluded is institutiorial change warranted as a means of reversing specific policies.
While I may risk being overly cautious in opting for the status
quo if it cannot be shown that errors are uncorrectible, 65 certainly
the argument for an initiative process is considerably strengthened if the reason for the pattern of errors is exposed, or if a strong
probability can be demonstrated that reconsideration of some policy choices is virtually precluded notwithstanding apparent public
opinion to the contrary. Accordingly, I will proceed by attempting
to isolate those forces at play in the political process that encourage, or at least permit, anti-majoritarian policies to be embraced by Congress. 66 Examples will be offered, quite tentatively,
thermore, the military and financial balance has swung tremendously in
favor of the central government.
As the ability of the states to contain the federal government was decreasing, the potential power of the central government was increasing. The Sixteenth Amendment was passed, allowing direct taxation. The Civil War
Amendments were enacted, laying the groundwork for a tremendous expansion of federal power; and the Commerce Clause was given an almost limitless reading. The dynamic, thus, was one of decreasing state power and
increasing federal power, and nothing arose to fill the void left by the decline
of the states. Another argument for the initiative is that it could fill that void.
64. R. DAHIt, supra note 17, at 52.
65. For a superb discussion of a similar problem in an unrelated area, see Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76
HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
66. Not surprisingly, many who have studied the representative process have
concluded that our institutions are generally responsive to their constituencies, although there are well-recognized exceptions. See Crane, Do Representatives Represent?,22 J. POL. 295 (1960); Crudde & McCrone, The Linkage
Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A
CausalModel, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 66 (1966); Froman, Inter-PartyConstituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior, 57 AM. PoL Sci. REV. 57
(1963); Ingram, The Impact of Constituency on the Processof Legislating,22
W. POL. Sci. Q. 265 (1969); Jones, Representationin Congress: The Case of the
House Agricultural Committee, 55 AM. POL Sci. REv. 358 (1961); Miller &
Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. PoL ScL REv. 45 (1963).
See generally A. DE GRAZIE, PuBUc AND REPUBUc-POUTICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (1951); J. HOGAN, ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION (1945);
Beard & Lewis, Representative Government in Evolution, 26 AM. Poi Sci.
REv. 223 (1932); Eulau, Wohlke, Buchanan & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observationson the Theory of Edmund Burke, 53
AM. PoL ScL REv. 742 (1959). See also R. SCAMMON & B. WATrENBERG, THE
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where these forces may have been effective. 67 The analysis will
require the examination of four areas: the methods used by Congress to read public opinion; 68 the role of special interests; 69 the
internal functioning of the legislative process; 7 0 and the functioning of the electoral process. 7 1 A final, somewhat paradoxical question must also be addressed--do these forces result in decisions
that we are willing to accept notwithstanding their unrepresentative character? 72
1. Public Opinion
Congress can be representative only if its members know the
wishes of their constituency. Ideally there would be a two-way
flow of communication between representative 73 and electorate.
In reality, there is very little communication, and what does occur
is quite often misleading.
The primary difficulty inhibiting accurate communication is the
size of congressional constituencies. They are much too large to
allow communication between a congressman and any significant
portion of his constituency.7 4 To the extent communication occurs,
it occurs between a representative and a very small group of persons; moreover, those who do communicate with congressmen are

67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

REAL MAJORrrY 15-16 (1971). Unfortunately, these studies are not entirely
satisfactory. They tend to look at relatively discreet issues and to limit the
inquiry to whether the voting record of a representative on these issues is
consistent with his constituency's views. The result of the limited scope of
these studies is that they field little on the broader issues of representativeness. Not much can be gleaned from them concerning such issues as to what
extent representatives attempt to convince their colleagues as compared to
simply voting on a measure; to what extent are there patterns of voting behavior in other areas of legislation; is the work product of Congress as a
whole instructive when compared to individual votes of congressmen; and
what of the proposals that never reach the floor to be voted on?
I will supplement the examples offered with citation of the results of various
public opinion polls. The limitations of that method of proceeding must be
clearly recognized. Most public opinion polls, for example, are too crude to
expose respondents' motivation, and generally no distinction is made between the voter and the nonvoter. More importantly, people are approached
and asked their views without forewarning, without time or reason to think
and deliberate.
See § fl-B-1 of text infra.
See § 1I-B-2 of text infra.
See § II-B-3 of text infra.
See § H-B-4 of text infra.
See § 11-B-5 of text infra.
"Representative" and "congressmen" will refer to members of both Houses of
Congress, unless it is clearly indicated to the contrary.
The smallest congressional district is Alaska, with a population of 300,000.
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION.
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not representative themselves. For example the upper-middle
class apparently composes the most significant group of correspondents, but that class is rarely the typical constituent.7 5 As a result,
divergent views and different perspectives may never reach our
representatives. And as Professor Blumer has said:
[I] n any realistic sense public opinion consists of the pattern of diverse
views and positions on the issue that came to the individuals who have to
act in response to public opinion. Public opinion ... which never came to
the attention of those who have to act on public opinion would be impotent and meaningless
as far as affecting the action or operation of society
76

is concerned.

Not only do our representatives have pressed upon them the
concerns and outlook of atypical electorates, 77 but unfortunately
very few congressmen do much to rectify the situation. A review
of the literature that is disgorged from congressional offices discloses little informational content, and much rhetoric, political
propaganda and self-serving statement, although there are some
notable exceptions. 78 Still, taken as a whole, the material is not
designed to spark intelligent communication between representative and constituent. Similarly, the attempts to elicit "voter reaction" that often accompany missives from Washington are
typically quite crude, their purpose often being to score political
79
points rather than to obtain information.
There is one other, closely related difficulty.-the communication blitz. On certain issues-an ever-increasing number, it
seems-congressmen are inundated with letters, telegraphs and
phone calls from small but cohesive groups.8 0 The desired effect of
75. S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 97-99 (1972). Such people are

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.

also more likely to vote. Id. Were that to be true in initiative elections, the
implemention of a national initiative would not provide a method of correcting congressional misapprehension of "public opinion". There are, however, other deficiencies in congressional law-making that an initiative process
could compensate for at least in part. See § II-B-2 to -5 of text infra.
Testimony before congressional committees also comes predominantly
from the higher social strata. Van Der Silk & Stinger, Citizen Witnesses
Before CongressionalCommittees, 92 Poi. SCL Q. 465, 467 (1977).
Blumer, Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling, 13 AM. Soc. REV. 542
(1948).
See Miller & Stokes, supra note 66, at 54.
A subjective evaluation to be sure, but one that is charitable, if anything. See
Hechler, Abuse of a Privilege, 222 THE NATION 339 (March 20, 1976); Under
Fire: FreeMailfor Congress,U.S. NEWS & Wonu REPORT, March 15, 1976, at
20. See also Comment, CongressionalPrerequisitesand Four Elections: The
Case of the Franking Privilege, 83 YALE L.J. 1055 (1974). The literature of
Jacob Javits of New York is a good example of one of the exceptions.
See Hechler, supra note 78.
See, e.g., J. CoRRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 362. The National Rifle
Association, various "right to life" groups, and the "Jewish lobby" are noted
examples.
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a communication blitz is to distort a representative's perception of
public opinion by inundating him with one particular perspective.
If there is no well-organized opponent to respond in kind, the letters and telegrams reaching Washington will predominate on one
side of an issue regardless of the actual state of public opinion. If,
on the other hand, there is an opponent, the input the representative receives may be more a function of organization than the actual state of public opinion. Furthermore, the more specific a
controversy becomes, as we move, for example, from whether women should receive equal treatment to whether the deadline for
the Equal Rights Amendment should be extended, the greater are
the chances of a communication blitz. Thus, as it becomes more
important for a representative to know his constituency's viewsas a vote gets nearer-the greater are the chances that he will receive a distorted perspective. 81
Our representatives are surely aware of these problems and
judge the content of their mail with some care. Moreover, there
are other ways by which representatives receive clues from the
public-reading newspapers and holding meetings in legislative
districts are two obvious examples. Nevertheless, that can only
partially correct for the fact that "the Representative knows his
constituents mostly from dealing with people who do write letters,
who will attend meetings, who have an interest in his legislative
stand."82 The views of those who do not write letters, who lack the
time to attend meetings, who do not have an expressed interest in
legislative positions, and those, I might add, who have an irrepresserious factors in a repsible distaste for politicans, simply are not
83
resentative's appraisal of public opinion.
There is, then, room for doubt about the accuracy of the communication between representative and constituency, 84 a condition that obviously facilitates the acceptance of anti-majoritarian
85
Moreover, there are other factors of that
policies by Congress.
86
well.
as
kind
81. See, e.g., The Swarming Lobbyists, TiME, Aug. 7, 1978, at 17-18, 21 [hereinafter
cited as The Swarming Lobbyists].
82. Miller & Stokes, supra note 66, at 54.
83. See, e.g., J. CORRY &H. ABRAHAm, supra note 12, at 398; Dexter, The Representative and His District,in NEW PERSPECTrVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 3, 11-14 (R. Peabody & N. Polsey ed. 1969). Miller & Stokes, supra note
66, at 56; Radin, PopularLegislationin California,23 MiNN.L. REV. 559 (1939).
84. For some empirical verification of that doubt, see A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE,
W. MILLER & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND THE POLInCAL ORDER 362-66 (1966).

85. Choper, The Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory
and Practice,122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 835-36 (1974).
86. There are two further complexities that deserve mention. I have assumed
that congressmen would credit each citizen's view equally. That is undoubtedly false. As Prof. Blumer has noted, the "public servant" has to assess
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2. The Effect of Organized Interest Lobbying
Lobbying has been one of our true growth industries over the
past twenty years. 87 When the federal government was fairly
small and relatively limited, there was little lobbying. As private
industry began to feed from the federal trough, more and more lobbying activity began to occur, as economists would expect. In the
words of Buchanan and Tullock, 88 as the public sector grows relative to the private, "the increased investment in organization
aimed at securing differential gains by political means is a predictable result."89 As the investments began to return dividends, other
types of organized interests were stimulated to send their own lobbyists to Washington. 90
The mere existence and spectacular growth of organized lobbying does not prove that lobbyists have an undesirable effect on legislative deliberations, of course. In fact, lobbyists clearly perform
several important functions. They often furnish very useful information that otherwise would be difficult to obtain, although it is
often a little biased.91 More importantly, they may help to fill the
information gap by providing a link between Congress and the
people back home.92 In light of these functions, and given the limitations of Congress, it is probably true that lobbying is "indispensable to law-making." 93 There is reason to suspect, however, that
despite the beneficial contributions of lobbying, it may also have
some untoward effects.
Lobbyists may well serve as a link between Congress and some
people back home, but not very many. As E. E. Schattschneider
has observed, "the flaw in the pluralists' heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent. Probably about
ninety per cent of the people cannot get into the pressure sys-

87.
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

what he hears, and "in this assessment consideration is given to expressions
only to the extent to which they are judged to 'count.'" Blumer, supra note
76, at 546.
Secondly, much of the public is unorganized, and have no spokesmen for
their views. This explains why it often appears that public opinion does not
"form" on many issues, although on occasion the appearance is accurate.
See, e.g., Erikson, Luttberg & Holloway, Knowing One'sDistrict: How Legislators PredictReferendum Voting, 19 Am. J. POL. SC. 231 (1975).
Single-Issue Politics, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1978, at 48-60 [hereinafter cited as
Single-Issue Politics]; The Swarming Lobbyists, supra note 81, at 14-15.
J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOc, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
Id. at 287.
See, New Breed of Lobbyists Plugfor Cities,States, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 4, 1978, at 39; Single-Issue Politics, supra note 87, at 48; The
Swarming Lobbyists, supra note 81, at 14.
See J. CoRRY & H. ABnReiin, supra note 12, at 361.
See Choper, supra note 85, at 844-46.
J. CoRuY & H. ABRAH"A, supra note 12, at 353.
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Moreover, the beautiful music of the "heavenly chorus" is

often accompanied by gifts of "kingly," if not "heavenly," value;
and often these gifts are given to those in a position to favor the
interests of the donor. A striking example is the campaign contributions of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Federation of American Hospitals made when legislation that would
have put a limit on the rise of hospital costs was being considered,
a bill that the AMA and the Federation did not favor. They contributed heavily to the members of the health subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee. The subcommittee bottled up
the bill and effectively killed it.95
It may be, of course, that the AMA and the Federation sincerely
believed that the members of the subcommittee were, on their
merits, deserving of campaign contributions. It may also be that
they thought that relatively large campaign contributions might influence the votes of the subcommittee members. I do not know
which of these alternatives more accurately reflects reality, but the
case of committee member, Omar Burlesen, certainly is troublesome. He has run unopposed in his last four elections, yet he received a campaign contributions of close to $10,000 from the AMA
and the Federation.9 6 A disinterested observer would be hard
pressed, I fear, not to conclude that this is an example of a special
interest trying to buy a congressman. Unfortunately, this is just
one of many examples that could be offered. 97 I do not know what
effect the contributions had on Burlesen or his colleagues, but the
entire incident creates an unfortunate impression. Unmistakably
may influthere is reason to suspect that campaign contributions
98
ence the outcome of legislative deliberations.
The sanguine view of special interest lobbying that is occasionally expressed, 99 in short, must be tempered. The purpose of lobbying is to further personal or organizational self-interest, not the
94. E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960). For more recent elaborations on this theme, see G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES
(1970); G. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967).

95. Cloherty, PublicFinancingSupported, Iowa City Press-Citizen, Oct. 28, 1978,
at 4A, col. 6. Obviously, what motivated the committee members is unknown.
96. Id.
97. See Clymer, Looking Out for the Folks Back Home-And Oneself, The N.Y.
Times, Mar. 5, 1978, § IV, at 3, col. 1. See also H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POuITICS 101-30 (1976); D. MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 41 n.63, 44 (1974).
98. For a journalistic account of the effect of lobbying, see R. WINrER-BERGER,
THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF (1972). See generally Herber, Special Interests
Gaining Power as Voter Disillusionment Grows, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1978, at 1, col. 1. But see H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN PoLITICS 137-64 (1972).
99. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 85, at 845.
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interests of the rest of us; 100 and what is lobbied for usually ends
up being financed by the rest of us. 1 1 It is not very surprising,
then, that the "average citizen, who has no one to lobby for him, is
angered by the ease with which organized interests maintain close
and intimate connection with government, and he comes to the
common sense conclusion that the practice would not be continued unless it pays dividends."'10 2 More importantly, it may very
well be true that
[i]n the face of observable pressure-group activity with its demonstrable
results on the outcome of specific issues presented and debated in legislative assemblies, that behavioral premise that calls for the legislator to follow a selfless pursuit of the 'public interest' or the 'general welfare' as
of and apart from private economic interest is sesomething independent
10 3
verely threatened.

If further study corroborates the common sense conclusion of
the average citizen and puts an end to the behavorial premise of
the political scientists, the case for a national initiative would be
considerably enhanced. An initiative procedure would provide a
method of limiting Congress' largesse by providing spending limitations. Moreover, a national initiative could possibly defuse the
effect of lobbying through regulation-something Congress has refused to do in any significant way. 104 Still, further study is needed,
but if we eventually conclude that organized interests play too
dominant a role in the legislative process and that Congress will
not limit that role of its own accord, a case will have been made for
seriously considering institutional reform designed to enhance the
accountability of the lawmaking process by enhancing the potential role of the citizen in it.
3. The Legislative Processin Operation
There need be no extended discussion of Congress' well known,
and generally applauded, capacity for inhibiting the passage of leg100. See, e.g., J. BucHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 88, at 241; J. CoRRY & H.
ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 348, 366-67.
101. For example, "[T]he largely unorganized consumer interests always pay for
the services that government provides for producer groups." J. CoRRY & H.
ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 348.
102. Id. To be sure, a number of self-styled "average-citizen," "consumer-oriented" lobbies have formed in recent years, but who they represent, and how
well, is not altogether clear. See, e.g., CarterDealt MajorDefeat on Consumer
Bill, 36 CONG. Q. Wm REP. 323 (Feb. 11, 1978).
103. J. BucHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 88, at 283.
104. Twice in the last three years Congress has defeated attempts at major reforms. The most recent attempt died in committee. The Swarming Lobbyists, supra note 81, at 14. See also, Lobby Disclosure Bill Near Death, 36
CONG. Q. WK. REP.1918 (July 29, 1978); Time Ran Outfor Lobby Revision Bill,
32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 477 (1976).
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islation 0 5 It is deserving of mention, however, that as more and
more laws are placed on the books, the less laudable it is that Congress is structured to inhibit legislation. Whereas originally that
meant that government could not easily meddle in private affairs,
it is coming more and more to mean that government cannot easily
be prevented from continuing its meddlesome behavior. Still, on
balance, the "negative bias" of Congress probably remains beneficial. There are, however, other aspects of the legislative process
that may have undesirable consequences, and the role of committees is the most important.
The congressional legislative process is dominated by the committee system, a method of organization that has many commendable features. It provides, for example, built-in organization and
also stimulates the development of legislative expertise. Nonetheless, the committee system has its drawbacks. It is largely in the
committees that the crucial decisions are made, and Congress does
not frequently change what a committee has done. 106 That may be
a necessary concession to expediency, but it also means that most
important decisions are being made by very small groups of very
unrepresentative individuals. 107 As a result "the representative
character of deliberations on lawmaking is greatly impaired."'10 8
There are two further undesirable consequences of the committee system. First, the system develops powerful people-predominantly committee chairmen-who need to be appeased. The
appeasement comes in the form of favored treatment by other congressmen and by other governmental agencies. An example of the
former is the role Wayne Hayes played before his exit from Washington. 0 9 A good example of the latter is the Pentagon's practice
of channeling expenditures into the districts of key representatives who vote on its budget. 11o The consequences are that congressmen do not possess equal power or influence and that
benefits are weighed in favor of the powerful, a result not easily
reconcilable with basic notions of representative government."'
105. Choper, supra note 85.
106. See J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 499-501; L. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL PoLrrIcs 237 (1973).
107. R. SHERRILL, WHY THEY CALL IT PoLIcs 87-88 (1972).
108. J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 501.
109. See, The Liz Ray Reform Kit, TIME, July 5, 1976; DemocraticCaucus Approves
Reform, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1976, at 1, col. 2. The Democratic Party did respond to the Wayne Hayes affair with an attempt at reform. Id.
110. Amacher, Tollison & Willett, Risk Avoidance and Political Advertising: Neglected Issues in the Literatureon Budget Size in a Democracy, in THE ECoNOMIC APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY 405, 423 (R. Amacher, R. Tollison & T.
Willett ed. (1976)); Clymer, supra note 97.
111. There have been a number of congressional reforms recently. See, e.g., Hopkins, CongressionalReform Advances in the Ninety-Third Congress,60 A.B.A.
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Moreover, the budgets and programs of the government are voted
on in committee primarily by individuals who have gained much
politically and stand to gain more from those programs, creating
obvious conflicts of interest.
The second undesirable effect of the committee system is that
Congress tends to view problems as singular issues l 2 Thus, there
is rarely a look at the broader concerns-Congress lacks "broad
issue" committees or subcommittees-that might emerge from the
simultaneous but mutually oblivious operation of separate committees."1 3 The most obvious potential problem here is the budget.
Most decisions are made on discrete spending proposals and little
concern is expressed for the overall financial impact of the accumulation of the discrete programs." 4 The overlapping, inefficient jurisdictions of federal agencies and the haphazard way
some
115
major legislative initiatives proceed are other examples.
Apart from the committee system, there is one final point concerning the legislative process that deserves mention-the role of
political parties. Like committees, political parties serve important
functions, 1 16 and it is difficult to see how we could function without
them. Still, in the deliberative process that ought to be the heart of
lawmaking, parties can be disruptive on occasion, and at times
counter-productive. As Professors Corry and Abraham have described the problem: "the psychological atmosphere . . .generated [by political parties] is one of struggle, and when the parties
are freely deployed in the legislature they tend to contest every
inch of ground, whether or not truth and the public interest are at
stake." 1 7 Others have concluded that political parties result in too
much power in hands that are too parochial, resulting in compromises that favor minority over majority interests. 118

117.

J. 47 (Jan. 1974); Senate Approves Committee Changes, 35 CONG. Q. Wx. REP.
279 (Feb. 4, 1977). They do not appear to have changed things very much for
the better, however. See Clymer, supra note 97; Democrats Still Arguing
Over Party Caucus Role on LegislativeIssues, 36 CONG. Q. WI. REP. 868 (Apr.
8, 1978).
J. CoRaY & H. ABRAHAm, supra note 12, at 501.
But see note 148 infra.
D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 128. See also text accompanying note 150 infra.
See S. BAILEY, CONGRESS IN THE SEVENTIES 59 (1970); W. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 26-27 (1969); L. REISELBACK, CONGRESSIONAL PoLIcS 8081 (1973). See also, FederalRegulations: Catch-22for Business, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1979, at 60; Greer, Civil War Among the FederalAgencies, BARRISTER, Fall, 1978, at 8.
See generally V. 0. KEY, JR., PoIrIcs, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1958).
See also Jaros & Mason, Party Choice and Supportfor Demagogues: An ExperimentalExamination,63 AM. POL Sci. REv. 100 (1969).
J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 497.

118.

See, e.g., S. BAILEY, THE CONDITIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES

112.
113.
114.
115.

116.

(1955).
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The criticisms of the role of political parties are somewhat suspect because of their time-boundedness. When Southern Democrats dominated Congress, unmistakably minority interests were
favored, but that is no longer the case. 119 Similarly, it is difficult to
give recent examples of party squabbles impeding beneficial legislation, although certainly some would argue that the Labor Reform
Bill filibuster is a good example. Nonetheless, the conditions that
generated these criticisms could recur, and thus we should take
note that conceivably anti-majoritarian forces may emanate from
the political parties. 120 When this possibility is conjoined with the
other potential anti-majoritarian aspects of Congress already discussed, it becomes clear that the legislative process may frequently operate in an unacceptable fashion. This gives sustenance
to the view that change may be in order, although again more work
is in order before final judgment should be reached. Still, should
further study yield the firm conclusion that the legislative process
suffers from the disabilities discussed here and that Congress is
unwilling or unable to rectify the situation, an initiative process
may emerge as an attractive solution. By allowing laws to be enacted without subjecting them to the legislative process, the initiative procedure provides a method of circumventing the
undesirable aspects of congressional lawmaking. Of course, initiatives also lack some of the positive aspects of the legislative process. Whether on balance that results in a net gain or loss is an
issue that must be considered. Before doing so, however, there is
one final matter that deserves discussion.
4.

2l
Congress: The Electoral Connection'

I realize that an impartial observer could easily think at this
point that not much of a case for institutional reform has yet been
made, even if further research irrefutably establishes all of the potential limitations of the legislative process discussed previously,
because the traditional solution-vote the bums out-should be
sufficient for all the problems so far presented. If Congress is misreading our views, we can send different congressmen to Washington who better understand our positions. If our representatives
have been too cozy with organized interests, we can replace them
119. See Sherrill, Congress Now Reformed: How Much Better Is It?, The Des
Moines Register, Jan. 7, 1979, at 1-B, col. 1.
120. Moreover, the decline in political parties may be partially responsible for the
increasing difficulties caused by single-interest politics, although it is difficult
to determine which is cause and which is effect. See text accompanying
notes 160-62 infra.
121. I have borrowed the title for this section from the book of the same name by
David Mayhew, supra note 97, in honor of the debt that I owe to his analysis.
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with individuals of greater integrity. If our representatives have
been unwilling to change the undesirable internal mechanisms of
Congress, we can elect people who are committed to doing So.122
Unfortunately, however, the electoral process may not be sufficient
for the task.
The primary difficulty is that very rarely will a constituency regard their legislator as being "wrong" on every important issue.
Life is too complex to permit such a case to arise with any frequency, although occasionally a single issue will dominate an election. Thus, the task of the voter is not to decide whether a
representative is "right" or "wrong" in his views. The voter must
choose among imperfect alternatives by weighing areas of agreement with those of disagreement. Invariably the candidate voted
for will disagree with the voter on certain issues that are, at the
least, annoying to the voter. In fact, there may be disagreement on
major issues. The complexities of our society make it not at all
unlikely "for a resounding majority of voters to elect a candidate
23
all of whose policies are the first choice of only a minority."'
The limitations of the electoral process go far beyond this, however. Serious problems beset the voter in that most issues that
their representative will face will not be examined during the campaigns. As Professor Choper points out, "the specific details of
most solutions ultimately passed upon by the legislature cannot
24
. . . be in the minds of the voters at the time of the election.'
Many, perhaps most, of the problems a representative will face are
either unknown or only dimly perceived at election time, while still
others are deliberately avoided by the candidates. 125 It is not only
not surprising, then, but downright laudable that the citizenry
often seems to base its judgment on more subjective factors than
articulated positions on selected issues. While those positions are
helpful, they typically cover a very limited range, and resort must
be had to more subjective criteria in order to attempt to fill in the
enormous gaps in knowledge.
The electoral process, in short, can do little to modify the manyfaceted existence we now pursue. Perhaps at one time issues were
so obvious, so limited, and so few, and positions so clearly delineated, that elections could serve as direct referenda, but that is not
true today. Presently, there is very little reason to believe that
elections can or will "provide much insurance that decisions will
122.
123.
124.
125.

See, e.g., J. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 39.
R. DAHi, supra note 17, at 128.
Choper, supra note 85, at 834.
For a commentary on a recent election of this sort, see Flansburg, Near MudSlinging in Senate Race, The Des Moines Register, Oct. 29, 1978, at 2-B, col. 1.
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26
accord with the preferences of a majority of adult voters."'
Reliance on the electoral process to provide governmental accountability suffers from other infirmities as well. It assumes that
reasonable opposition candidates can be found and thus ignores
the fact that congressional candidates may compose a fairly
homogenious group. 127 To the extent that the characteristics of
of a
these individuals transcend ideological bounds, the chances
28
Simivoter having a clear choice on election day are reduced.
larly, the nominating process is often under the domination of a
few members of political parties. 129 Thus, a discontented populace
cannot always affect who runs unless it is willing to take over the
parties or form new ones, and it is unrealistic to expect unpaid pri130
vate citizens to engage in such pursuits on any significant scale.
Thus, what the citizenry gets may not at all be what it would prefer, both because of who is willing to run for office and who the
political parties are willing to support, aspects of our political process that obviously tend to diminish governmental accountability to
the electorate.
Once an individual is elected, other pressures assert themselves that may further immunize certain policy choices from the
electoral process. At the crudest level, crass self-interest has the
potential to affect every individual elected to Congress. Thus, we
have the Speaker of the House using a huge self-inflicted pay increase for members of Congress as an example of how on occasion
the good of the nation requires Congress to act inconsistently with
the will of the people. 13' There are, periodically, other more contemptible examples of direct conflicts of interest. Such practices

126. R. DAiL, supra note 17, at 131.
127. Certainly the ones elected are fairly homogenious. In the 94th & 95th Congresses, for example, there were very few women (19 and 17, respectively),
very few minorities (e.g., 17 blacks), too many lawyers (288 and 291), too
many veterans of the Armed Forces (380 in the 94th Congress), and too many
Ivy Leaguers (95 and 92). This information can be gleaned from the Congressional Directories of the 94th and 95th Congresses. Things may be changing,
however. See Roberts, Senate's New Class Reflects Changing PoliticalStandards,N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1978, at A18 col. 1. See also 37 CONG. Q. WK. REP.
43 (Jan. 13, 1979).
128. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 118 n.73; Van Hoffman, Just One Word
for Congress-Typical,The Daily Iowan, Sept. 13, 1978, at 4. For a quaint view
of the qualifications of our representatives, see Campbell, The Initiative and
Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REv. 427, 435 (1912).
129. T. DYE & L. ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY 251 (1975); F. SORAUF, PARTY
PoIaTIcs IN AMERICA 79-80 (1972).
130. Qualifying initiatives and conducting campaigns take time and effort also, of
course. But the investment in a single initiative campaign is surely less that
is required to take our existing political parties.
131. Peoples' Will Ignored on Raise, Buffalo Courier Express, Feb. 2, 1977, at 1, col.
6.
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are, thankfully, of limited effect; the Republic will not fall because
some congressmen may attempt to line their pockets at the expense of the rest of us, although I must say the problem is still
quite annoying. 132 Unfortunately, crude financial self-interest is
not the only nor the most important force at play that may immunize representatives from the electoral process. And although
these other forces also may not cause cracks in the Republic's
foundation, they are much more troublesome than the proclivity to
self-enrichment that some of our representatives occasionally exhibit.
The most important of the remaining immunizing tendencies of
our political system appears at first blush to be internally inconsistent. One of the most serious deficiencies in the legislative process
stems from the fact that congressmen generally wish to be reelected to office. 13 3 One would think that a desire for reelection
would encourage representatives to act consistently with the
wishes of their districts, and to a large extent it does. 3 4 Nonetheless, the desire for reelection affects the manner in which congressmen approach their tasks, and that approach is in some
respects unsatisfactory. As David Mayhew has demonstrated, the
desire for reelection has two primary regrettable consequences-it
and in encouraging posturing
results in a quest for credit-claiming
135
instead of action by congressmen.
Many of our representatives apparently believe that the furnishing of particularized benefits, like jobs or support to local institutions, impresses the voters and is a prime factor in guaranteeing
reelection. As a result, much congressional activity appears to be
an endless quest for particularized benefits for which representatives can take credit. Consequently, congressional decision-making often appears to be perverted by a "strong tendency to wrap
policies in packages that are salable as particularized benefits" to
132. See, e.g., R. SHERRILL, supra note 107, at 96-105. See generallyAmacher, Tollison & Wfllet, supra note 110. Representatives responding to self-interest is
nothing new, of course. See, e.g., D. WILCOX, supra note 5 at 293. See also,
Federal Waste; The 50-Billion-DollarRathole, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Sept. 18, 1978, at 29.
133. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 14. We now appear to be more in a
period of transition than when Mayhew wrote. See CONG. Q. WK. REP. 19
(Jan. 1, 1977); CONG. Q. GUIDE TO CONG. 1523-29 (1975). But see Fenno, U.S.
House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration,71 Am. POL. Sc.
REV. 883 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 85, at 835, 836.
135. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 57-59. See generally Fiorini, The Case of the
Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 177
(1977). And it is not inconceivable that some congressional behavior is motivated by the desire to help campaign benefactors. See text accompanying
notes 95-99 supra.
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the people back home. 136 The tendency is so strong that Congress
often gives "a7 particularistic cast to matters that do not obviously
3
require it.'
The most disturbing consequence emanating from Congress'
enthusiasm for credit-claiming is that rarely does Congress seem
concerned with the financial impact of its various projects; 38 the
only serious concern is with the distribution of benefits. 39 Furthermore, there will tend to be undue investment in programs
financed from general revenues that specifically benefit discrete
groups, since the "benefits are highly visible to the beneficiaries
40
whereas costs are not so visible to the general taxpayer."'
The other major consequence of the desire for reelection-posturing-does not facilitate the subjugation of majority interests to
those of minorities nearly as much as the desire for credit-claiming, but it does provide further evidence of the limitations in the
electoral process.
Apart from attempting to secure particularized benefits, the primary concern of many congressmen often seems to be the taking
of positions solely for the purpose of home consumption. Although
there obviously are numerous exceptions, many congressman apparently mobilize support for their views on many bills only if
"somebody of consequence is watching, [or] when there is credit
to be gained for legislative maneuvers.' 4 1 As Professor Mayhew
has said, "[m]embers in both houses seem to offer a lot of floor
amendments with nothing accompanying them except
speeches."'142
Congressmen may be right, that as long as particularized benefits are not in the offing, taking a position is more important than
winning or losing on the vote, but that merely demonstrates the
difficulty the voter faces when evaluating the performance of his
136. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 127. See also Dexter, Congress and the Making
of Military Policy, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
175 (R. Peabody & N. Palsby ed., 2d ed. 1969).
137. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 128.
138. See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 132; Unending Tale of
Fraud,Waste in Government, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2, 1978, at 66.
139. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 128. See also R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); J. MANLEY, THE POLITICS OF FINANCE (1970).

140. B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 318 (1965). See, e.g., Burton, The 1976Amendments to the Fishermen's Protective Agency, 71 AM. J. INT. L. 740 (1977).
Shrimp eaters will be happy to hear that the Fishermen's Protective Act has
been expanded by the Antarctic Convention Act of 1978, § 14, 22 U.S.C. 1971.
141. J. KIRBY, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 9 (1970) quoting a "senior Congressman": "All we need do is be present for votes, introduce bills without
necessarily pressing them forward, and issue frequent press releases." D.
MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 115.
142. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 119.
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congressman. After all, "[a] congressman can hardly be blamed if
there are not enough right thinking members around to allow him
to carry his motions. He's fighting the good fight."'1 4 3 A representative certainly cannot be blamed for the refusal of others to act.144
He cannot be blamed, that is, as long as the "good fight" is honestly
fought and not done just for show. Yet, consider the difficulty of
determining which is the case. It would require a detailed study of
time spent, arguments made and bargaining done on each bill.
Even if serious inquiry was attempted, if posturing is as dear to
our representatives as it sometimes appears, most likely congressmen would simply supplement floor speeches with committee testimony and, perhaps, informal accounts of purported back room
bargaining. It would be, in short, difficult to determine when congressmen were acting sincerely instead of just acting.
The extent to which Congress as a whole is influenced by the
collective desires of its membership for credit-claiming and posturing is quite clear. As Professor Mayhew has summarized the situation:
[T] he organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs
of its members ....
[I] f a group of planners sat down and tried to design a
pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving the members' electoral needs year
in and year out, they would be hard pressed to
145
improve on what exists.

The committee system permits members to specialize and thus
claim credit for the matters dealt with by the committee. 146 As a
supplement to the committee system, Congress collectively acts
out of a sense of universalism-which crudely put, means that they
spread the goodies around, and which has "the appearance of 47a
cross-party conspiracy among incumbents to keep their jobs."'
The actual working of this spirit is illustrated by a member of the
House Public Works Committee when he said:
[There is] a rule on the committee, it's not a rule of the Committee, it's not
written down or anything, but it's just the way we do things. Any time any
member of the Committee wants something, or wants to get a bill out, we
get it out for him ....
Makes no difference-Republican
or Democrat. We
14 8
are all Americans when it comes to that.
143. Id. at 117.
144. This tends to explain why "we love our congressmen" but "we do not love our
Congress" id. at 164, and why congressmen tend to "run for Congress by running againstCongress," id. at 145 n.130 (quoting Richard Fenno). See also
Fenno, supra note 133, at 914.
145. D. MAYHEw, supra note 97, at 81-82.
146. Id. at 59.
147. Id. at 105.
148. Id. at 90, citing Murphy, Partisanship and the House Public Works Committee (paper presented to American Political Science Association, 1968). See
also B. BARRY, supra note 140; Amacher, Tollison & Willet, supra note 110, at
412.
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The rule may not be "written down or anything," but that does not
stop it from being enforced, and representatives who violate its implicit commands-in either House-run the risk of being penalized. When, for example, Senator James Buckley of New York
attempted to stop forty-four public works projects in committee,
his amendments except those
the committee voted against all of
1 49
eliminating projects in New York.
Not only are defectors from the "cult of universalism" sanctioned, but most disturbing of all, the "cross-party conspiracy" is
often fed by deficit financing which provides Congress with nearly
inexhaustible financial resources (viewed from its perspective) to
satisfy the congressional appetite for electoral advantage. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that Congress' recent reassertion of control over the budgetary process has had any effect
other than facilitating the particularistic tendencies of Congress.
It has not acted to restrain Congress but merely to shift the balance of power between Congress and the Executive. 15 0
An unwritten rule also protects congressional posturing: congressmen are not to engage in personal attacks on one another.15 1
And "[a] s long as congressmen do not attack each other ... any
cause without inmember can champion the most extraordinary
52
conveniencing any of his colleagues.'
The protection given to posturing can be seen in two other practices-one formal, the other informal. The formal practice concerns the Congressional Record. As Professor Mayhew has

149.
150.

151.
152.

The House Appropriations Committee and the Ways and Means Committee may tend to inhibit the House's unlimited desire to spread benefits
around. Id. at 154-58. Presidential veto also may limit Congress's tendencies.
See, e.g., Carter's"Pork Barrel" War With Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1978, at 72. The House Rules Committee has acted to inhibit
legislation coming to the floor in the past, but it is not doing so presently.
See, e.g., Sherrill, supra.note 119.
Reeves, Isn't It Time We Had a Senator?, NEW YORK, Feb. 25, 1974, at 38. See
also J. KIRBY, supra note 142, at 18.
Budget ProcessAssessed, 36 CONG. Q. WK. REP. 103 (Jan. 21, 1978). Compare
Cameron, Waking Up to the Budget Menace, FORTUNE, July 3, 1978, at 50, with
Everyone's Wild Over Alice, TIME, July 18, 1977, at 66. See also Budget Committee at the Center of Crucial 1979 Policy Fight, 37 CONG. Q. WK.REP. 11
(1979). For general discussions of the budget process, see Amacher, Tollison
& Willet, supra note 110, at 406-10; D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 142.
Again, transgressors are sanctioned. See J. KIRBY, supra note 142, at 16-17.
D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 82-83. See generally D. MATrHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD (1960). See also C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN 16-17
(1963). Exemplitive are the senatorial campaigns of James Vardaman that
called for the repeal of the 15th Amendment. As V.0. Key, Jr., has said, it was
"an utterly hopeless proposal and for that reason an ideal campaign issue."
V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN PoLrTicS 232 (1942). Attacks are permitted "on the issues," of course, which can be mutually beneficial if constituencies differ. D.
MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 83 n.2.
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observed: "the Congressional Record is largely a series of disjointed insertions prepared for the eyes of relevant political actors,
5 3
with each member enjoying final editing rights on his material."'
The informal practice, again quoting Professor Mayhew, is that on
"[a] controversial issue a Capitol Hill office normally prepares two
form letters to send out to constituent letter writers---one
for the
u5 4
If inpros and one (not directly contradictory) for the antis.'
structions on this form of posturing
are
needed,
they
are
available
55
from political professionals.
In addition to credit-claiming and posturing, there are a number
of other factors that facilitate Congress acting in a less than ideal
fashion. For example, the existence of the federal bureaucracy
provides support for congressional posturing by providing a convenient scapegoat. Individual congressmen may argue that their lack
of success on a particular issue was due to the bureaucratic system, placing it beyond their immediate control. The creation of bureaucracies also allows Congress to serve symbolic needs-a first
cousin of posturing, if indeed there is any difference at all-even
though there is little concern for actual results. Thus, for example,
"when water pollution became an issue, it was more or less predictable that Congress would pass a law characterized as an antipollution act, that the law would take the form of a grant program
56
for localities, and that it would not achieve its proclaimed end."'
Moreover, the case of water pollution is not an isolated example.
The history of bureaucratic regulation in the United States is characterized by vague, rhetorical goals that often go unfulfilled, l5 7 a
condition Congress is apparently willing to accept 5 8 and which
lends support to the view that often the primary purpose of the
entire scenario is political consumption. 5 9
A final factor that tends to dimish the importance of the electoral process as a means of ensuring accountability in government is
the consequences of single-issue politics. There are certain issues
upon which Congress seems unwilling to act, notwithstanding
strong popular sentiment to the contrary. The best known exam153. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 83.

154. Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
155. D. TACHERON & M. UDALL, THE JOB OF THE CONGRESSMAN 73-74 (1966).

But see

Fenno, supra note 133, at 914.
156. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 134 (footnotes omitted). See also Sherrill,
supra note 119.
157. For studies of the phenomenon of regulation, see D. MAYHEW, supra note 97,
at 135 n.113.
158. Id. at 134-35.
159. A problem at least tangentially related to the growth of bureaucracies is the
growth of legislative staffs. See Reston, Have Congressional Staffs Become
"an Unelected Legislature"?,Des Moines Register, Jan 16, 1978, at 7-A.
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ple is gun control, where the conventional wisdom is that the National Rifle Association has largely been responsible for inhibiting
national gun control legislation in the face of large majorities who
apparently favor national regulation of firearms. 160 Unfortunately,
there is reason to believe that "single-issue politics" is increasingly
prevalent on our political landscape, and is an increasingly troublesome issue due to its disproportionate impact on the political
161
process.
The power of a single-issue group stems from its apparent willingness to vote in a block against any official who violates its
norms. If the great majority of individuals who disagree with any
group's norms are not similarly blinded to all other issues, the cohesive group possesses great leverage. Since the votes of the rest
of the populace will be distributed among the candidates on the
basis of many other issues, the group may be able to swing an election by its members voting fairly uniformly. Accordingly, a candidate cannot risk alienating such a group unless his opponent has
already done so. The result is that candidates generally take care
not to offend cohesive groups that are unopposed by equally cohesive antagonists. Consequently, these groups may gain a veto
that, although limited in
power over the actions of government 162
scope, is out of proportion to their size.
There are other factors that could be addressed that tend to immunize the government from popular influence, 163 but the point
has been sufficiently explored for the present. That point is, of
course, that there is good reason to suspect that the idealized conception of the electoral process as ensuring a close congruence between the will of the electorate and the policy choices of the
government may need serious qualification. What remains to be
See, e.g., THE GALLuP OPINION INDEx, Nov. 1974 (113) at 12. Seventy-two percent of those polled favored the registration of all firearms; The Swarming
Lobbyists, supra note 81, at 22. A proposal to ban handguns in Massachusetts was defeated in 1976.
161. Hearings,supra note 1, at 457. See Broder, Are One Issue Advocates Killing
Party Politics?,Des Moines Register, Sept. 13, 1978, at 8A; Flansburg, SingleIssue Groups; Pols Who Have It Both Ways, Des Moines Register, Oct. 5, 1978,
at 13A, col. 1; Lewis, A Singular Issue, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1978, at A27,
col. 5; Stone, Whose Interests Come First?,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug.
21, 1978, at 88; Trippett, The Menace of FanaticFactions,TIME, Oct. 23, 1978, at
73.
162. See generally D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 130-31.
163. An important factor, is the electoral advantage of the incumbency. See generally Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in CongressionalElections, 71
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 166 (1977); Kostroski, Party and Incumbency in Postwar
Senate Elections, 67 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 1213 (1973). Another, less closely related one, is the severe limitations on taxpayer suits. See generally Lappas,
Taxpayer Standing in the Wake ofFlast v. Cohen, 81 DIcK. L REV. 495 (1977).
160.
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discussed, then, is whether most of us would view the substance of
that qualification, assuming it to be accurate, as beneficial.
5. The Nature of CongressionalUnrepresentativeness
Anti-majoritarian biases are not necessarily to be regretted.
There are certain values that we cherish more dearly than
majoritarian law-making-such as respect and tolerance for minority interests and views-and to the extent these values are served
by anti-majoritarian tendencies of government, these tendencies
are to be applauded. The question here is whether Congress' antimajoritarianism is of the sort, on balance, that we are willing to
accept-whether, in other words, the beneficial aspects of congressional unrepresentativeness outweigh the objectionable. That is a
question much easier to pose than to resolve. Much of what may
be objectionable in Congress' behavior has already been discussed, but I have neither the space nor the expertise to place all
of the relevant workproduct of Congress into its proper context
and then analyze it from the perspective of its beneficial anti-majoritarianism. Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that can
be addressed that will at least be helpful in this regard. Before
proceeding, however, there is one difficulty that must be faced at
the outset. Many of the values we hold dear are already insulated
from legislative action by the Constitution. Thus, we must address
those issues on which a sufficient consensus has not emerged to
justify "constitutionalizing" them. One very instructive issue of
that kind is the protection of civil rights that goes beyond explicit
constitutional provisions.
It seems fairly clear that the civil rights legislation that
emerged from Washington in the middle-sixties is not an example
of a wise, beneficent government leading the way-at least not a
wise, beneficient Congress. Rather, the evidence strongly suggests
that Congress was reacting to its perception of the country's mood
following the Democratic landslide of 1964 that kept Lyndon Johnson in the White House and put a solid Democratic majority in
Congress. The public opinion polls, for example, demonstrated
1
strong support for the 1964 civil rights legislation. 6 Similarly, the
only recent Congress to receive a favorable rating from a majority
of the populace is the one responsible for enacting President Johnson's programs, 165 all the more impressive in light of the fact that
164. D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 31. By January, 1964, 61% of those polled expressed support for a public accommodations bill. G. GALUP, 3 THE GALLUP
POLL 1863 (1972); see also id. at 1827, 1837.
supra note 107, at 87. The favorable rating diid not stop Republi165. R. SHERRnm,
cans from making the traditional opposition party gains in the 1966 elections.
See D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 31.
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a favorable rating from as much as
rarely does Congress receive
166
one-third of the population.
Most impressive of all, though, is that the refusal of Congress in
the late-sixties and early-seventies to repeal many of the advances
made a few years earlier cannot easily be attributed to Congress
resisting reactionary pressures from a fickle populace. The latesixties was unmistakably a time of "white backlash"-a time when
white America thought that minorities were not only asking for too
much, too quickly, but also that they were one of the primary
causes of the lawlessness of the times. This was especially true of
the riots in the major cities.' 67 At the same time, however, a large
majority agreed that "America has discriminated against Negroes
for too long,"' 68 nearly two-thirds of the population felt that
"[u]ntil there is justice for minorities, there will not be law and
order,"'169 and over two-thirds indicated that if their "party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a Negro"' 7 0 that they would vote for him.' 7 ' Although
it is difficult to know for sure, I suspect that attitudes of this sort
rather than congressional beneficence explain Congress' failure to
cut back significantly on the civil rights legislation and also probably explain the absence of any broadly based, grass-roots move-

ment to do So.172

That Congress was led by the emergent national concern for
civil rights rather than having led it is also supported by the studies of constituency influence on Congress. The evidence we have
indicates that the votes of individual representatives on civil rights
issues are greatly influenced by the views of their constituencies.' 73 In fact, I have been unable to find any recent literature that
seems
casts doubt upon this conclusion, and congressional action
1 74
consistently to reflect public opinion on these issues.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

R. SHERRILL, supra note 107, at 87.
See, e.g., R. SCAMMON & B. WArrENBERG, supra note 66, at 94-97.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
The percentage keeps increasing. See Gallup, 77% Say They'd Vote for Black
for President,Des Moines Sunday Register, Aug. 27, 1978, at 1. See also Gallup, PollFinds Sex, Race, FaithMatter Little to Voters, Des Moines Register,
Sept. 21, 1978, at 14A.
172. For another indication of a continuing decline in explicit racist views, see
Gallup, Poll Finds Huge Change in Favor of Mixed Marriages,Des Moines
Register, Aug. 28, 1978, at 2-B.
173. Miller & Stokes, supra note 66. One area in which Representatives are not
greatly influenced by constituent views is foreign affairs, where Congress typically defers to the Presidency. Id.
174. Recent events are also consistent with that conclusion. For example, in 1974,
a Gallup poll found that 66% of those polled felt the federal government,
"should not reduce spending for social programs such as health, education
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The close correlation between congressional action and the
views of the nation on civil rights, which also appears to be the
case on matters of social and economic welfare, 75 that may dispose of these areas as possible bastions of acceptable anti-majoritarianism, is also evident in recent events. 17 6 The refusal of
Congress to allocate federal funds to defray any of the costs of
court-ordered busing may be an example. 7 7 Another is the debacle over the use of federal funds for abortions. 7 8 Other, somewhat
tangential, examples are the stripping of the Humphrey-Hawkins
bill of any serious content, 179 and the refusal to allow tuition tax
credits for parochial schools. 180 Whatever one's views on the merits of these issues, it seems clear that Congress is responding to
the national debates rather than boldly leading the nation to a
moral consensus. By contrast, when Congress' electoral needs are
at issue, our representatives show a willingness to resist the public
view. Thus, to date Congress has refused to provide for public
financing of congressional campaigns in the face of strong public
support,'81 and the spending limits that may eventually be imposed may very well redound to the benefit of incumbents. 8 2
These examples do not prove that Congress' anti-majoritarian
tendencies are generally met with disapproval. I must say, however, that the civil rights area, in particular, is an impressive re83
minder of the limitations of an idealized conception of Congress.

175.
176.
177.

178.
179.

180.

and welfare programs." Gallup Opinion Index, Nov. 1974 (113) at 11. Only
with the recent emergence of the taxpayer revolt have congressmen begun
talking of spending cuts.
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKEs, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 371 (1966).
For some not so recent events-such as the treatment of American Indians,
see S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY (1973).
See 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 450 (1977). Busing of students has never been favored by the populace as the proper method of desegregating the schools. G.
GALLUP, 3 THE GALLUP POLL 2323,2328,2243-44 (1972). By contrast, desegregation has been supported. Id. at 1723.
See 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 295-97 (1977). There appears to be a growing sentiment opposed to abortions. Compare G. GALLup, 1 THE GALLUP POLL 247, 509
(1978), with G. GALLUp, 2 THE GALLUP POLL 669 (1978).
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill Compromise Passed, 36 CONG. Q. WK. REP. 3102
(Oct. 21, 1978), which is also another example of Congress engaging in meaningless symbolic acts.
College Student Aid Increased; Tuition Tax Credit Killed, 36 CONG. Q. WMREP. 3071 (Oct. 21, 1978).

181. G. GALLUP, 1 THE GALup POLL 1060 (1978).
182. See 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 801-05 (1977). But cf.Hamilton, Direct Legislation
Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda, 64 Am.PoL SCL REV. 124
(1970) (city council voted for a politically unpopular open-housing law). In
1971, Congress passed campaign expenditures limits that were found to be
unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
183. See, e.g., Bond, Initiative and Referendum Underthe Federal Constitution,56
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When that example is viewed in light of the credit-claiming desires
of congressmen and the effect of special interest lobbying, what
emerges is a picture of an institution that is generally responsive
to its occasionally erroneous perception of the public will, except
when the best interests of its own members are at stake. When
obtaining electoral advantage is not a concern, Congress acts very
democratically and provides, typically, relatively blunt, popular
answers to questions regardless of an issue's complexity. When
credit-claiming or electoral advantage is available, Congress typically makes the most of it regardless of what solution would be
84
optimal.1
There is then, significant evidence that the electoral process
does not provide an adequate means of controlling the government. While in part this is due to the complexities of modern life,
it is also due, in part, to pressures that are inherent in our political
structure. The upshot may very well be, if I may quote Professor
Mayhew one last time, that "the electoral process guarantees not
that there will be a fiduciary relationship, but only that politicians
will make it appearas if there were one. 1 85 And, I might add, the
divergence between appearances and reality would not appear to
be one that many of us would favor, although again we must postpone judgment in anticipation of more thorough analysis of contemporary congressional decision-making. If Professor Mayhew's
characterization proves to be accurate, however, it goes far in explaining why the general public, as well as most commentators,
have consistently held Congress in such low esteem. 186 What must
be asked is whether anything can be done. Admittedly, it would
not be impossible to elect a reform Congress that might attempt to
solve some of the problems that appear to afflict congressional lawmaking. However, the chances of such an election occurring are
slim. 18 7 The chances of a reform Congress effecting lasting change
seem to be even slimmer. Too many times we have seen the resurrection of an abusive practice (or its first cousin) once the public
clamor for reform has subsided. We have seen it too often to have
CENT. L.J. 444 (1903). The Vietnam peace movement is another example of a
broadly based popular movement preceding and probably stimulating governmental action. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROciK,THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 343-44 (1976).
184. See generally D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 138.
185.

D. IVIAYHEW, supra note 97, at 114 n.68.

186. See R. SHERRILL supra note 107. See also, e.g., A. MACDONALD, AMERICAN
STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 146 (5th ed. 1955); R. SHERRILL,

supra note 107; L. TALLAIN, supra note 9, at 4-5; D. WILcox, supra note 5, at
293; Gardner, Problemsof Percentagesin Direct Government, 10 Am.POL. ScI.
REV. 500 (1916); Radin, supra note 83, at 564; Radin, PopularLegislation in
California: 1936-46, 35 CALIF.L. REV. 171 (1947).
187. See note 144 supra.
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much hope that '"politics as usual" will be permanently modified
without institutional change. 188 In fact, we have embraced institutional change in response to our dissatisfaction with Congress; we
have given the Presidency increasing power, but that is a dangerous tactic for a democratic republic. 18 9 There may be, however, another way to ensure greater responsibility in our legislative
process that is at least deserving of consideration, and to that we
can now turn.
C.

The Potential Role of a National Initiative Process

The role that a national initiative process could conceivably
play is so obvious as to require but brief elaboration. Although a
national initiative would not directly affect any of the deficiencies
in congressional decision-making, it would provide the means of
reversing any policy decision resulting from those deficiencies. An
initiative procedure could provide, in short, a method to translate
widely shared value preferences into law that would not be captive
to the forces that skew congressional decision-making.190 If, for example, we feel that the federal government distributes public
works projects across the country in an equitable fashion, but that
the government spends too much on public works, an initiative
process would allow us to set limits on the spending of Congress
without affecting its distributive mechanisms. Similarly, if we
think that our representatives have treated themselves or others
too lavishly at taxpayer expense, we could limit their expenditures
accordingly. Or, if we are convinced that the time has come for
public financing of congressional campaigns but Congress continues its recalcitrant behavior, we could provide the necessary procedures without congressional approval. And if we think Congress
has been overly influenced by a small group on a specific issue, we
could correct the imbalance.
The list of examples is endlesss, of course, and they would all
make the same, simple point-that an initiative would allow us to
act in the face of an unresponsive legislature. It would allow us to
implement specific policies, and more importantly-much more
importantly-it would allow us to provide parameters for the activ188. A recent example is the Senate's postponement of the curbs on outside earnings that only took effect January 1, 1979. See, Congress's Ethics Drive Goes
Into Reverse, U.S. NEWS & WoRiL REPORT, March 26, 1979, at 28.
189. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW, supra note 97, at 169-74.
190. See § III of text infra. Moreover, even if we should take our civic duties seriously and elect better men to office (see J. BOYLE, supranote 5, at 39), surely
Mr. Teal is still correct that "this may be true, but to have a concurrent remedy can do no harm." Teal, The PracticalWorking of the Initiative and Referendum in Oregon, in W. MuNmo, supra note 5, at 217, 231. See also Radin,
supra note 83, at 584.
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ity of government, thus limiting it to what we perceive as its proper
sphere. 191 The result may be a counterweight to the unrepresentative tendencies of the federal government that would enhance the
possibilities of a closer congruence between the policy choices of
government and the wishes of the populace. Moreover, the counterweight would not necessarily impinge substantially upon the
lawmaking function of Congress; it would simply limit or preclude
congressional discretion in certain areas. 192 Working within the
confines so provided, Congress would continue to provide its own
solutions to perceived problems. The initiative, in short, is not
designed to supplant the legislative process. 193 It would simply be
191. The contemporary desire to provide parameters for Congress is surely the
sustaining force of the movement to amend the Constitution to mandate a
balanced budget. To date, 27 of the required 34 states have petitioned Congress to call a constitutional convention to consider such an amendment.
TIME, Feb. 19, 1979, at 18-21. The strength of the balanced-budget movement is
a testament to the great distance between Congress and a large portion of the
citizenry on matters of fiscal responsibility. Unfortunately, the balancedbudget-by-constitutional-amendment approach is probably ill-advised, due
primarily to its rigidity and its failure to obviate potential congressional
avoidance tactics.
A national initiative, by contrast, would not only permit the spending of
Congress to be limited to what the electorate deems to be reasonable (which
is the primary objective of the balanced-budget proponents), but also it
would be free of the difficulties attending the balanced-budget amendment.
With an initiative process, the citizenry could limit congressional spending
by statute, and the statute could be amended as needed in light of subsequent developments.
192. See, e.g., Schwartz, Initiative Held in Reserve, 41 NAT. MuN. REV. 142, 145
(1952).
After years of observation we can look upon direct legislation as only
an adjunct to the regular legislative process, resorted to as a means
of carrying out the public will when an enlivened public opinion demands it as a method of accomplishing that purpose when such will
has been thwarted by the legislative body.
Id. See also Jones, The Initiative and Referendum Under the United States
Constitution,56 CENT. L.J. 393 (1903). There have been other suggestions recently for institutional change designed to offset Congress' unrepresentativeness. For example, Prof. Miller has suggested that we consider using
computerized national referenda. Miller, A Programfor Direct and Proxy
Voting in the Legislative Process, in The Economic Approach to Public Policy, supra note 110, at 369. Others have suggested random selection of representatives. Mueller, Tollison & Willett, Representative Democracy Via
Random Selection, id. at 381. See also note 191 supra.
193. The "supplanting" of the legislative process was one of the earliest, and one
of the silliest, arguments against initiatives generally. See, e.g., Campbell,
supra note 128, at 428-31. See also Littleton, Mob Rule and the Canonized
Majority, 7 CONsT. REV. 86 (1923); Smith, The Referendum and Its Uses, 10
CONST. REV. 21-26 (1926).
The proper role of the initiative was also seen quite early, however. See,
e.g., D. Wacox, supra note 5, at 289; Carey, Limitations on the Use of the
Initiative and Referendum, 23 CASE & COMMENT 353 (1916); Gardner, supra
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another check in a system of checks and balances that commends
itself as a means of inhibiting the undesirable aspects
of congres194
sional law-making without disturbing the desirable.
Another important potential benefit of an initiative process is
that it may enhance representative government by defusing singleissue politics. 195 As noted earlier, single-issue politics seems to

have had a greater and more destructive impact on our political
process in recent years. 196 The detrimental effect of single-issue
politics is twofold: first, small groups enjoy a near veto over certain policies of government; second, candidates who may be generally superior to their opponents lose on occasion because they
197
alienate special interest groups.
An initiative process might go far toward alleviating both
problems. If Congress feels it cannot risk antagonizing certain
groups by adopting policies those groups oppose even though a
significant majority favor governmental action, an initiative process would allow the nation to implement that policy if the citizenry
so desires. Similarly, if we generally support a person's views and
think him the superior candidate but disagree with him on a major
issue, the availability of an alternative means of legislating should
reduce our inhibition to vote for him because of that issue. We can
have the better person as our congressman, in other words, without forfeiting the possibility of implementing our policy views in
areas where we disagree with our elected representative. 198

194.

195.
196.
197.

198.

note 186, at 500; Crouch, DirectLegislationLaboratory,40 NAT. MUN.REV. 81,
99 (1951); Crouch, The ConstitutionalInitiative in Operation,33 AM. POL Sc.
REv. 634, 637 (1939).
The modern advocates of the national initiative also realize that it is not
designed to replace the legislative process but merely to supplement it. See,
e.g., L. TALLLAN, supra note 9, at 28. For data on the frequency of use, see
Hearings,supra note 1, at 47-53 (statement of Larry Berg). "
That a national initiative would not be frequently used does not detract from
its potential importance. The power to impeach the President has rarely
been used, but I doubt that very many of us would think it a superfluous
provision in the Constitution. The test of such procedures lies not in their
use but in their effect. Like the power to impeach, "[t]he great value of direct
legislation consists not so much in its use, as in its possession which, like the
gun behind the door, renders its use unnecessary." L. TALUiAN, supra note 9,
at 28 (quoting John Randolph Haynes).
See generallyHand, Is the Initiative and Referendum Repugnant to the Constitution of the United States?, 58 CENr. L.J. 244, 247-48 (1909).
See note 160 & accompanying text supra.
Evidence suggests this happened recently in the case of Dick Clark of Iowa.
Farney, Clark-JepsenRace: Clear-Cut Test of Single-Interest Groups' Power,
Des Moines Register, Nov. 1,1978, at 8A; Flansburg, supra note 161. See also
Herbens, Special Interests Gaining Power as Voter Disillusionment Grows,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
See, e.g., Diamond, diDonato, Marley & Tubert, California'sPolitical Reform
Act: GreaterAccess to the Initiative Process, 7 S.W.U. L. REv. 453, 461 n.34
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There are other contributions a national initiative could make.
It might stimulate a healthy public debate of issues and thus facilitate the examination of problems and their possible solutions. 199 A
national initiative might also contribute to the growing political sophistication of the country 20 0 by giving citizens a greater incentive
to become involved as a result of their enhanced capacity to affect
the outcome of political decisions. 2 01 Moreover, an initiative procedure might even further that second primary goal of our political
theory-access of all interests to the process of decision-making.
With an initiative, any group, or any person for that matter, that
feels abused or ignored by the legislature has a possible remedyit can appeal directly to the people. 202 Although the chances of
winning at the polls, or even qualifying may be small, the mere
utilization of the initiative process may be valuable. Publicity
given to the perceived grievance will allow others to gain a deeper
understanding of the proponent's position. That, in turn, may facil20 3
itate a compromise that is more satisfactory than the status quo.
And even when a group loses completely, it cannot say that its
claims were denied because of the perverse nature of politics. It
cannot say that powerful vested interests that dominate the legislature precluded a fair consideration of its grievance. Rather, it
will have had its chance to make its case and to win or lose unrestrained by the arcane labyrinth of the legislative process; and
that, although I cannot prove it, seems the superior state of af-

199.
200.
201.

202.

203.

(1975). For a good example of this dynamic, see Hamilton, supra note 182, at
132. The defusing of special interests may also help arrest the decline of political parties. See note 120 supra.
An example is California's experience with pension initiatives, all of which
lost but which probably helped lay the groundwork for the Social Security
Act of 1935. See L. TALLLAN, supra note 9, at 48; note 210 infra.
See, e.g., N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 183.
There is good reason to believe that initiatives may engender interest in the
political process. See, e.g., Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience 1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 339-40
(1975). Initiative America has compiled the voting statistics for the November, 1978, election and found that the voter turnout in states with an initiative
on the ballot was 21.0% higher than in states that do not permit initiatives.
The turnout was also significantly higher in states that permit initiatives but
that did not have any on the ballot this election than in states without the
procedure. The Florida ballot had that state's first-ever initiative and the
turnout was more than double that of the comparable 1974 election. This data
is contained in a December 1, 1978, press release, which I have on file and is
obtainable on request.
This furthers one condition of Prof. Dahl's conception of polyarchal democracy that "[a]ny member who perceives a set of alternatives ... can insert
his preferred alternative(s) among those scheduled for voting." R. DAHL,
supra note 17, at 70.
See, e.g., note 199 supra.
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fairs. 204 Finally, the proponents of an initiative measure may prevail. One of the most beneficial aspects of an initiative process is
that it permits a supposed minority to test whether a proposal is
indeed favored or opposed by a majority of the electorate. 205
That is the theory, at any rate, but of course, there is another
side to it. A number of potentially serious problems with the process have been articulated. It has been suggested that the voting
populace is not competent to make intelligent judgments on legislative matters, and thus the results of initiatives are likely to be at
best random and at worst arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the
fear is often expressed that citizens will lack the expertise to draft
statutes and, worse, that they will use the process to deal with
"emotional" issues. Consequently, the argument runs, there will
be a stream of crude, simplistic measures dealing with complex,
inflammatory issues put on the ballot that appeal largely to the biases and prejudices of the populace.
The critics of initiative also argue that these bills must be taken
as given-there is no way to amend an initiative once the qualifying procedure has begun. Thus errors cannot be corrected and,
more disturbing still, the deliberative aspects of the legislative
process with its give and take, with all relevant interests heard and
hopefully accommodated, are eliminated from the process. The
risk of inept as well as abusive legislation unfairly impinging on
minority rights is increased commensurately.
Finally, the view is often expressed that the initiative process
would come under the influence of monied interests-the wealthy,
it is feared, will buy their way onto the ballot and then buy the
election by inundating the mass media with propaganda. The
voter, according to this view, has little power of discrimination.
Thus, when he hears or reads (assuming he is able to do so) 10
paid political advertisements favoring a proposition and only sees
one opposing advertisement, two opposing editorials, and two opposing endorsements by people whose judgment he respects, he is
going to tally it all up and conclude that the affirmative of the proposition
outweighs the negative two to one 20 6 and vote accord2
0
7
ingly.
204. See also J. POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 68.
205. Everett, FederalInitiative and Referendum, 11 S. Am._ Q. 350, 353 (1912).
206. Actually, the voter will conclude that the affirmative outweighs the negative
10 to 5 since he is probably unable to do fractions. That would be adequate, I
think, since none of the critics, to my knowledge, are of the view that the
typical voter does not know that 10 is a larger number than 5.
207. See generally D. Wimcox, supra note 5, at 53-54, 78; J. BOYLE, supra note 5;
Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of FairHousing in California:An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. PoL. ScI. REV. 753, 767 (1968); Diamond,
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That, at any rate, is the opposing theory. 208 Thankfully, however, we need not rest having merely presented theoretical positions, although for some reason that typically is as far as the
opponents of initiatives go. What Professor Max Radin said forty
years ago is still accurate today. In the writings of those critical of
the initiative "there is a paucity of reference to any extended practice in the many jurisdictions that have adopted direct legislation.
The references to all actual experience are for the most part
couched in very general terms and are often admittedly based on
single incidents. ' '20 9 Indeed, it does appear as though the subjunctive mood is much more dear to the critics of the initiative process
than the indicative. 210 But, as John Randolph Haynes wrote more
than a quarter of a century before the scholarship of Max Radin
was published:
Why need we use the subjunctive mode in discussing these provisions of
direct government, speculating as to what might happen, when the experience of. . .cities, states and nations enables us to use the indicative mode
of expression, stating that under their operation such and such things
have happened. Opponents of the initiative, referendum, and recall without specifying instances where these provisions have failed, contend that
they would, if adopted, cause continual disturbance, hamper honest officials, injure business, prove expensive to operate, result in hasty and unwise legislation, mean a government by the minority
instead of the
2 11
majority, and, in short, be a government by the mob.

Haynes and Radin were surely right on at least one score-we
must invoke the facts where possible to resolve the tensions between opposing theories. We are now in a very propitious position
to do just that. The "generation of detailed ... experience in the
United States" that so impressed Professor Radin 2 12 has now been
extended to three generations of an even more detailed experi-

208.
209.

210.
211.
212.

di Donato, Marley & Tubert, supra note 198, at 454-57; Littleton, supra note
193. For more specific cites to critics, see notes accompanying § III of text
infra.
The opposing arguments have not changed much over the years. See, e.g.,
Parsons, Relative to Popular Government Through Initiative, Referendum
and Recall, S. Doc. No. 360, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
Radin, supra note 83, at 564-65. Obviously, the qualitative difference between
a theoretical and a pragmatic analysis of an institution often will collapse into
a quantitative difference. Thus, my discussion of congressional lawmaking
could be viewed as "theoretical." Hopefully, however, enough examples were
provided to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the theoretical positions reflected reality. By contrast, the typical work critical of initiatives relies on no actual experience or on an extraordinarily limited set of datasuch as one issue in one election.
See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 5, at 43; Campbell, supra note 128; Scott & Nathan,
Public Referenda, A CriticalAppraisal, 5 URB. AFF.Q. 313, 319 (1970); Note,
The AppropriationException in Nebraska, 54 Neb. L. Rev. 393, 394 (1975).
Haynes, The Actual Workings of the Initiative Referendum and Recall, 1 NAT.
MuN. REV. 586, 587 (1912).
Radin, supra note 83, at 564.
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ence. A review of that history is crucial to beginning the process of
resolving the theoretical contentions that have developed with respect to the initiative.
III.
A.

THE EXPERIENCE IN THE STATES

An Examination of the Results of Ballot Measures

The American experience with the initiative is rich and varied.
Following South Dakota's lead,2 13 twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have embraced the initiative and used it to handle an incredible array of issues.2 14 The doubts raised about the
initiative, as well as the aspirations for it, hopefully can be informed through an examination of that experience. If the initiative
will lead to poorly drafted, perverse laws and to the undermining
of what we hold dear, or if it will come under the domination of
organized interests, there should be evidence of those consequences in the states which have an initiative procedure. Similarly, if the initiative will act as a healthy supplement to the
legislative process, that, too, should be indicated by the experience
215
in the states.
213. See note 8 supra.
214. I have a research memorandum, available on request, that examines and
compares the various state procedures. In addition to the states now possessing the initiative, a number of states are presently in the process of considering the adoption of an initiative procedure. See, Hearings,supra note 1,
at 16 (statement of James Abourezk).
Initiatives are also quite prevalent at the municipal level, regardless
whether the city is in a state that has a statewide initiative. See generally
Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in Cities, 37 AM. PoL. SC. REV. 491
(1943); Fordham & Pendergast, The Initiative and Referendum at the Municipal Level in Ohio, 3 U. Cin. L. REv. 313 (1945). One interesting use to which
local initiatives have been put is to provide citizens a means to express their
views on national issues. See, e.g., Comment, The Local Initiative-A Proper
Sounding Boardfor National Issues?, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 464, Note, Vietnam
PeacePetitions-Questionof American Policy in Vietnam Permittedon Local
Election Ballot, 3 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (1967). For another interesting
suggestion for the use of ballot measures that is tangential to the present
discussion, see Weil, "BestLast Offer" Referendum-A Viable Alternative, 50
FLA. B.J. 483 (1976); Zasoria, Solve Public Strikes by Referenda, 18 CURREN'r
MuNICIPAL PROB. 276 (1977). For a discussion of law-making entities other
than officially constituted government, see Jaffe, Law Making by Private
Groups, 51 HARv. L. REV. 20 (1937).
215. I will not examine the results of local initiatives. It seems to me that the
aggregate experience with statewide initiatives should more closely approximate what would happen with a national initiative, whereas local initiatives
are too likely to be influenced by parochial concerns that would not affect
state or nationwide ballot measures. Moreover, an examination of the results
of local initiatives would require a concommitant examination of the performance of local legislative bodies. That is a burden too great to be borne here.
There are, however, numerous studies of local decisionmaking. See, e.g.,

1008

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:965

Evaluating the states' experience with the initiative is not a
simple task, however. It requires a clear recognition of the subjectivity of an analysis that rests, in part, upon whether the outcomes
of ballot measures meet with our approval. 2 16 Limiting the subjectivity of analysis is always a problem, of course, but it is particularly troubling here because the task of evaluating the results of
initiatives is inherently difficult apart from its subjectiveness. To
evaluate the initiative process one must look to the results of ballot
measures; but to grasp the significance of the result of any particular measure, one must appreciate the circumstances that precipitated it. Doing that for any significant number of issues would
indeed be a task of "monumental proportions." 217 As one of the
earliest students of the initiative process has said:
The more intensely one tries to study the interesting phenomenon of direct legislation the more humble does he become. To look closely, for example, at the two hundred and ninety-one constitutional and legislative
measures which the people of thirty-two states voted upon in 1914 is to be
impressed with the number and significance of the things about that remarkable election which one cannot possibly know. How superficial at
best must be our insight into that complex of social, political, economic
and human forces which lay back of 2the
18 presentation of those measures
and the popular decision upon them.

The difficulties have, in one sense, increased considerably since
Professor Cushman wrote. More states have adopted the initiative, and it has been used extensively over the past sixty-five years.
This considerable history, however, which makes a detailed analysis of all or any significant portion of its parts nearly impossible,
also provides the means by which a helpful examination can be
conducted. Not only has there been considerable use of the initiative, but there have also been a considerable number of studies of
the process similar to Professor Cushman's. Some have attempted
to study the initiative over time in a single jurisdiction, 2 19 others
220
have looked at a single election in more than one jurisdiction,
22
while others have traveled slightly different routes. ' From all
these studies remarkably consistent conclusions emerge, 222 and
Bruce, Participationin Local Policy Making: The Case of Referenda, 56 Soc.
Sci. Q. 55 (1975).
216. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 182, at 131.
217. Crouch, supra note 193, at 638.
218. Cushman, Recent Experience With the Initiative and Referendum, 10 Am.
POL. SC. REV. 532 (1916).

219. See, e.g., J. PoLLocK, supra note 5.
220. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 218.
221. See, e.g., Gamson, The FluoridationDialogue: Is It an Ideological Conflict?,
25 PuB. Op. Q. 526 (1961).
222. A number of objections to a national initiative process that are not related to
the actual operation of initiatives can be quickly disposed of. The first is that
there would be "no limit" to what could be done by a national initiative. That
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though their mere consistency does not prove the truth of those
conclusions, it certainly provides impressive evidence.
One of the most remarkable findings that emerges from an exis wrong. The power to initiate law would be, at most, co-extensive with congressional power to legislate. See text accompanying note 3q7 injfa Furthermore, while the vote of the electorate surely "produces pause and generates
restraint" in the courts, constitutional principles are nonetheless applicable.
Lucas v. 44th General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 737 n.30 (1963) (quoting Lisco v.
Lowe, 219 F. Supp. 922, at 944 (D. Colo. 1963)). See also Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969); Hand, supra note 195, at 248 nA.
Another objection that has been raised to the initiative and will surely be
raised again is that the initiative is inconsistent with the views of the Founding Fathers. See, e.g., J. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 15-20; Smith, supra note 193,
at 26. For a modern rendition, see Will, Initiative,The Populists' Voguish Darling, Wash. Post, July 28, 1977, at A23.
One is tempted to respond by saying, "Of course, that's why we need a
constitutional amendment." A better course, I suspect, is to deal directly
with what is implicit in such charges-that the Founders rejected the initiative. If the Founders rejected the idea of a national initiative, they certainly
did so discretely. To my knowledge there is no record of any discussion at all
of a national initiative procedure in the constitutional debates. That is not
very surprising since general statewide statutory initiatives were also unknown, although constitutional referendum was practiced. Lobingier, supra
note 9, at 358-59.
To be sure, one can find references to fears of untrammeled majority rule,
see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 55, 63 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), but a
carefully structured initiative process would avoid the crucial problem of the
Founders-mob rule. See § IV of text infra, & note 366 infra. More importantly, even if we assume that some of our forefathers would have rejected
the idea of a national initiative, the somewhat skeptical view of the population at large held by certain of the gentry 200 years ago is hardly an impressive datum when measured by the experience we have had with the initiative
and with the legislative branch of government.
Had the Founders seriously considered the issue, they probably would
have rejected it because of the logistics involved. Today, however, the conditions that would have made a national initiative a practical impossibility have
changed. See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 5, at 5-7. For an excellent discussion of
this and related issues, see Shafer, A Teutonic Institution Reviewed, 22 YALE
L.J. 398 (1913). See also Radin, supra note 83, at 561. In fact, recent studies
have concluded that "no single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving"
the goals of democratic government, R. Dmm & E. TufTE, SIZE AN DEmocRACY

138 (1973).

One objection that often is raised to state initiatives is that the initiative
procedure is inconsistent with the guarantee clause of art. IV, § 4 of the Constitution, an argument that has been used against many innovations. Radin,
supra note 186, at 171 n.5. See, e.g., Sherwood, The Initiativeand Referendum
Under the United States Constitution, 56 CENT. L.J. 247 (1903). For a definitional treatment, see Note, The Referendum as a "Republican Form of Government," 24 HARV. L. REV. 141 (1911).
That argument would not be relevant to a constitutional amendment providing for a national initiative process, obviously. For a thorough treatment
of the guarantee clause, see Bonfield, The GuaranteeClause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in ConstitutionalDesultude, 46 MiN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
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amination of the various studies of the initiative is that they consistently conclude that the initiative process has, on balance,
performed in most respects at least as well as the legislative process.

223

To be sure, there are studies critical of the process, but

they are limited in scope. Typical are those that draw an inference
from a few apparently irrational voters in a small number of elections that the process itself is irrational. Yet these works avoid, as
a rule, a consideration of the crucial questions--did the measure
win or lose, can the result be seriously questioned, and if so is the
election aberrational? Furthermore, these studies are able to conclude that certain votes are irrational only by resolving all doubts
do not even attempt to consider more
in that direction. They
224
favorable explanations.
Other studies have been content to criticize the initiative process without any apparent concern for the outcome of any measures
at all.225 In fact, the closest anyone has come to condemning the
process on the basis of its results is Senator Neuberger who criticized the defeat of a few measures in California. 226 What Senator
Neuberger failed to ask, though, is why the electorate had to deal
with those measures, and the answer is because the California
Legislature failed to deal with them. Yet, the failure of the electorate to enact a bill is not a cogent criticism. The refusal to enact
measures that the legislature did not pass provides no support at
all for the argument that the initiative process is inferior to the
legislative as a method of lawmaking;2 27 the most that it does is
demonstrate an equivalency in certain areas over a short period of
time.
By contrast, those studies of a more general nature consistently
have concluded that the work-product of the initiative process
overall is at least the equal of, and often superior to, that of the
legislative process. 228 There is no evidence from any extensive
223. The legislative process is the proper comparison, given the issue is whether
we can improve upon it.
224. See, e.g., Mueller, Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patternsand Historical
Trends in California, 63 AM. Poi. Sci. REV. 1197 n.16 (1969); Schumacher,
Thirty Years of the People's Rule in Oregon, 47 POL. SCL Q. 242, 250 (1932).
225. See, e.g. J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 412-13; Campbell, supra

note 128, at 431.
226. Neuberger, The People or TheirRepresentatives?, in THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 85 (E. Lee ed. 1966).

227. For a work that suggests, without citation, that the initiative process has little
effect on state governments, see Showal, Attitudes Toward Conflicting Politi-

cal Institutions,20 PuB. Op. Q. 604 (1957).
228. I will make no distinction in this discussion between initiated constitutional
amendments and initiated statutes. There seems to be little difference in the
way the two processes are used in the states, notwithstanding the fact that an
initiated constitutional amendment is typically more difficult to amend or re-
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study that legislation enacted by initiative is, as a whole, more "biased," more "ideological," more "emotional," more "ill-considered," more "poorly drafted," or less "deliberative" than the
workproduct of the legislative branch. Quite to the contrary, in
fact. But rather than rest upon my own characterizations of the
work of others, I believe it better that they speaik for themselves:
Professor James Pollock, upon examining the process in Michigan:
In any event, Michigan's thirty years' experience with the initiative...
has shown that there is quite as likely to be a judicious and rational decision on popular votes as on legislative votes. Even on technical questions
the popular judgment has been as good as the judgment of the legislature
have
and certainly less open to suspicion. On larger reforms the 2people
29
been much more likely to arrive at an acceptable conclusion.

Professor Edwin Cottrell, studying the initiative and referendum
in California:
Neither fear of much radical legislation on the one hand, nor of an ultraconservative attitude of the people on the other, has proved justified.
The early charge that direct legislation would arouse passions between
different elements of the population has failed to materialize.
Students of government would probably agree after an examination of
this experience that Theodore Roosevelt was prophetic in saying, The majority of the plain people will day in and day out make fewer mistakes in
than any smaller body of men will make in trying to
governing themselves
230
govern them.'

Professor Max Radin, on the basis of his first study of the California process:
Not only is it impossible to characterize the result reached in any case as
clearly bad, but in the overwhelming majority of instances, the popular
decision was precisely that which had been approved of by most civic organizations that had given independent and disinterested study to them.
And this must be particularly emphasized because, of the twenty-nine
proposals accepted, a certain number were quite patently of a kind that
would be reckoned "unpopular," that is to say, they limited rather than
increased popular action, and in some cases ran counter to our ancient
Similarly proposals
and supposed inveterate popular prejudices ....
were rejected which had always been supposed to have a strong popular
appeal.... Of some of these proposals accepted-all strongly advocated
by competent political experts-it is not too much to say that no legislapeal. Because of this difference, however, one student of initiatives has concluded that the process of initiating constitutional amendments should be
used quite sparingly. W. Harmon, Oklahoma's Constitutional Amendments:
A Study of the Use of the Initiative and Referendum (1951) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation on file at Univ. of Okla. Library).
229. J. POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 65. Professor Pollock also studied referenda.
230. Cottrell, Twenty-Five Years of DirectLegislationin California,3 PUB. Op. Q.
30, 38, 40, 45 (1939).
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ture would have passed them, although they constituted highly desirable
reforms. And of many of the jobbing and reckless proposals rejected by
passed
the people, it is only too likely that the legislature would 2have
31
them; indeed in several cases, the legislature did pass them.

And Professor Radin, upon concluding his second study of the California experience:
The inferences which I felt justified in making in the former article
seem amply confirmed by the four elections that have taken place since.
Direct legislation can deal with complete competence-at any rate with a
competence equal to that of representative legislatures-with the technical and routine problems which need legislative intervention. So far as
large problems of public welfare are concerned, it is markedly more likely
to reach a fair and socially valuable result.
One thing is clear. The vote of the people is eminently sane. The danger apprehended that quack-nostrums in public policy can be forced on
the voters by demagogues is demonstrably nonexistent. The2 representa32
tive legislature is much more susceptible to such influences.

The most thorough study of the results of an initiative procedure that I have been able to find is the dissertation of Dr. Paul
Culbertson. His detailed evaluation of the Oregon experience is
deserving of complete quotation:
Analysis of the type and content of direct legislative proposals since
1902 reveals the following important trends and facts:
1. Adequate financial support for education when a need for such
assistance has been clearly demonstrated.
2. A tendency toward economy in appropriations for construction of
institutions other than those relating to education and public
health.
3. Generous financial provision for veterans of the World War.
4. An unsuccessful program of aid for agriculture.
5. A varied, but on the whole constructive, policy regarding revenue
and expenditures.
6. A definite purpose to extend and preserve the 'people's power' in
government.
7. Almost unanimous rejection of innovations in the basic machinery
of government-other than changes included in the 'Oregon System.'
8. A policy of economy and a desire for greater purity in elections.
9. Extension of the governor's power in the interests of better government.
10. Modifications of the judicial system in the interests of cheaper,
more rapid, and more exact justice.
11. Protection of public health.
12. A constructive attitude toward crime control.
13. An indecisive, hesitant attitude toward public power development.
14. Opposition to state entrance into direct competition with private
business.
231. Radin, supra note 83, at 576-77. This study also included referenda.
232. Radin, supra note 186, at 190 (footnote omitted). He again included referenda.
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15. Lack of interest in purely 'local' measures and a decided tendency
to reject them.
16. On the whole, a friendly policy with reference to the aims of organized labor coupled with a requirement that labor keep its activity
within limits prescribed by the general public welfare.
17. An enlightened, though conservative, attitude toward suffrage legislation.
18. With one or two exceptions, a policy of protection for the personal
and civil rights of the individual citizen.
19. A varied policy toward highway construction, characterized at first
by hesitation and uncertainty, then financial generosity, and
finally by a determination to preserve the established system.
20. A reasonable
degree of state control over corporations and utili2 33
ties

What, in Dr. Culbertson's view, does all this add up to? "The marvel isthat this system of popular government, so vulnerable to apathy, indifference and actual ignorance, has not only worked but has
a considerable degree of constructive and progressive achievement
'23 4
to its credit.
These quotations capture the essence of the scholarship which
has examined the actual operation of the initiative. What emerges
from these studies is a fairly attractive portrait of the performance
of the initiative procedure. Those who have looked at the results of
the process have consistently concluded that the initiative, on balance, is a healthy addition to the law-making machinery of a jurisdiction, 235 as have many who have worked intimately with an
233. P. Culbertson, A History of the Initiative and Referendum in Oregon 493-95
(1941) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file at the Univ. of Oregon). His
work, obviously, also dealt with referenda.
234. Id. at 497.
235. In addition to those quoted in the text, see J. BARNETT,THE OPERATION OF THE
INImATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL IN OREGON (1915); D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, REFERENDUMS 67-122 (1978); W. CROUCH, THE INnTIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA (1950); J. LAPALomBARA, THE INrrIATrVE AND REFERENDUM
IN OREGON: 1938-1948 (1950); Bone & Benedict, supra note 201; Fordham &

Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 Ouo ST. L.J. 495, 501 (1950);
Haynes, "People'sRule" in Oregon, 1910, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 32 (1911); Johnson,
The Initiative and Referendum in Washington,36 PAC. N.W. Q. 29 (1936); Norton, Referenda Voting in a MetropolitanArea, 16 W. POL. Q. 195 (1963); Potter, The "Tools of Democracy," 24 CASE AND COMMENT 610 (1918); Schwartz,
supra note 192, at 144; Thatcher, The Initiative, Referendum and Popular
Election of Senatorsin Oregon, 2 Am. Poi- Sc. REv. 601 (1908); Thomas, The
Initiative and Referendum in Arkansas Come ofAge, 27 AiMi. PoL- ScL REv. 66
(1933); Comment, The Application of the Equal ProtectionClause to Referendum-Made Law: James V. Valtierra, 1972 U. ILL. LF. 408; Comment, The
Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California,54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717
(1966).
For a thorough account of a recent well-publicized initiative campaign, see
L. Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment: The Defeat of the 1976
Winter Olympics in Colorado (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file
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initiative procedure. 236 What may be referred to as "hate legislation"237 is not enacted by initiative; 238 rather, the grist of that mill
tends much more to be measures regulating government in one
form or another or instituting some other type of reform for which
there is a perceived need.239 Nor are frivolous or ill-considered
measures enacted with regularity, at least when measured against
the workproduct of the legislative process. Unquestionably measures have been enacted that are criticizable on technical as well as
substantive grounds, and the initiative process has not proven to
be an electrifying instrument of reform that has transformed political Sodoms and Gomorrahs into the Promised Land. But, what it
has done is permit the citizenry to intervene directly into the governance of its own affairs when the need to do so has been perceived, and the disinterested students of that process have
concluded that its benefits have exceeded its costs.
Conclusions concerning the initiative process must remain tentative, however. The material I have cited suffers from two deficiencies. The first is that it is dated; the second is that it is
methodologically suspect. Little can be done about the first problem, except, of course, to update the studies, 240 and there has been
one recent effort to do so. Professors Bone and Benedict have reviewed the results of initiatives in Washington:
The theory of the initiative first states that it would give a large segment of
the voters an opportunity to enact important policies when a legislature
refuses to responC. This portion of the theory has passed the test reasonably well. Time and time again the sponsors have been ahead of the legislature. The initiative has been used to liberalize liquor laws, adopt
daylight savings time, expand welfare benefits, authorize joint tenancies
in property, protect game, advance and protect recreational opportunities,
bring about reapportionment, and to institute a number of government reforms including the state civil service, open meetings, and regulation of
lobbying and campaign practices....
The second justification given for the direct legislation process is that it
would lead to more egalitarian policy-making with less interest group ma-

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

at the Univ. of Iowa Law Library). See also Bass, The Initiative and Referendum in Oklahoma, 1 Sw. POL. SCL Q. 125 (1920).
Those political scientists who disapprove of initiatives do so on structural
grounds. For a thorough discussion, see R. Anderson, Adoption and Operation of Initiative and Referendum in North Dakota (1962) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation on file at the Univ. of Iowa Law Library). See also Schumacher,
supra note 224.
See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 1, at 85, 102 (statements of Baxter Ward and
Don Whiting).
Hearings,supra note 1, at 60 (testimony of Peter Bachrach).
See, e.g., W. CROUCH, supra note 235, at 17.
See D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, REFERENDUMS 78 (1978).
My subjective review of successful initiatives corroborates the conclusions of
the other students of the initiative process. See, e.g., text accompanying
notes 268-301 infra.
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nipulation than would occur in the legislature. Certainly the wide variety
of interests that have availed themselves of the opportunity
2 4 1to initiate ballot measures is indicative of a large degree of pluralism.

As helpful as Bone and Benedict's work is, more appraisals of
the results of the initiative process ought to be obtained before we
allow our conclusions to become any less tentative. Hopefully,
whatever subsequent work that is done will also address the methodological weaknesses of most of the existent studies. These studies proceed by asking whether, taken as a whole, the measures
enacted by initiative are more or less consistent with "good government" than the output of the legislature. The trouble is, of
course, that the definition of "good government" has a heavy element of subjectiveness. Such an approach is not surprising, in
light of the fact that the strong emphasis on quantification is a relatively recent phenomenon in political science, as in the social sciences generally. Moreover, I am not at all sure that any other
approach is preferable, since the issue is how an initiative process
is likely to be used. Nonetheless, modern political scientists, after
recoiling from my degeneracy, would likely point out that there are
a number of empirical examinations of initiatives that could and
should be done. In fact, one study has attempted to apply modern
analytical techniques to the initiative process, and the results corroborate the more impressionistic conclusions of the earlier writers.
Professor Charles Price studied the "quality of life" in states
with and without initiatives. He also studied the strength of state
pressure group systems and political parties and the performance
of the state legislatures. He tested the hypothesis that in states
with initiatives, pressure groups would be stronger, parties would
be weaker, and the legislatures would not be as effective or innovative.
Using the Midwest Research Institute's ranking of states on the
basis of quality of life, he found "by a statistically significant score
• .. 'Quality of Life' rankings in the high-use [of initiative] states
were higher than 'Quality of Life' rankings in the low-use
states. '242 Applying the Zeller categorization of state pressure
group systems, 243 he found no significant results when he compared high-use to low-use states and initiative and non-initiative
states.244 When he applied the Jewell-Patterson compilation of
241. Bone & Benedict, supra note 201, at 347. See also D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY,
supra note 239, at 67-122.
242. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a
Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 257-58 (1975).
243. B. ZELLER, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 90-91 (1943).
244. Price, supra note 242, at 253.
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party voting in state legislatures 2 45 and Ranney's Inter-Party Classification, 246 he found no significant difference in political party
strength between high-use and low-use states, but he did find
some indication that initiative states may have less cohesive and
disciplined parties than non-initiative states. 247 However, he also
found that "by a statistically significant margin high-use states had
'24 8
more functional (effective) legislatures than low-use states,
and that there was no significant difference in terms of innovative
legislation between high-use states and low-use states or between
initiative states and non-initiative states. 249 On the basis of his
study, Professor Price commented that:
The most important overall conclusion of this study is to question the prevailing negative assessment of initiatives held by politicians, not unexpectedly, and academics and journalists as well. The various conventional
wisdom views of the initiative were all discarded and2 50the familiar litany of
other criticisms were found to be open to question.

If we are seriously to consider implementing a national initiative, more work similar to the traditional studies as well as that of
Professor Price will be essential. Indicia of "good government"
need to be explicitly articulated and comparisons done on that basis between states with and without initiative procedures. Similar
studies should also be done that address such issues as political
stability and tolerance for minority interests. The need for further
work notwithstanding, the cumulative impact of the existent studies is still quite impressive, I think, especially in light of their apparent consistency over time and in light of the similar conclusions
reached through the use of different methodologies. This apparent
consistency among the trained observers raises quite forcefully
the question as to why the initiative has impressed its students
beyond what might have been predicted. The primary reason, so
far as I can tell, is that the typical voter is not a mindless, bigoted
fool who is readily influenced by the claptrap that public relations
firms employ as a substitute for reasoned discussion of ballot
245. M. JEWELL & S.

PATrERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES,

445 (1973).
246. Ranney, Partiesin State Politics,in POLrTcS INTHE AMERICAN SYSTEM 87 (H.
Jacob & K. Vines, ed., 2d ed. 1971).
247. Price, supra note 242, at 253-54.
248. Id. at 257. He relied on the ranking of the quality of state legislatures done by
the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. J. BURNS, THE SOMETIMES
GOVERNMENT-. A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE 50 AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 52-53

(1971).
249. Price, supra note 242, at 258. Here he applied Walker's Innovation Rank for
States. See Walker, The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States,
63 AM. POL. SC. REV. 880 (1969); and Gray's Overall Average Innovation Rank,
see Gray, Innovations in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 Am. POL.Sm. REV.
1174 (1973).
250. Price, supra note 242, at 261-62.
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measures. Moreover, perhaps partly in response to the claptrap,
voters demonstrate a healthy tendency to vote no on initiated
measures.
B.

The American Voter Revisited

Political commentators have until quite recently consistently
denigrated the abilities of the voting populace. 251 The source of
this uncharitable view of those of us who vote, typically can be
traced back to some of the "classic" works in the field of voting
studies, such as Voting 252 or The American Voter.253 It is now
clear, however, that these works are seriously deficient if used to
support any sweeping generalizations about voters, especially
about their powers of judgment and discrimination. The study involved in Voting, for example, although it was methodologically of
the greatest importance, did not generate many insights into the
process of voter discrimination. In fact, while it may be unkind it
is also fair to say that "the authors of Voting confine their discussions to trivialities
and present conclusions that might very well be
'25 4
wholly false.

Although the results of The American Voter are of greater interest than those of Voting,255 interpretations often given those results-that the American voter is a political simpleton whose only
redeeming256
feature is that he is also extraordinarily shallow-are
simplistic.
As one commentator has said, "frequent statements
that the book suggested issues were not of great consequence [to
the voter] say more about the loss of information when a complex
phenomena is reduced to a dichotoumous variable ... than they

do about the content of the book itself."257 Still, The American
251.

See, e.g., B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFELD &W. MCPHEE, VOTING (1954); J. PERRY,
THE NEW PoLrIcs 213 (1968); Davis, Community Attitudes Toward Fluorida-

tion, 23 PuB. Op.Q. 474 (1960).
252. B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFLED & W. MCPHEE, supra note 251.

253. A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER
(1960). For a review of the literature of voting studies prior to 1954, see Lipset, Berelson, Barton & Ling, The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1124 (G. Lindzey ed.
1954).
254. Berns, A Critiqueof Berelson,Lazarsfeld & MePhee's Voting, in PUBLIC OPiNION AND PUBLIC POUCY: MODELS OF POLITICAL LINKAGE 24 (N. Luttbeg ed.

1968). For a discussion of some of the difficulties voter studies entail, see
Key, The Politically Relevant in Surveys, 24 PUB. Op.Q. 54 (1960).
255. See also P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON &H. GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE (3d

ed. 1968).
256. See, e.g., Pomper, supra note 59, at 415-16.
257. Kessel, Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting, 66 Am. POL. SCL REV. 58 (1972).
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Voter, and the comment that it generated, 258 does contain data
from which one may infer that the average voter is not greatly concerned with politics, does not possess deeply held ideological commitments, and that he gives very little thought to public issues.
However, it is now becoming clear that those inferences are in
great need of qualification.
The primary difficulty with drawing inferences of a general nature from the data presented in The American Voter is that the
data is time-bound, as it is primarily based on a study of the 1956
election. 25 9 It may be true that the average voter was uninterested
in that election, but that probably is because it was a very uninteresting election. The Korean War was over, the Red Scare had
largely abated, and the country was heading into a time of remarkable prosperity. The battles that were soon to be fought over the
import of American ideals were not yet perceived. It was a time of
quiescence, of stability, and most importantly of all, of contentment.260 It does not seem very surprising that, at a time of no
burning issues, there was little evidence of a burning interest in
261
politics.
If this explanation is accurate, there should be evidence from
the decade of the sixties quite different from that of 1956, and indeed there is. Professor Pomper has updated the work of The
American Voter, using essentially the same methodology. He
found that after the great issues that would dominate the next decade began to be perceived, the views of the political parties began
to diverge on those issues. As the parties diverged, the public perception of party differences on the issues increased dramatically. 2 6 2 Moreover, "this process of education" increased over the
entire population-it "was not confined to the insightful young, or
to the formally-trained college population, or to committed White
segregationists and Black integrationists. This political education
was general and apparently persistent. '263 And, in Professor
Pomper's words, since there is not a demographic explanation for
the phenomenon, the "alternative . . . is a directly political one:
the events and campaigns of the 1960's ... made politics more relevant and more dramatic to the mass electorate. In the process,
258. See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND
THE PoLrrIcAL ORDER (1966).
259. Pomper, supra note 59, at 416. The American Voter does have some comparative data based on a similar study done of the 1952 election. A. CAMPBELL, P.
CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, supra note 253, at 17.
260. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 183.
261. See Skeingold, Social Networks and Voting: The Resurrection of a Research
Agenda, 38 AM. Soc. REV. 712, 716-17 (1973).
262. Pomper, supra note 59, at 417-19.
263. Id. at 423-24.
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party differences were developed and perceived. Democrats divided from Republicans, Democrats
became more liberal, and vot'264
ers became more aware.
Professor Pomper's basic premise-that the level of political
knowledge in the electorate is apparently more a function of interest than of ability-has received recent corroboration from the
most extensive inquiry into the dynamics of the voting public since
The American Voter.265 In fact, the subsequent work of two of the
authors of The American Voter-Miller and Stokes-makes this
point dramatically. Miller and Stokes' appraisal of the electorate
in the 1958 congressional election is similar to the view of the electorate that emerges from The American Voter based on the evidence from the 1956 election. 266 Yet, as Miller and Stokes report, in
the Arkansas Fifth Congressional District election enormous interest had been generated due to the perception of Congressman
Brooks Hays as being too moderate on what the voters of that district then considered a burning issue-civil rights. The survey data
of that election showed that every voter sampled had a clear perception of the candidates' positions on civil rights and that those
perceptions were responsible for the victory of a write-in candidate.267

At any rate, I think it is a fair appraisal that since the publication of The American Voter we have witnessed the pendulum of
political sophistication in the electorate swing back the other way,
and with it has come a growing recognition of the voting populace's
ability to intelligently distinguish available options.268 Moreover,
264. Id. at 421, 422; See also Converse, Miller, Rusk & Wolfe, Continuity and
Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election, 63 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1089 (1969).
265. N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 183. In particular, see id. at 4-5, 7,
35, 43, 98-99, 110-22, 123, 166-73, 272-288, 290, 294, 348-49.
266. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, supra note 258, at
366.
267. Id. at 369. One may not approve of what motivated the voters in the Arkansas
Fifth Congressional District, but that is not the point, at least not here. See
text accompanying notes 278-292 infra.

268. G. POMPER, VOTER'S

CHOICES: VARIETIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

210-26 (1975); R. SCAMMON & B. WATrENBERG, supra note 66, at 22, 60-61; V.0.
KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE (1966); H. HAHN, supra note 59, at 167;
Brody & Page, The Assessment of Policy Voting, 66 AM. PoL ScL REV. 450
(1972); Shapiro, RationalPoliticalMan:e A Snythesis of Economic and SocialPsychological Perspectives, 63 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 1106 (1969); Wilson &
Banfield, Public Regardness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, 58 AM.
POL. SC. REV. 876 (1964).

For a critical appraisal of the Wilson and Banfield article, see Wolfinger &
Field, PoliticalEthos and the Structureof City Government, 60 AM. PoL. SCL
REV. 306 (1966). As we have become more "aware" it appears we also have
become more cynical. Miller, Trust in Government, 68 AM. PoL. SC!. REV. 951
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the little evidence we have specifically focusing on the voters' relationship to ballot measures is
quite consistent with the developing
269
view of the voter's abilities.
Even critics of the initiative procedure recognize the process of
education that accompanies initiated measures, 270 and the natural
experiments that have occurred lend further support to the proposition that the voter comprehends his task. For example, in the
1964 California election, there were two incompatible measures on
the ballot--one would have set up a state lottery and licensed a
particular firm to run it; the other forbade any constitutional
amendment decided by popular referendum, which the first would
have been, to name a particular firm in it. The former lost and the
latter won by sixty-nine percent of the vote. 271 Proposition 14 of
constitutional law fame 2 72 is another example. It was a very complicated measure that required an affirmative vote to express a
negative attitude on the Rumford Act, which was the primary stimulant to the proposition. The proposition won, a result consistent
273
with what was apparently the public's views on the merits.
In sum, then, although the data presented here does not irrefut-

269.

270.

271.

272.
273.

(1974). Compare Critin, Comment, The PoliticalRelevancy of Trust in Government, id. at 973, with Miller, Rejoinder to "Comment" by Jack Critin: Political Discontent or Ritualism, id. at 689. For evidence that voters may pay
more heed to Presidential than to congressional elections, see Hinckley, Issues, Information Costs, and Congressional Elections, 41 AM. POL. Q. 131
(1976); Hinckley, Hofstetter & Kessel, Information and the Vote: A Comparative Study, 2 Am. POL. Q. 131 (1974). Again, though, I wonder how time-bound
such data is. If Congress continues its independent ways, a resurgence in
interest in congressional elections may likely occur.
Most of the work done has been demographic studies, which are not very
enlightening for my purposes. For a representative sample, see Kaufman &
Greer, Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area
Analysis, 38 Soc. FORCES 196 (1960); Kent & Harmon, Class, Party, and Race
in Four Types of Elections: The Case of Atlanta, 28 J. POL. 391 (1966); Lustey,
The RelationshipsBetween Demographic Characteristicsand Pro-Integration
Votes of the White Precincts in a Metropolitan Southern County, 40 Soc.
FORCEs 205 (1962); Vyeki, Patternsof Voting in a MetropolitanArea 1936-1962,
1 URB. AFF. Q. 65 (1966).
See, e.g., Lutrin & Settle, The Public and Ecology: The Role of Initiatives in
California'sEnvironmentalPolitics,28 W. POL. Q. 352, 359 (1975). See also W.
CROUCH, supra note 235, at 121-23; J. POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 675; Hearings,
supra note 1, at 68 (1977) (testimony of Henry Abraham); Cottrell, supra
note 230, at 33; Haynes, supra note 235, at 62. But see A. MACDONALD, supra
note 186, at 149.
Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 207, at 755. The winning proposition was
a referendum. See also Cottrell, supra note 230, at 40. "Conflicting measures
often appear on the same ballot. However, the voters have never adopted any
which were in direct opposition." Id.
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 207, at 755-57.
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ably establish the competency of those who vote, 274 it does nonetheless cast serious doubt on the once fashionable view of the
voting populace as a collection of disinterested idiots.275 If that
view turns out to be wrong, that would go a long way towards explaining the favorable view of the initiative possessed by those
who have studied its results. It would also be helpful in disposing
of a potential criticism of a national initiative procedure. 276 But,
what of the related fear that the electorate is so bigoted that the
initiative will come to be dominated by emotional proposals reflecting the worst side of the American character? We can best approach that question by returning once more to the actual results
2 77
of the process.
The history of the initiative is remarkably free of the enactment
of abusive legislation. 278 One of the few examples of an initiated
274. Yet another point deserving of mention is that the belief that the position of a
measure on a ballot has a substantial effect on its outcome does not appear to
reflect reality. See J. PoLLocK, supra note 5, at 48. The alienated voter hypothesis has also been undermined considerably. Mueller, supra note 224, at
1209 n.32; Shepard, Participationin Local Policy Making: The Loss of Referenda, 56 Soc. ScL Q. 55 (1975); Stone, Local Referendums: An Alternative to
the Alienated Voter Model, 29 PuB. Op. Q. 213 (1965). But see Horton &
Thompson, Powerlessnessand PoliticalNegativism: A Study of DefeatedReferendums, 67 AM. J. Soc. 485 (1962). See also H. HAHN, supra note 59, at 16667.
275. There are disbelievers, to be sure, but there is occasionally a strained quality
to their disbelief. Consider, for example, one of the datum that is used to
demonstrate the lack of competence of the typical voter in Hamilton, supra
note 182. The author criticizes the electorate's knowledge on, among other
things, the basis of its failure to know who the pro-fair housing candidates
were in the election studied. Id. at 132-33. It is only in a footnote that he
points out that the pro-fair housing candidates avoided the issue as though it
were the kiss of death. Id. at 133 n.35.
He also does not realize the significance of the fact that the pro-fair housing mayor and councilmen who enacted the bill that was defeated in the referendum were all reelected. If one assumes that there was some knowledge
of who voted for the bill, that sounds to me like a very discriminating electorate indeed. Compare McCall, Representativeas Against Direct Legislation,
in W. MuNRo, supra note 5, at 164,173 with Bourne, A Defense of DirectLegislation, in W. MuN'o, supra note 5, at 194, 201.
276. An argument that is occasionally made in favor of the initiative is that if voters are competent to elect people, a fortiori they are competent to do the less
difficult task of accepting or rejecting a particular bill. Not everyone agrees
that "voting for the man" is more difficult, however. Compare Hearings,
supra note 1, at 162 (testimony of Arthur S. Miller) and id. at 148 (testimony
of Peoples' Lobby) with Scott & Nathan, supra note 210, at 315. I am not sure
what portion of this argument is substance and what portion rhetoric. It
seems to me that the range of difficulties faced by the voters in electing candidates is similar to the range of difficulties faced in voting on ballot measures.
277. See also text accompanying notes 164-74 supra.
278. The concern, obviously, is with measures that pass. See text accompanying
notes 354-65 infra.
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measure that singled out a small group for special, and worse,
treatment is a 1920 measure that strengthened the California alien
land laws. 2 79 A complete history of the measure, however, defuses
it considerably as an example of the failings of the initiative.
The bill was enacted at a time of intense racial tension, at a
time when the people of California were using all the methods
available to them to limit what was viewed as the encroachment of
foreigners. 280 The initiated alien land law was but one manifestation of this conflict and by no means the most significant.2 81 I do
not mean to downplay the abusiveness of this statute or to condone its passage, but the political structure that generated it can
only be fairly evaluated by placing this incident in proper perspective. That perspective is one of explicit racial hatred, but the significant point is that the role of the initiative in that conflict was a
quite limited one. 282 Moreover, the explicit racial prejudice of the
California voting populace did not persist. In 1952 and 1954, the
electorate modified the land laws through referenda, 283 and in 1956
they repealed the laws entirely.2 84 Similarly, in 1952 the electorate
repealed the hated "coolie law" that had been given constitutional
285
status in California.
279. CAL. GEN. LAwS ANN. act 261, §§ 1-14 (Deering 1921).
280. REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CONTROL OF CALIFORNIA 9-10 (1920).
281. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIX (adopted in 1879 and repealed in 1952), which
became known as the "coolie law."
282. In contrast to the one statute enacted by initiative, consider the following
statutes enacted by the California legislature:
a. After the 1920 initiative on the alien land laws, the legislature
shifted the burden of proving citizenship to the defendant in an
action under the law. CAL. GEN. LAws ANN., act 261, §§ 9a-9b
(Deering Cum. Supp. 1925-1927).
b. Local school districts were authorized to create separate schools
for Indians, Chinese, and Mongolians; and once created, no integration was allowed. CAL. POL CODE § 1662(3) (Deering 1909).
c. The state was forbidden to purchase any supplies of any kind
(even if produced in California) if the product of Mongolian labor. Id. § 3235.
d. "No native of China, no idiot, insane person, or person convicted
of any infamous crime, and no person hereafter convicted of the
embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, shall ever
exercise the privilege of an elector." Id. § 1084.
e. Cities and towns were authorized to remove Chinese to outside
the municipal boundaries. CAL. GEN. LAws. ANN. act 1369 (Deering 1880).
f. Statutes designed to restrict immigration of Chinese and
Mongolians were enacted. CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 1363 (Deering 1858); Id. act 1365 (Deering 1891).
g. Chinese labor was taxed to protect free-white labor from competition. Id. act 1364 (Deering 1862).
283. 1953 Cal. Stats. ch. 1816 at 3600; 1951 Cal. Stats. ch. 1714 at 4035.
284. 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 316 at 767 (as amended); 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 1550 at 2831.
285. CAL. CONsT. art. XIX (adopted in 1879 and repealed 1952). See also
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The clearest case of abusive initiated legislation, then, appears
not to provide much support for the view that the initiative process
will more likely generate unfair statutes that will impinge on the
286
rights of insular minorities than will the legislative process.
Moreover, apart from this single statute, it is difficult to find abusive legislation enacted by initiative. 287 There are no cases where
the great mass of people penalized the wealthy by imposing excessively graduated taxation. Nor are there any other measures
designed to effect massive transfers of wealth, such as inordinately
high estate or gift taxes, although it seems likely that pension initiatives
that lost did much to lay the groundwork for Social Security.288 In the field of morality, one finds few initiated measures
placing restrictive conditions on abortions 289 or enacting draconian
obscenity statutes 290 or, for that matter, modifying liberalized drug

286.

287.

288.
289.
290.

Radabaugh, Tendencies of CaliforniaDirect Legislation,42 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q.
66, 71-73 (1961).
A recent example to the contrary is the loss of California's Proposition 8, in
the November, 1978, election, which was designed to restrict the rights of
homosexuals. Issues That Caught the Public Eye, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 20, 1978, at 35. In 1978, in Washington, id., and Colorado in 1974,
Hearings,supra note 1, at 435, it was mandated that children be assigned to
local schools rather than bused to achieve racial balance. Although minorities appear to now favor busing to achieve racial balance in schools when
faced with that single issue, it also seems clear that busing is the leastfavored alternative. Compare G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL 370 (1978), with
id. at 566-67.
The only other initiated measure that perhaps should be included here is California's Proposition 14, which in essence repealed California's fair housing
laws. There is evidence, however, that a significant motivating force of Proposition 14's proponents was the view that the government was intruding too far
into the private lives of the citizenry. See Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note
207, at 764-66. Even if that evidence is erroneous, Propostion 14 is, at the
statewide level, a singular occurrence that has not been repeated. See also
text accompanying note 304 infra. In a referendum in 1968 the voters of Maryland rejected a fair housing statute. The bill was passed in modified form
in 1971, however, and it was not subjected to a referendum. 1971 Md. Laws,
ch. 324, (codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 21-30).
See note 199 supra. Initiatives that won probably helped lay the groundwork
for national conditions of employment statutes (Colorado, 1912), and the direct election of senators (Oregon, 1908).
In the November, 1978, election, Oregon voters endorsed continuing state
funding of abortions for welfare recipients. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
supra note 286, at 36.
In the November, 1978, election, South Dakota rejected an obscenity bill outlawing the sale of obscene materials, whereas Montana voted to allow cities
and counties to enact local obscenity statutes. Id. at 34.
Washington enacted an obscenity bill in 1977 (Initiated Measure No. 335,
Nov. 1977), that did not adequately provide for a prompt judicial determination of obscenity and provided for much too liberal use of the summary contempt power. It was declared unconstitutional in Spokane Arcades, Inc. v.
Ray, 449 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Wash. 1978). This statute is one of the few excep-
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use or sexual misconduct laws. Nor does one find initiated measures placing restrictions, however disguised, on the free exercise
of religious beliefs. 29 1 What Winston Crouch said close to thirty
years ago is still true today: "Moral and religious reform groups of
considerable variety have advocated measures by means of the ini'292
tiative, but have encountered very slight success.
In contrast with this lack of success, one finds a dazzling array
of political reform acts, usually passed in the face of an obdurate
legislature. California's Political Reform Act of 1974 was an initiated measure described by a critic of the process as "the most re'293
strictive lobbyists disclosure law ever enacted in California.
Once again a comparison to the legislative process may be instructive. When the California legislature was faced with a major scandal involving lobbyists, its sole response was to provide for a
registration requirement. 294 Another example is the California
State Executive Budget Act of 1922, an initiated constitutional
amendment that brought order to a chaotic budget process. A
respected authority has described that measure as "one of the out-

291.

292.

293.
294.

tions to the general lack of success that has characterized attempts to regulate public morality through the initiative process.
By contrast, the Senate recently voted to deny the federal courts jurisdiction
over state laws relating to voluntary prayers in schools. See, e.g., Attacking
the Constitution,Des Moines Register, April 5, 1979, at Cl, col. 1. Such single
incidents must be kept in proper perspective, of course.
W. CROUCH, supra note 235, at 17. The Congressional Research Service has
compiled a list of statewide initiatives appearing on the ballot through 1976.
Hearings,supra note 1, at 355. I recommend this source to anyone wishing to
evaluate the thoroughness of my search for abusive legislation. I have also
written each of the states with a statewide referendum procedure requesting
a summary of all the referenda that have appeared on their respective ballots
and the election results. I have received replies from every state but Nevada.
I have reviewed that data, looking closely at negative votes, in an attempt to
determine whether the referendum procedure has been used in an abusive
manner. I must say that the primary result of my efforts was a headache.
The great majority of referenda involve legislative detail and the popular vote
appears to be reasonably sound. Nonetheless, it borders on the impossible to
give a sophisticated analysis of those votes; they involve too many factors of
the day-to-day administration of the relevant states that are unknown to an
outside observer like myself. Beyond the morass of legislative detail, I found
very few startling votes, see, e.g., note 287 supra. The impression I was left
with is that the referendum probably more closely corresponds to the legislative process than does the initiative, the most significant differences being
that the use of a referendum does not permit a citizenry to force policy
choices-e.g., sunshine laws-on a recalcitrant legislature. Let me emphasize the tentativeness of that conclusion, however. This difference between
the referendum and the initiative probably militates in favor of the initiative.
See text accompanying notes 294-302 infra.
Note, The CaliforniaInitiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 922, 947 (1975).
Id. at 947 n.115.
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standing pieces of legislation and one of the outstanding amendments produced in this state. '295 In Oregon, a Corrupt Practices
Act was enacted by initiative after having been defeated by the
legislature. 2 96 The Oregon voters also extended the provisions of
the direct primary law to presidential elections, 297 and provided a
reasonable reapportionment plan when faced with a recalcitrant
legislature.2 98 Further examples are the sunshine laws recently
enacted in seven states in the face of legislative obstinence, 299 and
the budget limitations that are being imposed in many states to
retard irresponsible state spending. 300 Of all initiatives appearing
on the ballot in the states, forty-five percent have dealt with government or the political process in one form or another, while
another fifteen
percent have dealt with education, health, welfare,
30
or housing. '
The list of beneficial statutes enacted by initiative could be
lengthened considerably, 302 but that would be superfluous. Obviously, the mere listing of these accomplishments would not prove
that the initiative, on balance, has made an important contribution
to those states that employ it. A more in-depth analysis than that
provided here must be attempted before we reach judgment on
this issue-an analysis that attempts to put as many initiated
measures as possible in their proper context and then evaluates
them from that perspective. 303 Nonetheless, the clear indications
W. CROUCH, supra note 235, at 18.
Haynes, supra note 235, at 47.
Id. at 59.
Baker, Reapportionmentby Initiative in Oregon, 13 W. POL. Q. 508 (1960).
Nelson, Citizens Take Initiative,Politicksand OtherHuman Interests,Oct. 25,
1977, reprintedin, Hearings,supra note 1, at 627, 628.
300. See, e.g., Tax Revolt at the Polls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 9, 1978, at
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

30.
301. D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, REFERENDUMS 78 (1978). I have included revenue
issues in the category of issues related to the governmental process.
302. See, e.g., L. TALLIAN, supra note 9, at 43; Hearings,supranote 1, at 54-56 (testimony of Larry Berg); id. at 80-83 (testimony of Roger Telschow).
303. There are two areas where a number of commentators have expressed doubt
about the wisdom of the often negative outcomes of city or countywide referenda: fluoridation, see, e.g., Davis, supra note 251; Plaut, Analysis of Voting
Behavior on a FluoridationReferendum, 23 PUB. Op. Q. 213 (1960); and metropolitanization, Merrando, Voting in City-County ConsolidationReferenda, 26
W. POL. Q. 90 (1973); McDill & Ridley, Status, Anomic, PoliticalAlienation,
and PoliticalParticipation,68 AM. J. Soc. 205 (1962). What the experts have
overlooked in their evaluation was very nicely captured by Prof. Gamson. Although he was discussing fluoridation, his point is relevant to both areas: "It
is as if fluoridation somehow symbolized the buffeting one takes in a society
where not even the water one drinks is sacrosanct." Gamson, supranote 221,
at 536. Nor, apparently, is the size of a city one lives in-at least, that is, if
these measures are not defeated. See also D. McNEIL, THE FIGHT FOR FLUORIDATION 198 (1957); Mueller, The Politics of Fluoridationin 7 Californian Cit-
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positive contribution
are that such a study will demonstrate the
30 4
initiatives have made to state government.
ies, 19 W. POL. Q. 62 (1966). At any rate, an examination of local initiatives is
beyond the scope of this paper. See note 215 supra. But see note 304 infra.
See also note 287 supra.
304. In a recent article, Prof. Derrick A. Bell has cast aspersions on the initiative
and referendum processes. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978). He asserts that direct democracy
may be generally pernicious to individual rights, and, more particularly, that
initiatives and referenda pose a serious threat to the rights of blacks and
other minorities. According to Prof. Bell, "because [direct democracy] enables the voters' racial beliefs and fears to be recorded and tabulated in their
pure form, the referendum has been a most effective facilitator of that bias,
discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American democracy from
its earliest day." Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted). Similarly, "the experience of
blacks with the referendum has proved ironically that the more direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is "and" [t]he threat is growing," as
voters turn more and more to the processes of direct democracy to implement their will. Id. at 1.
Unfortunately, the strength of Prof. Bell's statements are not matched by
the strength of the evidence he has adduced. Apart from open housing and
low-income housing referenda, all he cites in support of his position are two
pre-Civil War referenda, id. at 16-17, the 1977 Washington anti-pornography
bill, id. at 18-19, California's Prop. 13, id. at 19 n.72, three Massachusetts initiatives that all lost at the polls, id. at n.73, and a Maine referendum nullifying a
court order drastically revising the traditional method of school funding in
Maine. This list, it seems to me, is rather unimpressive. For obvious reasons,
one can put aside pre-Civil War referenda. Moreover, ballot measures that
lose are not much of an argument against initiatives. See text accompanying
notes 263-70 infra. Thus, the only statewide measures worthy of attention
that Prof. Bell cites (apart from housing measures) to demonstrate the seriousness of the "growing threat" that direct democracy poses for individual
rights are Washington's attempt to control obscenity, Maine's desire to perpetuate its traditional method of financing schools, and California's tax reduction proposition. Those measures collectively do not mount much of an
assault on individual rights. Moreover, Prof. Bell made no apparent attempt
to broadly survey the results of ballot measures, nor does he attempt to compare the workproduct of direct democracy with that of the legislature, which
is, of course, the essence of any analysis of the value of the initiative or the
referendum.
What, then, of Prof. Bell's reliance on the defeat of various low-income
housing and fair-housing measures? Unfortunately, again there are serious
problems. In the first place, almost all such measures are local, not statewide. See id. at 15 n.54. Thus, to determine whether the methods of direct
democracy have generally been beneficial, notwithstanding these measures,
one would have to examine and compare generally the workproduct of local
initiatives and legislative bodies, a task Prof. Bell did not attempt. Furthermore, while Prof. Bell makes much of the fact that a number of fair-housing
referenda have lost, he fails to mention that as early as 1968, "more than 120
million people-62% of the total population of the United States-were living
in the 23 States and 120 localities with fair housing laws." Holmgren, NCDH
and the FairHousing Law, HUD CHALLENGE, April, 1978, at 17. Moreover, in
1977, the federal government recognized 22 states and the District of Columbia "as providing rights and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing
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Before concluding the present examination of the states' expepractices substantially equivalent to those in the "Federal Fair Housing Act"
24 C.F.R. § 115.11 (1978). Of those states, eight permit both initiatives and
referenda (Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon), see Hearings,supra note 1, at 285, that could be used, but
have not been, to repeal the fair housing legislation in those states.
Thus, one begins to wonder if the fair-housing elections Prof. Bell relies on
may be aberrational or anachronistic, and there is reason to believe they are.
In 1978, the New York Times reported a significant drop from 10 years before
in the antipathy of whites to integrated neighborhoods. In 1968, only 46% of
the white respondents "would not mind at all" if a black family of similar
social class moved in next door. In 1978, the figure was 66%. More importantly, in 1968, 60% of the white respondents felt blacks should be able to live
wherever they can afford to, but in 1978 the figure had risen to 90%. Similarly,
in 1968 close to one-third of the white respondents felt they had a right to
keep blacks out of their neighborhood but only 5% felt that way in 1978. Reinhold, Poll IndicatesMore Tolerance, Less Hope, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1978, at
28, col. 3.
These apparent changes in racial attitudes have been corroborated by the
major study done by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., for The National Conference of Christians and Jews, Inc., which I have on file and which may be
obtained on request from the NCCJ. The results of the Harris study were so
remarkable that they prompted Harry A. Robinson, Vice-President of the
NCCJ, to say that: "[d]espite the widespread belief of leadership groups that
the country is in a regressive period in race relations,. . . [the Harris survey]
•..* reveals major shifts in white thinking about the black quest for equality,
indicating a period of real progress is now imminent." Id. See also Wilkins,
The Kerner Report of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, at A14, (see also accompanying chart: Two Societies: How the Races View One Another); Wilkens,
Blacks and Politics: Steady Gain in a Decade of Disappointment, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1978, at 12, col. 3; The Black Middle Class: Making It, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at 34 (Magazine).
Prof. Bell's attempt to support his use of the fair housing ballot measures
by reference to the results of low-income housing referenda is equally unpersuasive. The primary difficulty is his facile equation of resistance to low-income housing with racism. As he says, referenda "upsetting city council or
zoning commission approval to build low-income housing have become a
standard means of barring minorities from suburban, residential communities." Bell, supra at 8 (footnotes deleted). Unfortunately, there are many
reasons having no relationship to racism to resist the construction of lowincome housing in middle class neighborhoods, not the least of which is, as
the Supreme Court pointed out, that construction of low-income housing
"may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased
public services and to lower tax revenues." James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
143 (1971). To be sure, there also are cogent considerations to the contrary,
but that simply demonstrates the complexity of the issue, a complexity Prof.
Bell seems to ignore.
Prof. Bell also ignores the fact that blacks have not been "bar[red] from
suburban residential communities." In fact, just the opposite has occurredthe black population in the suburbs has increased dramatically and at a
much faster rate than the white population. 34% Increase in Suburban
Blacks Tied to Incomes and New Laws, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at 82, col. 3.
I do not mean to suggest that racism has died in the United States, see,
e.g., Hecht, Apartment-Hunting,in Black and White, The N.Y. Times, May 11,
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rience with the initiative, however, an important issue remains to
be considered. Even if, as a rule, we seem to collectively demonstrate reasonable judgment, and even if we generally do not rush
to legislate our biases, is it possible that there might be an exception to the rule when organized monied interests lend their support to a proposition? Might not, in short, our judgment be swayed
and our biases inflamed by the paid political propaganda that accompanies some initiative campaigns? 305 Unmistakably, this is a
concern that cuts to the heart of the wisdom of the national initiative proposal.
The Effect of Campaign Expenditures on Initiative Elections
The concern, in essence, is that monied interests will be able to
buy their way onto the ballot 306 and then buy the election 30 7 by
dominating the media with the help of clever public relations
firms, 308 regardless of the nature of the initiated measure or
whether it is in "the public interest. '30 9 The evidence we have,
though, suggests that this fear may not reflect reality. It is difficult
to find an initiated measure where a monied interest has induced
the public into giving it a special advantage or privilege. 3 10 A significant part of the initiative's history is to the contrary; the
electorate has used the process to limit the influence that monied
interests have occasionally exercised over legislatures. 311 Thus, it
is not surprising that those who have studied the matter have conC.

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

310.
311.

1978, at 23, col. 1, nor, more particularly, that racism no longer infects the
housing market. See Stanfield, FairHousing-Still Doors to Open After 11
Years, 11 NAT. J. 734 (1979). However, the issue here is not racism but
whether initiatives facilitate the expression of racial bias. In my judgment,
the evidence does not support Prof. Bell's position on that issue.
See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 1, at 59 (testimony of Peter Bachrach).
This is probably true, see Diamond, diDonato, Marley & Tubert, supra note
198, at 463 n.36, but of no great concern, as the following discussion elaborates.
A related difficulty is whether a deserving measure may be defeated by monied interests that oppose it. That problem, however, is of lesser concern. See
text accompanying notes 354-65 infra.
See, e.g., Lutrin & Settle, supra note 270, at 361; Scott & Nathan, supra note
210, at 317; Note, supra note 293, at 949.
I put "public interest" in quotes because it is a very misleading term. There
is no such thing as the "public interest" apart from the aggregate of "private
interests." See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 17, at 14 n.13, 69 n.5. But see R.
FLATHmAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREsT 32-52 (1966). It is in that sense that I use the
phrase.
See Warren & Best, The 1968 Election in Washington, 22 W. PoL. Q. 545, 547
(1969).
See, e.g., The California Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 81000-81004 (West 1976). This Act has been declared unconstitutional in
part in light of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Hardie v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal.
3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1976).
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312
cluded that monied interests do not dominate the process.
There are numerous explanations for this lack of success with
the initiative process. The fear of such entities rests on a misimpression of the role of money and the effect of the mass media on
the electoral arena. It is also based on a misconception of the process of public opinion formation in the United States.
Our knowledge of the role of money in elections comes primarily from research into campaign expenditures of candidates, particularly of congressional and presidential candidates. What
emerges from those studies is that "no neat correlation is found
between campaign expenditures and campaign results. '3 13 For example, the Democratic candidates for President in this century
have generally been at a financial disadvantage, yet according to a
preeminent authority, "it cannot be argued convincingly that the
election in the
Democratic party has lost a single '3presidential
14
twentieth century for want of funds.
Moreover, what we know of expenditures in congressional campaigns is consistent with the data from presidential elections. As
Herbert Alexander, one of our foremost authorities on election
finance, has noted:

During the 20th century, at the national level, Republicans consistently
have had more money at their disposal than the Democrats, even when
independent labor funds are added to Democratic spending. Yet from the
1930s through the mid-1970s, the Democrats have been able to command a
majority of voters more often than have Republicans. In his eight years in
office, Dwight Eisenhower had a Republican-controlled Congress for only
from 1969 through 1976 faced large Democratic
two years; Nixon and Ford
315
majorities in Congress.

In the 1952 and 1956 elections, for example, Republican expenditures on candidates averaged between sixty to seventy percent
higher than Democratic expenditures, and in four out of five states
direct Republican expenditures exceeded those of the Demo317
crats,3 16 yet in neither year was there a Republican landslide.
Similarly, in one of the few years that total spending on congressional candidates probably favored3 18the Democrats-1966--they
suffered serious losses in Congress.
312. See, e.g., Bone & Benedict, supra note 201, at 332-35; D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY,
supra note 235, at 106.
313. A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 16 (1960). Much of the data is suspect,
however, because it is based on self-reporting.
314. Id. at 34.
315. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING PoLrrIcS 40 (1976).
316. A. HEARD, supra note 313, at 20-24.
317. In 1952, Republicans picked-up 22 seats, but they lost three in 1956. 2 U.S.
DEP'T OF COMM., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES

1083 (1975).

318. L. BERG, H. HAHN & J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN PoLmrCAL SYSTEM 101 (1976). Democrats lost 49 seats in 1966. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF
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This is not to say that money is of no consequence in a campaign, for obviously it is; 3 19 but it is to say that the importance of
money may be overrated. Although money is important, it is only
one of many factors that influence the outcomes of elections.
320
There is little evidence to suggest that it is the dominant one,
and even less to suggest that the primary use of money in initiative
campaigns-to obtain public relations assistance-is of much
value. As Professor Heard has said:
In recent years much has been said about the increasing ability of experts
in advertising and public relations to influence popular tastes and opinions. It has even been contended that through what is called motivational
research and the techniques of hidden persuasion the outcome of elections can be decisively influenced through skillful use of the mass media,
especially television. Since the skill and the media cost money, a possibility is seen that a party or candidate could translate a financial advantage
more or less directly into an electoral advantage-as once could be done in
many places through election-day expenditures. No evidence is yet at
COMM., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1083. By contrast, the

Democrats probably also spent more in 1964 and were fairly successful. K.
MCKEOUGH, FINANCING CAMPAIGNS FOR CONGRESS 9 (1964). See also H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 116, 127 (1972).
Recent research has attempted to go beyond the aggregate data used by
Heard and Alexander, and the findings are quite remarkable. There has been
found to be no positive correlation between an incumbent's spending and his
chances of winning at the polls. In fact, the more an incumbent spends the
greater is his chance of losing. Glantz, Abramorvitz & Burkart, Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?,38 J. POL. 1033, 1036 (1976); Jacobson, The Effects of CampaignSpending in CongressionalElections,72 AM. PoL. Sci. REV.
469, 489 (1978). The more a challenger spends, by contrast, the greater are his
chances. Id. The relationship between challengers' expenditures and success is probably in part a function of name recognition. Id. at 485-89. However, it is also possible that challengers who demonstrate a better chance of
winning attract greater campaign contributions. Id. at 469-70; Palda, The Effect of Expenditure on PoliticalSuccess, 18 J. L. & ECON. 743 (1975). See also
Welch, The Effectiveness of Expenditures in State Legislative Races, 4 Am.
POL. ScI. Q. 333 (1976). Moreover, in those campaigns without an incumbent,
there does not appear to be a close correlation between high spending and
winning. CONG. Q., DOLLAR POLrICS 21-22 (1971). All of these authorities
concur on one point-that campaign spending is only one of many factors
that influence the outcomes of elections and that it is not the dominant one.
Glantz, Abramorvitz & Burkart, supra at 1036-37; Jacobson, supra, at 470;
Palda, supra at 771; Welch, supra at 340-56; See also CONG. Q., supra,at 19;
Lott & Warner, The Relative Importance of Campaign Expenditures: An Application of Production Theory, 8 QuALITY & QuANTrrY 99 (1974); Palda, The
Effect of Expenditures on PoliticalSuccess, 18 J. L. & ECON. 748 (1975). It is
also becoming clear that whatever effect expenditures have, it decreases rapidly as more money is spent-the Law of Diminishing Returns apparently is
fully applicable to campaign finance. Welch, supra at 353; Welch, The Economics of Campaign Finance,2 PuB. CHOICE 83 (1975).
319. See note 318 supra.
320. A. HEARD, supra note 313, at 31; H. ALEXANDER, supra note 315, at 39-59; H.
ALEXANDER, supra note 318, at 37-50.
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hand, however, to confirm the fear that men so well understand themthey can predictably conselves that in the context of a political campaign
32
c
trol the opinions and actions of other men.

Not only is there still no such evidence at hand, but much evidence
has accumulated to the contrary.
One of the more remarkable findings of the last two decades is
that the mass media appears to have a limited impact on the formation of public opinion, or at least on how the public votes. For
example, Professor Mueller found no difference between the votes
of absentee voters and those who voted on election day in an election with intense media activity towards the end of the campaign. 322 Similarly, the evidence we have suggests that the
relationship between editorial content and voter preference is
slight, and the perceived relationship may be as much a function of
public opinion influencing editorial content as the other way
32 3
around.
Again, this is not to suggest that the mass media has no effect at
all on public opinion. In certain limited situations-as, for instance, in a very confusing election-the potential role of the media is considerably heightened.324 But in the typical case, the view
that the media has a significant impact on the outcomes of elections is largely unsubstantiated. 325 If the reasonably disinterested
components of the mass media, such as editorial content, have little observable impact on the outcomes of elections, it should come
as no surprise that the effectiveness of expansive, and obviously
biased, media campaigns is also highly questionable:
A look at the record of 1970 outcomes of gubernatorial and senatorial contests should make this clear. In the 32 senatorial contests (excluding
those won by independents) the candidate who spent the most money on
radio and television advertising won in only 56 percent of the cases. The
victory rate of the 34 gubernatorial high spenders was only slightly
greater-59 percent. The record of the nine best-known media advisors in
1970 is also unimpressive. Excluding the several elections where their clients competed against each other, their record in statewide contests was
321. A. HEARD, supra note 313, at 32.
322. Mueller, supra note 224, at 1204-06.
323. R. ERICKSON & N. LUTrBEG, AMERICAN PUBUC OPINION: ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT,

AND IMPACT 143-45 (1973). Another example of the limited effect of editorial
content is that in most recent presidential elections (the Goldwater-Johnson
election being a notable exception) newspapers have overwhelmingly endorsed the Republican candidate. Id. at 143-44.
324. See, e.g., Mueller, ChoosingAmong 133 Candidates,34 PuB. Op. Q. 395 (1970).
325. See, e.g., J. CoRRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 385-86; J. KLAPPER, THE
EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION (1960); Boyd, Popular Control of Public
Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election, 66 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
429, 444-45 (1972); Hamilton, supra note 182, at 185. See also Horland, Effects
of the Mass Media of Communication, 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
1062 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954).
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326

The limited ability of media campaigns to influence elections is
a readily explainable phenomenon. In the first place, when a campaign effort inundates the media with propaganda, it does not necessarily inundate the voter. "[Tihe flow of messages of the mass
media is rather like dropping a handful of confetti from the rim of
the Grand Canyon with the object of striking a man astride a burro
on the canyon floor. In some measure chance determines which
messages reach what targets. '327 Moreover, once the target is hit,
the typical impact is small. People tend not to take political propaganda very seriously. 3 2 8 We filter out most of it, and tend to hear
only that campaign propaganda that is consistent with our previously formulated views. 329 To the extent that is true, the power of
to influence attitudes is obviously severely cirmedia campaigns
33 0
cumscribed.
The most important factor limiting the influence of media campaigns, however, is that the messages of the mass media are but a
small part of the forces acting on individuals that together influence individual opinion. As Professor Key has said: "[t]he
messages of the media do not strike the isolated and atomistic individual; they strike ... an individual living in a network of personal relationships that affect his outlook toward the objects of the
external world .... ,331 A person's background, family, job and social relationships set the matrix within which decisions are made.
When information is received, it is evaluated from the perspective
of that personal matrix and its concomitant well-determined, reasonably stable, set of values and views 33 2 rather than from the per333
spective of an isolated, valueless, easily manipulable automaton.
The importance of interpersonal relationships to opinion forma326. R. ERICKSON & N. LUIrBEG, supra note 323, at 152.
327. V.O. KEY,JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 357 (1961).
328. To some extent, this is an elaborate elucidation of the obvious. Of course we
do not take the mindless babbling that is often the essence of media
campaigning very seriously. The Dec. 5, 1978, edition of the cartoon P.T.
Bimbo captured the general view of public relations activities quite well. A

public relations man, carrying a shovel, is walking toward a circus workman
who is shoveling a pile of bovine droppings. He says to the workman, "Bimbo
wants me to work with you guys awhile to learn more about the circus. Imagine, an advertising man like me shoveling this stuff around." "Why not," responds the workman, "You got more experience than I got."
329. V.O. KEY,JR., supra note 327, at 354-56.
330. See id. at 397.
331. Id. at 366-67.
332. See id. at 234-62, 293-343; R. ERICKSON & N. LU'rBEG, supra note 323, at 122-212.
333. But see J. PERRY, THE NEW PoLrrICs 213 (1968): 'These new managers...

can play upon the voters like virtuosos. They can push a pedal here, strike a
chord there, and presumably, they can get precisely the response they seek."
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tion is demonstrated by the fact that, although media campaigns
do not greatly influence people, 33 4 other people do, especially other
people of personal importance. The influence of the views of the
members of primary groups is well known, 335 as is the influence of
neighbors 336 and friends. 33 7 In the context of elections, an issue or
candidate that can generate personal commitments and grassroots support will have a much greater chance of winning than an
issue or a candidate with a small but well-financed constituency
that lacks general appeal.3 38 It is thus readily understandable why
monied interests have been unsuccessful in their attempts to use
the initiative. As Professor Heard said:
Activities that shape the climate of opinion customarily lie outside the
usual concept of political campaigning and the monies involved are beyond the customary definition of campaign finance. However, all the energies that seek to mold this climate affect the outcome of campaigns as
themcertainly-which is not to say how certainly-as campaign activities
339
selves, and the sums of money engaged are infinitely larger.

There is, in short, little evidence from the studies of election
campaigns to substantiate the fear that monied interests will be
able to use the initiative to their advantage by hoodwinking the
public. Moreover, the sketchy information that is available on expenditures in initiative campaigns is consistent with that view.
Although a number of states have campaign finance disclosure
340
requirements applicable to the contestants of ballot measures,
34
most of the data are not in a readily usable condition. 1 The limSee Hamilton, supra note 182, at 129.
Key, supra note 254, at 55.
Hamilton, supra note 182, at 135.
Id. at 133. See also P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON & H. GAUDET, supra note 255,
at 150-58.
338. Eldersveld, Experimental PropagandaTechniques and Voting Behavior, 50
Am. POL. Sci. REV. 154 (1956); McPhail &Tucker, Interest GroupActivities and
the Public OpinionProcess: A Case Study of a Liquor Referendum, 20 S. CAR.
L. REV. 749 (1968); Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 207, at 762-63. See generally E. KATZ & P. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE (1955); Coleman, Katz
& Menzel, The Diffusion of an Innovation Among Physicians,20 SOCIOMETRY
253 (1957); Crain, Fluoridation:The Diffusion of an InnovationAmong Cities,
44 Soc. FORCES 467 (1966); Freidson, A Prerequisitefor Participationin the
Public Opinion Process,19 PuB. Op. Q. 105 (1955); Woelfel, PoliticalRadicalization as a CommunicationProcess, 1 COM. RESEARCH 243 (1974). See also
334.
335.
336.
337.

L. GERLACH & V. HINE, PEOPLE, POWER, CHANGE: MOVEMENTS OF SOCIAL

TRANSFORMATION (1970); H. HAHN, supra note 59, at 93.
339. A. HEARD, supra note 313, at 31.
340. Because of the limited data available, I have included the figures on initiatives and referenda, except where specifically noted to the contrary.
341. Alaska, for example, keeps excellent records of who spent what, but one cannot tell from the records whether money was spent in favor of or in opposition to a measure. Ohio and Oregon keep superb records but do not compile
them, although I have been informed by their respective Secretaries of State
that I, and presumably any other interested party, would be quite welcome to
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ited data that are available, however-primarily from California
and Montana-are quite remarkable, especially in light of the general absence of party labels and partisanship that surely tempers
the effect of money in elections of candidates. From 1954 to 1976,
there were campaign disclosure statements filed in fifty-seven
342
statewide ballot campaigns in California and two in Montana.
Money was on the winning side in thirty-four of those campaigns.
If money was the dominant force in the outcomes of ballot measures, one would think that it would have a higher winning percentage than fifty-eight per cent. To some extent that figure is
misleading, though, because in many elections very little money
was spent and the money differential was small. However, the
figures become even more striking if one looks to those elections
where one side is outspent by more than $500,000. 343 There were
twenty-one such elections 344 and money was on the winning side
in ten for an average of only forty-eight percent. More importantly,
in those instances where the proponents outspent the opponents,
345
the proponents had a success rate of only twenty-two percent,
which is consistent with the view that the initiative does not provide monied interests with an easy to use method of obtaining
their statutory goals. 346 When money opposed an issue, the meas-

342.

343.
344.
345.

346.

inspect and attempt to utilize their records. A similar situation prevails in
Massachusetts, according to the Office of Political Campaign and Political Finance. Michigan's campaign disclosure law did not become effective until
June 1, 1977, and South Dakota has required disclosure for the first time this
year. Colorado has recently required disclosure, but I have not yet obtained
its records. Finaly, no committees for the support or defeat of a measure
have ever formed in Wyoming, and thus no financial statements have ever
been filed. All of this information is contained in letters to me from the relevant state officials and may be obtained on request. Obviously, the files in
Ohio, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Colorado should be examined before any
definitive conclusions are reached.
I obtained this information from the California Fair Political Practices Commission, and from the Montana Commissioner of Campaign Finance and
Practices. Montana began keeping records of this sort in 1975. This data, too,
is available on request.
A figure picked for convenience-California organizes its data on that basis.
I have included Proposition 12 from the 1976 California Primary, where
$467,760 was spent in favor of the measure and $268 was spent against it. It
lost.
Two out of nine. Two of the measures that lost were referenda-Proposition
5 in the 1976 California General Election and Proposition 12 in the 1976 California Primary. If those two measures are excluded, the rate of passage is
29%, which is less than the overall rate. See text accompanying note 354 infra.
The two measures that passed are hard to characterize as examples of special
interests obtaining an advantage at the expense of the population at large.
One forbade pay television (1964 General Election Proposition 15) and the
other eliminated featherbedding on railroads (1964 General Election Proposition 17).
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ure passed two out of eight times, 347 a figure reasonably close to
348
the overall passage rate of initiatives.
The limited data we have, then, tends to confirm the suspicion
that inoney, and the public relations experts it can buy, is not a
dominant factor in determining the outcomes of initiated measures, 349 although there is reason to believe that well-financed cam347. Prof. John Shockley of the Western Illinois University Department of Political Science is in the process of collecting data that may demonstrate a high
correlation between heavy spending in opposition to a measure and its loss.
Some of his preliminary data was presented at the hearings on S.J. Res. 67,
Hearings,supra note 1, at 172 (testimony of John Shockley), and in his testimony to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Committee on Government Operations of United States House of Representatives on May 23, 1978. See
Shockley, The Political Impact of Grass-Roots Lobbying By Corporations in
Initiative Campaigns (prepared testimony for the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs, May, 23, 1978) (on file NEB. L.
REv.). His work shows a uniform pattern of nuclear energy limitations being
opposed by well-financed opposition and consistently losing. He infers that
money was one of the primary causes, but I wonder how much of this is explainable on the basis of a widely shared view that we must encourage the
development of nuclear energy to replace our dwindling fossil fuels, a point
Prof. Shockley notes. He also discusses mandatory deposit bills and his data
shows that in the four cases studied the opponents greatly outspent the proponents, but the measure won two out of the four times.
I should also point out that in the November, 1978, election, the nuclear
power limitation measure in Montana was approved, presumably again in the
face of heavy spending by the opposition. Prof. Shockley also presents data
from the 1976 elections in Colorado that show a high correlation between
money spent in opposition to measures and measures losing. Losing measures are not much of an argument against an initiative procedure, however.
The concern rather is with those measures that win, and Prof. Shockley's
work provides no support for the proposition that monied interests can buy a
favorable vote on a measure. Moreover, there is some difficulty with making
too much of a single time period. In 1972, for example, environmental issues
won quite consistently at the polls. See, e.g., Major Tax Revisions Fail: Environmental Issues Win, 15 ST. GOV'T NEWS No. 11, at 2 (1972).
An interesting natural experiment on the effect of corporate spending on a
measure occurred recently in Massachusetts. Massachusetts voters have
considered a constitutional amendment to provide for a graduated income
tax three times-in 1962, 1972, and 1976. Corporations have generally opposed
the measure. In 1962 and 1972, they contributed heavily to its opponents, but
in 1976 they were precluded from doing so by a state statute. In 1962 the
measure was favored by 16.5% of the electorate, in 1972 by 33%, and in 1976,
when corporations could not finance the opposition, the measure was favored
by only 26.5% of the electorate. The voting data was obtained from the Massachusetts Office of the Secretary of State and is obtainable on request. The
background to this measure can be found in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S.
Ct. 1407 (1978), where the Court struck down the statute limiting corporate
expenditures on state ballot measures.
348. See text accompanying note 354, infra.
349. A. HEARD, supra note 313, at 583.
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paigns against a measure may increase its chances of losing.350
Organized, monied interests clearly have an advantage in qualifythe ballot,351 but it does not appear that they can
ing measures for 352
buy the election.
Not only does it seem unlikely that elections can be bought by
monied interests, but it seems clear that their efforts in favor of a
proposition occasionally backfire. Too much spending by a small
group for a proposition, or a last minute media blitz, may actually
lose rather than gain votes and thus enhance a measure's chances
of losing.353 Voters seem to be quite skeptical of a measure when a
group lacking a history of disinterested involvement in civic affairs
shows too great an affection for it. But then, voters are generally
skeptical of initiated measures, and wisely so, given the nature of
the process.
Close to two-thirds of the statewide measures that have appeared on the ballot have lost, a figure that has remained remarkably stable over time. 354 There appear to be a number of reasons for
the low passage rate, the primary one being that usually the voter
seems, quite sensibly, to resolve any doubts he has on a particular
355
measure against it.
While this trait may, on occasion, permit opponents of a measure to bring its defeat by raising baseless
fears, 35 6 that is practically its only regrettable consequence. A
"no" vote does not preclude reconsideration of the issue by either
the populace or the legislature. 35 7 Thus, if a problem needs to be
addressed, but a voter is unsure of the effects of the measure
350. This would not be optimal but would not be all that troubling. See note 359 &
accompanying text infra. Hopefully studies of the marginal effect of expenditures in initiative campaigns will be done using the data the states are collecting. See note 341 supra. That should provide much more information than
the limited aggregate data discussed in the text.
351. W. CROUCH, supra note 235, at 17.
352. Bone & Benedict, supra note 201, at 347; Scharrenberg, Big Business Attempts
to Use the "Initiative,"46 AM. FEDERATIONIST 38, 44 (1939); Hearings,supra
note 1, at 90 (testimony of Baxter Ward). Special interest activity may not be
significantly less in those states with initiatives, however. See, e.g., A. MACDONALD, supra note 186, at 149.
353. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 1, at 54 (testimony of Larry Berg); Comment,
CorporateContributionsto Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 U.M. J. L. REF. 781,
795 n.90 (1973); Note, supra note 293, at 935 n.72.
354. Thirty-seven percent, to be exact. I used the Congressional Research Service
Study, which goes through 1976, for my data base. See Hearings,supra note
1, at 355. Prior to 1970, the figure is 36.9%; from 1970 to 1976, the figure is
37.2%.
355. A. MACDONALD, supra note 186, at 149; L. TALLIAN, supra note 9, at 122; Schumacher, supra note 224, at 251; Smith, Can We Afford the Initiative?,38 NAT.
MuN. REv. 437 (1949).
356. Scott & Nathan, supra note 210, at 321.
357. See, e.g., Carter, NuclearInitiatives: CaliforniansVote "No, "But Legislature
Acts, 192 SCIENCE 1317 (1976).
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before him, a "no" vote merely provides the opportunity for further
consideration and exploration of the problem and its potential solutions. Furthermore, the entire process will have stimulated pubthe formation of
lic debate on the issue and hopefully facilitated
35 8
informed opinion on the various alternatives.
The low passage rate also t-ends to compensate for potential
problems in the drafting and qualifying of measures for the ballot.
There is often an initial burst of enthusiasm sufficient to qualify a
measure if it appears on first blush to fill an important need. Occasionally, however, further reflection suggests that the proposal is
ill-considered or poorly drafted, 35 9 and there is no way to amend
such a bill.3 60 But, signing a petition and voting for a proposition
are two very different things. 361 As such a proposal is probed and
its drawbacks become more evident, its support usually dissipates,
which typically results in a loss at the polls.3 62 The cost, then, of
allowing citizens to draft and offer measures for approval free from
the political structure is a low passage rate.363 But that does not
appear to be a great expense to bear. Initiatives that lose wreak no
havoc, 364 and quite frankly I can think of no serious argument
358. See note 288 supra. See also Cottrell, supranote 230, at 45; J. POLLACK, supra
note 5, at 67.
359. A good example is discussed in Lutrin & Settle, supra note 270, at 359 (Proposition 9).
360. This difficulty is noted in J. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 21; Crouch, John Randolph Haynes and His Work for Direct Government, 27 NAT. MUN. REv. 434,
439 (1938) (quoting LA. Times editorial, Oct. 11, 1917); J. CORRY & H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 413. The oft-stated fear that any crackpot can come up
with a ballot measure is theoretically true but not very realistic. If a measure
is to have any chance of success, it must receive broad support. A radical or
poorly drafted proposal is not likely to receive such support. It is thus not
surprising that typically a great deal of consultation and compromise go into
the drafting of proposed ballot measures. See, e.g., J. BOURNE, supra note 275,
at 210; W. CROUCH, supra note 235, at 20. Moreover, amending procedures
could be implemented, even though generally the states do not have them.
Hearings,supra note 1, at 144.
Of course, if the measure passes it can later be amended by initiative or by
the legislature in most instances.
361. See Note, supra note 293, at 630 n.62.
362. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 270, at 359. Not all 'Imperfect" bills lose.
Sometimes the imperfections are outweighed by the benefits, as occurred
with the famous Proposition 13. See note 368 infra.
363. This is indicated by the significantly higher passage rate of referenda as compared to initiatives. D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, supra note 235, at 80-82.
364. The only troublesome aspect of the fact that most initiatives lose is that each
initiative, win or lose, does entail certain expenses-validating signatures on
petitions, the cost of printing the measure, preparation of the materials for
petition drives, and setting up the election machinery are examples. The
greatest of these costs appears to be that required for validating signatures,
which is normally close to 21 cents per signature. On the assumption that
four million signatures would be required in order to get a measure on a na-
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against an initiative process predicated upon the fact that a few
proposals manage to qualify for the ballot before they are sufficiently understood and then lose at the election once their deficiencies have been exposed. Yet, on the other hand, such
proposals may be beneficial in that they facilitate public consideration of troublesome issues notwithstanding that the proferred solution is unacceptable. 365 Moreover, the only way to inhibit
"unacceptable" proposals prior to a vote is to inhibit the entire
process.
The low passage rate, in short, reflects a cautious electorate that
votes "no" when faced with too much ambiguity or doubt. This
caution, one would think, should increase the difficulty of enacting
undesirable legislation by the initiative, restrict even further the
potential role of organized, monied interests in the process, and
compensate in part for the lack of a means to amend initiatives
after the process has begun. If so, and in conjunction with what we
know of the judgment of the electorate and the difficulty of
manipulating its views, it becomes quite understandable why the
results of the initiative process have consistently been viewed as
beneficial.
D.

From the State to the Federal Level-A Note of Caution

The evidence we have, then, suggests that we voters are not, at
least collectively, mindless automatons who can be manipulated
with ease by clever media specialists. Nor do we seem inclined to
translate our well-known prejudices and bigotry into law when
given the slightest opportunity to do so. 3 6 6 To the contrary, the disinterested observers who have examined the results of initiated
measures consistently have been impressed by the product of the
initiative process and by the social and political dynamic that appears to underlie it.367 To be sure, a statute is occasionally entional ballot, it would cost $840,000 to certify a measure for the ballot. See,
Hearings,supra note 1, at 4, 5 (Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate).
That expense is another factor that must go into the balance, of course, as are
the other costs involved. The remaining costs should be relatively low, depending primarily on the effort made to provide voter information to the electorate. Id.
365. An example is California Proposition 9 in the June, 1972, election. It was an
extreme measure that lost handily but that may have helped lay the groundwork for the success of Proposition 20, a much less extreme measure, in the
November, 1972, election. Lutrin & Settle, supra note 270.
366. Moreover, the time element in the initiative process normally is considerable,
which is why rash measures usually are unsuccessful. Tempers calm down
before it is time to vote, even if they had not when the petitions were being
circulated.
367. A recent development lends support to the view that the typical man on the
street is not a cretin. Most of us are apparently coming to realize the impor-
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acted, the wisdom of which is questionable, and the initiative
process clearly has not proven to be a panacea for all the political
ills in those states thkt have embraced it. Nevertheless, on balance
the fears of the critics do not appear to have been substantiated to
any significant degree by the extensive experience we have had
with the initiative, while the expectations of the proponents seem
to have been at least partially fulfilled. 368 In fact, the most impressive testament of all to the favorable operation of the initiative in
tance of reporter's shield laws. See Gallup, Growing Majority Backs Newsmen's Privilege, Des Moines Register, Oct. 5, 1978, at 6A, col. 1.
368. The most recent election appears to be quite consistent with what has come
before. The dominant theme of the measures on the ballot was government
reform, and a number of measures were passed over the opposition of what
surely were much better financed opponents. Oregon passed a measure permitting dental technicians to sell false teeth, and Montana enacted a measure
restricting the construction of nuclear plants, as did Hawaii in a constitutional referendum. See U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, supra note 286, at 34. In
two recent California elections (Proposition 5 and 7 in November 1978) well
financed groups apparently won.
Perhaps the most well-known initiated measure of recent times is California's Proposition 13, which was enacted in the June, 1978, election. Proposition 13 suffers from some infirmities and thus will probably be used as an
example of the unfortunate consequences of initiatives. One example, however, is not much of an argument against a generally beneficial practice.
Moreover, I am not sure which way Proposition 13 cuts, notwithstanding its
difficulties.
Admittedly, Proposition 13 is not a perfect bill and it is certainly not a
model of clear draftsmanship. See Adams, Coping With Proposition13, Wall
St. J., Oct. 10, 1978, at 22; The Jarvis-GannProposition,Wall St. J., Apr. 25,
1978, at 24. These problems could have been avoided had Proposition 13 been
handled by the legislature, the argument may run. Unfortunately, however,
the California legislature showed absolutely no inclination to engage in tax
cutting until after it was clear that Proposition 13 had a reasonable chance of
winning. And that is true notwithstanding California's history of tax initiatives, all of which failed but which together should have sent a message to the
legislature. Yet that message was ignored. Moreover, it is instructive that
the California electorate was willing to embrace a relatively poorly drafted
measure by close to a two-to-one margin rather than permit the status quo to
continue. That seems to demonstrate how far out of line the California State
Government had gotten, and without the initiative it would probably have
been more difficult to begin to put things into proper order.
Finally, that Proposition 8-the California Legislature's hasty response to
the possibility of Proposition 13 passing-was defeated is not surprising. To a
large extent Proposition 13 was a referendum on the state government, which
the government lost. Given the view the electorate had of its elected officials,
a vote for a measure proposed by them would have been very surprising indeed. See, CaliforniaTax Slash Proofof Voter Ire, Buffalo Courier Express,
June 11, 1978, at c-1, Col. 6.
Let me be clear that I do not mean to condone the more unfortunate aspects of Proposition 13, but I do not think that, on balance, Proposition 13
makes much of a case against the initiative. Rather, I think it is a better example of the difficulties of representative government.
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the states is not the laudatory views of the experts that I have
quoted at length. Rather, the most impressive testament is that
there has never been a serious effort to eliminate the initiative in

any state that has ever embraced

it.369

Still, before we can decide to embrace a national initiative proposal, much more work remains to be done. In a matter of this
import, we should not act until all possible questions have been
answered as best they can be.370 The information I have presented
here paints a fairly attractive picture of the initiative process as it
has operated in the states, but that picture needs to be updated,
fleshed-out, and checked for accuracy.
Another reason to proceed cautiously, of course, is that the concern is not simply over the operation of the initiative in the states.
The experience in the states is relevant only to the extent one can
draw inferences from that experience about the likely operation of
a national initiative. It may be that the results of a national initiative process would not be much different from what we find in the
states. After all, voters who demonstrate powers of discrimination
and judgment at the state level should not lose them in a federal
election-especially if the issues dealt with by a national initiative
3 71
process prove not to be of greater complexity.
369. Fordham & Leach, supra note 235, at 497. But see Dow, PortlandLimits the
Initiative,40 NAT. MUN. REV. 347 (1951). Moreover, a number of states that do
not possess the initiative are now in the process of amending their constitutions to provide for it. See, Hearings,supra note 1, at 16 (opening statement
of James Abourezk).
370. One argument often raised against initiatives is that laws are typically enacted by a minority of the people since rarely does a proposition receive the
votes of over 50% of the eligible voters. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 186, at
507; Johnson, supra note 235, at 46; Schumacher, supra note 224, at 244-45. See
also J. POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 28. There are a number of responses to this.
One is to point out that as many vote for state legislators as vote on initiatives. Radin, supra note 83, at 571; Bone & Benedict, supra note 201, at 339.
Another is that "those who through ignorance, indifference, or carelessness
fail to vote on propositions that are put in their hands at the polls make out a
prima facie case of unfitness against themselves," and we are perhaps better
off without their votes. D. WILCOX, supra note 5, at 31. See also R. DAHL,
supra note 17, at 38; L. TALI AN, supra note 9, at 30 (quoting John Randolph
Haynes); D. Wn.cox, supra note 5, at 237.
371. Certainly, federal statutes may on the average be more complex than state
statutes, but that does not mean that the issues underlying the statutes are
more difficult to comprehend. Moreover, much of the complexity in federal
statutes results from pandering to special interests. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW,
supra note 97, at 138. At any rate, the issue is not the complexity of present
statutes; instead, it is the likely form national initiatives will take. If an exceedingly complex measure is qualified for the ballot, or one whose effects
are not clear, it will probably lose, given the tendency to vote no that our
fellow citizens exhibit when faced with ambiguity. Thus, complex, technical
matters, or measures of doubtful effect, will almost of necessity have to be
left to Congress, which is where they belong.

1979]

NATIONAL INITIATIVE PROPOSAL

1041

Similarly, if public relations firms cannot hoodwink the public
in statewide elections, it would seem unlikely that they will be able
to do so on the national level. National initiatives will undoubtedly
be subjected to much greater scrutiny than state initiatives. Who
is backing a bill and why, is more likely to be exposed, and the
actual strengths and weaknesses of any particular measure surely
will receive even greater attention than is now the case in the
states. Reason suggests, then, that the results on national initiatives will be at 2least as commendable as the results we have gotten
37
in the states.
Nonetheless, reality is not always reasonable. To the extent
possible, we should attempt to narrow our gaps in knowledge by
further study. We should try to determine if the dynamics of group
decision-making may vary from the state to the national levelwhether the larger group is likely to become less rather than more
tolerant. For example, we should attempt to compare the acceptance of progressive state legislation to the national consensus on
similar federal legislation. We also need to conduct further studies
of the effect of money and media campaigns on elections. The
states with campaign finance disclosure requirements applicable
to ballot measures 37 3 have created a splendid opportunity to study
the marginal effect of money on initiative balloting. We should
also examine more carefully the effect of money in elections without incumbents, especially primaries where partisanship should
also be lacking. Moreover, more careful, in-depth analysis of the
results of initiatives should also be conducted. Only when these
and related questions have been examined to the extent feasible
should we extrapolate from the data and estimate the likely performance of a national initiative procedure.
Yet, even after such extrapolation, one important question will
remain: is the federal law-making machinery seriously so deficient
as to justify taking whatever risk a national initiative amendment
would entail? 37 4 The federal lawmaking process has generally op372. Special interests, due to greater organizational and financial resources, may
have an even greater advantage at the national level in qualifying national
measures. To the extent there is a concern about special interests abusing
the qualifying process, it can be handled by appropriate statutory provisions.
My own view, however, is that the qualifying procedure is essentially immune from abase. I see nothing wrong with anyone or any group utilizing
their resources in an attempt to qualify a measure or to ensure its passage. If
a ridiculous bill is qualified, I have confidence we will vote it down. But the
process should still prove interesting, probably educational, and the resultant
debate will contribute to the quality of life in the United States.
373. See note 341 supra.
374. One argument against the initiative deserving of brief mention is the occasionally expressed fear that direct democracy will adversely affect the legislative branch by dulling its sense of responsibility. See, e.g., J. BoYL, .spra
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erated at a higher level than that of most states, yet it is clear that
Congress is subjected to a myriad of forces that are capable of influencing it in an undesirable fashion. 37 5 Even if we conclude that
those forces are often successful and that an initiative process
would prove helpful in counteracting them, we still must decide
whether whatever risk a national initiative entails is worth it. That
will be, I think, a question requiring individual judgment, although
to some extent the answer will depend on the form the national
initiative amendment would take. Accordingly, I will conclude this
article with a brief consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 67.
IV.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 67-SOME SUGGESTIONS

Senate Joint Resolution 67 is, for the most part, well drafted and
suited to its purpose. 376 It does contain a few questionable provisions, however. 37 7 Of these, the most important is the criterion
note 5, at 25; Smith, supra note 193, at 26. The referendum may have this
effect, and thus it may make sense not to provide for a national referendum,
but it is difficult to see how a legislator could rationally abdicate his responsibilities because a jurisdiction employs the initiative. Moreover, no such consequence appears to have occurred. What Prof. Cushman observed long ago
still seems true today:
Critics of the system have long declared that direct legislation would
rob the state legislator of his dignity and destroy his sense of responsibility to the people. He would become a mere automaton and the
important work of legislation would be carried on at the polls. Needless to say no such complete emasculation of state law-making bodies has anywhere occurred. The legislators in Oregon, Washington
and California still grind out laws with as great rapidity and steadiness as though they were paid for their statesmenlike labors by the
piece instead of by the day.
Cushman, supra note 218, at 533.
For empirical support for Cushman's views, see text accompanying notes
242-49 supra.
There are other objections that have been raised to the initiative process,
but they are not deserving of extended discussion. One is that the initiative
does not allow intensity of feeling to influence the outcome of policy choices.
Again, though, I know of no examples where a mildly favorable majority have
imposed their will on a stridently opposed minority. If there are not a
number of people seriously interested in a measure, it will not likely qualify
for the ballot. Moreover, the same reasons that motivate legislators to accommodate intensity of feeling should also motivate voters. See R. DAHL, supra
note 17, at 50. But see Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 207, at 769. Another
concern is that initiatives may be hard to interpret, given the lack of legislative history. 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 408, supra note 235, at 420-21. The answer, I
suppose, is that the courts will have to expand their conception of "legislative
history." See, e.g., Fields v. Fung Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 322, 556 P.2d 729, 134 Cal. Rptr.
367 (1976).
375. See § III of text supra.
376. It is reproduced in the appendix to this article.
377. I have limited myself to relatively significant aspects of S.J. Res. 67.
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provided for the enactment of a bill. A law would be enacted if,
after qualifying, it received "approval by a majority of the people
casting votes with respect to such proposed law." 378 I think,
though, that the late Alexander Bickel was correct when he observed that "no measures 3of
pervasive application can or should
79
rest on narrow majorities.
Professor Bickel's primary concern was that a law that commanded barely more support than it generated opposition would
be difficult to enforce, and efforts to do so could result in more
harm than good. Resistance to the enforcement of such laws undoubtedly would develop; in many places the statute would be
openly and brazenly flouted; and any serious intervention by the
authorities would be viewed as repressive by a large segment of
the populace. The result would be to bring the process of law and
its enforcement into disrepute and, consequently, to undermine
the conditions of the rule of law. 380 Accordingly, the process of
lawmaking should try to avoid dichotomizing the population and,
so far as possible, should rest upon a consensus more complete
than that required by a majority vote.
There are other reasons for requiring something other than a
simple majority to enact a federal statute by initiative. Our present structure deliberately contains impediments to law-making
that are designed to make it generally difficult to enact legislation.
These exist partially in response to concerns similar to Bickel's,
partially as an awkward attempt to provide institutional protection
for minority interests, and partially as a result of a general bias
against governmental intervention into private affairs. 38 1 A simple
majority vote on a national initiative would amount to a potentially
serious reordering of our law-making process through its implicit
rejection of many of these concerns, and I, for one, am still sufficiently impressed by the tyrannizing3 82
tendency of any form of government to think that a poor choice.
378. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
379. A. BicKLm, THE MORAITrY OF CONSENT 103 (1975).
380. Our experience with sumptuary criminal legislation provides much support
for Prof. Bickel's view. See, e.g., Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 588 (1968).
381. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
382. Since the status quo will undoubtedly contain some statutes that deserve to
be repealed, any modification of a simple majority rule does allow for some
rule by minorities by making the status quo more difficult to change. Thus, a
modification of the majority rule means not simply that private action will be
preferred to governmental intervention, but also that present statutes will be
preferred to proposed ones. Were I convinced that the need to repeal statutes was of great enough magnitude, I might favor a majority vote, but I am
not convinced of that. Thus, the loss resulting from the enhanced difficulty of
repeal appears to be outweighed by the value of inhibiting new legislation.
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Allowing for enactment by a simple majority also may give too
much power to a few heavily populated states.383 It is very likely
that regional concerns would on occasion be the subject matter of
national initiatives, and a simple majority vote would give a decided advantage to the densely populated portions of the country.3 84 Concern for the disruptive effects of regionalism was one of
the justifications for the creation of the Senate, in fact, and a simple majority vote foregoes this advantageous aspect of state representation without providing any alternative. Similar concerns also
stimulated the only provision of the Constitution that purports to
be unamendable, absent consent of the affected parties. 385 Article
V provides that "no state, without its Consent, shall be deprived of
its equal Suffrage in the Senate. '386 Although the scope of this
provision surely "is confined to protecting the equality of the
states in the Senate" and "says nothing about the ... freedom of
the state from a whole or partial loss of its powers through amendment, ' 387 still Article V rests on the desire to guarantee the states
equal power to influence legislation at one necessary step in the
legislative process, a guarantee that a majority vote provision nullifies.
For all these reasons, something other than a simple majority
vote for the enactment of a national initiative should be required, 388 but precisely what should be substituted for it is not altogether clear. There appear to be two alternatives. One is simply
to raise the percentage of affirmative votes required for passage to
something greater than a majority, but that course presents
problems. If, for example, one is concerned that the heavily populated states may tend to vote uniformly on a particular measure,
nationwide support for the measure can be guaranteed only by
raising the percentage to virtually unattainable levels. 3 89 FurtherMoreover, most statutes are written with present conditions in mind. Accordingly, most statutes supported presently by only a minority will probably
tend to lose support as time passes and conditions change until eventually
there is a sufficiently large consensus to repeal them.
383. According to the 1970 census, half the population is in nine states. U.S. BuREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION.

384. The problem was recognized quite long ago. See Everett, supra note 5, at 360.
385. L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 6 (1948).
386. U.S. CONST. art. 5.

387. L. ORFIELD, supra note 385, at 97. The seventeenth amendment (direct election of senators) strongly supports this conclusion.
388. The lack of a Presidential veto power, which perhaps should be made explicit, see Hearings,supra note 1, at 123, is yet another reason for requiring
more than a simple majority. See S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Governors also do not possess veto powers over initiatives. See, e.g., Fordham & Leach, supra note 235, at 523.
389. The 25 least-populated states have only approximately 15% of the population.
Thus, to guarantee support for a bill in at least half of the states, we would
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more, what plurality would satisfy concerns such as Bickel's is not
self-evident, nor for that matter is it clear how high the required
percentage can be made without again making the process virtually impossible to use. 390 Accordingly, the second alternative may
be preferable to requiring a super-majority vote.
The alternative to a super-majority vote is a structural solution
that parallels the federal arrangement. What should be considered
is a requirement that a proposed statute receive not only an overall
majority but also a majority in a majority of states. 39 ' Such an arrangement would ensure that no bill would be enacted without
widespread support, and thus it would go far towards solving the
problem of regionalism as well as serving the laudatory, although
somewhat random, screening function of the Senate.392 Moreover,
this arrangement should also satisfy the concerns raised by Article
V of the Constitution, since each state would maintain its ability to
influence the outcome of a proposed statute.
Obviously, this suggestion does not guarantee that a statute
would not be enacted by a very close vote, and I have considered
suggesting a super-majority vote in addition to requiring that a
measure receive a majority in a majority of states. 3 93 I have decided against it for a number of reasons, however. In the first
place, I doubt that proposed statutes will very often be approved
by a majority in over half the states and still only barely receive a
majority overall.3 94 Moreover, the electorate's tendency to be

390.

391.
392.
393.

394.

have to require that a measure receive approval from 85% of the electorate
(assuming population and voting population are roughly proportional), although it obviously is unlikely that a proposed statute would uniformly be
voted for in the 25 largest states and uniformly voted against in the 25 smallest.
An examination of the votes in presidential races and public opinion polls on
various issues does not lead one, or at least did not lead me, to form any
conclusion concerning what percentage might be optimal for a national initiative process. On the basis of the experience in the states, it seems as though
a requirement that a bill receive from 55% to 60% of the vote for enactment
would not emasculate the process, although some bills are passed with less
than a 55% affirmative vote.
See generally L. TALLuUA, supra note 9, at 13; Everett, supra note 5, at 354-55.
S.J. Res. 67 provides that for purposes of that amendment Washington, D.C.,
shall be treated as a state.
See text accompanying notes 21-35 supra. And, like the electoral college, it
would encouarge the contestants to argue the merits of their positions
throughout the entire country.
I would have suggested 55%, which would ensure a sizeable winning margin
but probably would not eviscerate the process. On supermajority requirements generally, see Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); Comment, The Constitutionality of Supermajority Voting Requirements: Gordon v. Lance, 1971
U. IuL. L.F. 703.
If so, one might argue, why not impose a supermajority requirement? I must
say, I am almost convinced. My only response is that I do not know how high
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skeptical about initiatives is a built-in check upon the process,
which, in conjunction with the requirement that a measure carry
half the states, should be a more than adequate surrogate for the
to legislating contained in our extant political strucimpediments
3 95
ture.
The remaining suggestions I have to offer do not deal with matters as significant as the criteria for enacting a measure, and can be
discussed in short order. First, the scope of legislative power
under the proposed amendment should be clarified. The amendment provides for the enactment of "laws" but does not define the
scope of the term, which creates the possibility that certain quagmires that can and should be avoided may not be.396 Accordingly,
the first sentence of Section 1 should be amended to read: "The
people of the United States shall have the power to propose and
a requirement to impose. See note 393 supra. Given that uncertainty, and
that it is probably not necessary anyway, prudence dictates not imposing a
higher standard. See also text accompanying note 395 infra.
395. One consequence of requiring half the states to approve a measure may be to
encourage a greater number of challenges to the vote count, but that has not
been a serious problem in presidential elections. Hearings on the Electoral
College and Direct Election of the President Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977).
A number of states require that in addition to a ballot measure receiving a
majority of the votes cast on it, it also receive a minimum number of votes or
that a minimum number of votes be cast one way or the other on it. See, e.g.,
Stewart, The Law of Initiative Referendum in Massachusetts, 12 N. ENG. L.
REv. 455, 486 (1977); Troutman, Initiative and Referendum in Washington: A
Survey, 49 WASH. L. REv. 55, 57 (1973). Such provisions generally are
designed to reduce the chance that bills without serious popular support are
enacted. Whatever the wisdom of these provisions at the state level, I see no
reason to incorporate them into a national initiative process. The difficulties
of qualifying bills should preclude most bills without significant support. But
see note 372 supra. Moreover, it may be that a relatively small group, but one
sufficiently large to qualify a bill, has been mistreated by Congress to the
advantage of only a few, and it is hard to see why that should be within the
power of Congress but excluded from the scope of the initiative. Similarly, if
two or more groups are contesting an issue that is within the reach of federal
lawmaking but that does not affect most of the nation, and if one of these
groups manages to qualify a measure, it is hard to see why those who are
interested in it should not decide its fate themselves, simply because none of
the rest of us care enough to vote on the measure. See also note 370 supra.
396. The principal quagmire is the distinction between "legislative" and "administrative" acts that has developed in the state courts, particularly with respect
to local initiatives where local governing bodies possess both legislative and
administrative functions. The scope of the power under the initiative has
been held not to extend to administrative acts, but the cases are, to say the
least, difficult to reconcile. See Fordham & Leach, supra note 235, at 501;
Troutman, supra note 395, at 84-87. Note, The Legislative/AdministrativeDichotomy and the Use of the Initiative and Referendum in a North Dakota
Home Rule City, 51 N.D. L. REv. 855 (1975); Note, Limitations on Initiative
and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. RE.v. 497, 503 (1951).
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enact laws in accordance with this article. This article shallnot be
construed to excludefrom the lawmaking power of the people any
subject matter that is within the legislativecompetence of Congress
397
including, but not limited to, taxation and appropriations."
The exceptions now contained in the first sentence of Section 1
serve no real purpose and should he removed. 398
Second, the amendment should be made explicitly self-executing, since its very existence would postulate a potentially unresponsive legislature. Thus, the next to last sentence of Section 2
should be amended to read: "The Congress shall provide by law
reasonableproceduresfor the preparationand transmittalof such
petitions, andfor the certification of signatureson such petitions,
but the chief law enforcement officer of the United States shallprovide for the preparationand transmittal of such petitions andfor
the certification of the signatures on them, in the absence of congressional action." Similarly, Section 4 should be amended to
read: "This article is self-executing upon being ratified by the legislaturesof three-fourths of the several States. However, the Congress
and the people shall have the power to enforce this articleby appropriate legislation."399
Finally, provision should be made for inconsistent measures.
Given the diversity of this country it is not at all unlikely that two
measures will qualify for the ballot that are inconsistent with one
another in at least a minor way, and Senate Joint Resolution 67
provides no method of resolving any such tension. Thus, Section 3
should be amended to add a concluding sentence: "In the event
that two laws are enacted at the same election that are in whole or
in part inconsistent,the inconsistent laws or parts thereof shall be
40 0
deemed to repeal one another."
397. The specific reference to fiscal affairs should remove any doubts about the
scope of the initiative based upon the fact that the House of Representatives
has exclusive jurisdiction to originate bills raising revenues. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7. A number of states limit the scope of the initiative with respect to fiscal
affairs. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 395, at 462; Note, supra note 210; 3 STAN.
L. REV. 497, supra note 396. See also Comment, The Scope of the Initiative
and Referendum in California,54 CALiF. L. REV. 1717 (1966).
398. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11. It provides for the declaring of war and related matters. Clause 15 provides for the calling out of the militia. Neither of
these powers can effectively be exercised through an initiative, and the President's position as Commander-in-Chief further immunizes these areas from
popular influence.
399. See generally Fordham &Leach, supra note 235, at 501-02; Note, The Initiative
Cannot Be Limited by Legislative Act, 25 RocKy MTN.L. REv. 106 (1952-53).
Perhaps citizens should be given standing to sue to enforce the provisions of
the amendment. That might provide some leverage to be used against a recalcitrant Executive.
400. See Fordham & Leach, supra note 235, at 522. The alternative to mutual repeal is that the bill receiving the highest number of affirmative votes (or pos-
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The issues discussed here are, I believe, the most significant of
the problems raised by Senate Joint Resolution 67, but by no
means the only ones. A number of its other aspects may generate
controversy and certainly will require discussion if we decide to
give serious consideration to the wisdom of the national initiative
proposal. 40 1 Moreover, there are myriad issues of lesser significance that will have to be handled by statute that also are in need
of elaboration, but I will leave that task for another time.40 2 On the
sibly the highest winning percentage) would supercede the other. See
Stewart, supra note 395, at 491. That view rests on the assumption that inconsistent parts of the measures caused the different outcomes, but with relatively complex bills, or with bills that deal with largely different issues, that
may not be the case. Thus, resolving the difficulty by reference to the
number of affirmative votes runs the risk of being an arbitrary method of resolution. Providing for mutual repeal, by contrast, merely preserves the status
quo. If the provisions repealed are crucial to the statutory scheme, Congress
can provide the missing link through its power to amend initiatives. See S.J.
Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1977).
For bills passed at different elections, the normal rules of statutory construction would apply, of course.
401. Principal among the issues that may be discussed is whether we should
adopt an indirect initiative process rather than a direct one as contained in
S.J. Res. 67. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 1, at 193 (testimony of B. Barber);
Note, Effect of Pending InitiativePetition on Legislature'sPowerto Enact InconsistentLaw, 49 COLuM. L. REV. 705 (1949).
Should S.J. Res. 67 be enacted, Congress would still be able to enact any
bill it likes prior to the election on a measure. Thus, a lot of trouble could be
saved by Congress enacting a proposal that appears likely to qualify; or Congress could attempt to defuse the situation by enacting a substitute. Accordingly, the primary purpose of an indirect method may be met by the present
proposal, as may the primary purpose of those schemes that allow the legislature to place substitute measures on the ballot. Moreover, Congress can also
amend any initiated measure, although during the first two years after enactment only by a two thirds rollcall vote. Nonetheless, I think it would make
good sense to allow Congress to place alternative measures on the ballot,
once a measure has qualified, and let the electorate choose among them (or
reject or accept them all). That, I think, might provide a mixture of the best
of both worlds.
The power to amend contained in S.J. Res. 67 serves the purposes of state
"emergency clauses." See generallyTroutman, supra note 395, at 57 n.10, 68; 3
STAN. L. REV. 479, supra note 396, at 498-502; Note, Court Interpretationof the
Power to Amend the Initiative, 34 WASH. L. REV. 150 (1958). Another issue
that may be raised is whether state legislatures should be permitted an explicit role in the process. It seems to me their implicit role is quite enough.
402. The issues that should be dealt with by statute are too numerous for extended discussion here. See generally Diamond, diDonato, Marley & Tubert,
supra note 198. Among the most important are the method of obtaining,
transmitting, and certifying signatures on petitions; statutory determinations
of the point at which the qualifying and certifying processes begin; the governmental aid that should be provided to proponents and opponents of measures; the limitations on paid signature gatherers and on the campaigns over
measures; the process of amending proposals to correct technical or stylistic
flaws; and the role of the judiciary prior to an election.
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whole, Senate Joint Resolution 67 is a very solid proposal that
should serve very well to facilitate consideration of the wisdom of
a national initiative procedure-which, of course, is its primary
task.
V. A CONCLUDING THOUGHT
And so we have come to the end of a long but hopefully not
unduly tedious journey. It is with some regret that I echo what
was anticipated at our departure to the effect that what we have
seen along the way has not disposed of every possible criticism of,
nor substantiated all the hopes and expectations for, the initiative
process. To some extent that could never be accomplished, for a
considerable portion of the argument over the worth of the initiative rests upon fundamental disagreement on often implicit value
judgments. To the extent disagreement rests on issues more susceptible of reasoned discussion, there is more work to be done
before final judgment is reached. And it may be that some may
403
find questions unexamined here to be of crucial importance.
Nevertheless, the journey has not been entirely for naught. It has
yielded, hopefully, a useful analytical scheme; it has provided a
preliminary analysis of many of the issues central to the wisdom of
a national initiative process, and perhaps it has been helpful in
making explicit what may underlie much of the dispute over the
wisdom of initiatives generally.
There remains just one point to be made. 404 The question
whether or not to take the next and most dramatic step in the democratization of the Republic 405 is, in essence, to ask to what exteht we take our ideals, and ourselves, seriously. The history of
the United States is to a considerable degree a history of an everexpanding enjoyment of an ever-increasing portion of our ideals.
The issue posed by th national initiative amendment is whether
we sufficiently trust ourselves to make real yet another ideal and
403. For instance, whether a national initiative would enhance the power of the
presidency, due to the Executive's national stature, and thus enhance the
chances of creating a tyrannical demagogue. I must say that in this regard
the potential effect of a national initiative procedure pales beside the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
404. I feel compelled to point out that the present size of the various political parties should not influence one's view of the wisdom of a national initiative
process, unless the minority is convinced it will never be able to demonstrate
to a sufficient number, the wisdom of its views and thus become the majority.
R. DAHr,
supra note 17, at 52.
405. Six of the last 12 constitutional amendments have extended the franchise or
attempted to protect its exercise. For a discussion of the American progress
towards democracy, see A. GiimEs, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION

(1978).
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the consequences of our inability to do so. I cannot improve on the
words of Professor Benjamin Barber:
In the end, in fact, the real issue at stake in S.J. Res. 67 is whether or not
America believes in democracy, and believes it can afford the risks that go
with democratic life. All of the objections to it are so many different ways
of saying "the people are not to be trusted"--a skepticism which, it is perfectly true, can be traced back to the "realism" and cynical elitism of a
significant group of constitutional fathers. But there really is no democratic alternative to such trust: if the American people are not capable of
perish-whether or not elites keep
self-government, our democracy40will
6
them from initiating legislation.

I do not mean to suggest that the gravity of the question makes
the answer any easier. It may be that upon further study and reflection enough of us will have sufficient reservations about
enough of our fellow citizens to force the conclusion that a national
initiative would not be a wise addition to our political structure. I
agree with Professor Barber, however, that such a conclusion does
not bode well for the health of the Republic. Say what you will
about the importance of institutional structures and relationships,
in the final analysis the perpetuation of any free society rests primarily on the character of its citizens, not in the form of its institutions.4° 7 And it is difficult for me to imagine how a citizenry that
lacks the competence to intercede directly into matters of its own
governance when it feels the need has arisen can long survive as
the pillar of a free society. Still, those are the issues the national
initiative proposal generates, and I, for one, hope that we will begin
the process of examining them.

406. Hearings,supra note 1, at 195 (testimony of B. Barber). See also L. TALLAN,
supra note 9, at 40 (quoting John Randolph Haynes); D. WILCOX, supra note
5, at 311.
407. See R. DAHL, supra note 17, at 22, 134-35, 143. See also D. WILcox, supra note
5, at 67.
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APPENDIX
95mn CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S.J. Res. 67

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 11 (legislative day, MAY 18), 1977

Mr. ABOUREZK (for himself and Mr. HATFIELD) introduced the following joint
resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary

Joint Resolution

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
with respect to the proposal and the enactment of laws by popular vote of the people of the United States.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of
each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE-

"SECTION 1. The people of the United States shall have the
power to propose and enact laws in accordance with this article,
except with respect to carrying out the powers granted to Congress
in clauses 11 and 15 of article 1, section 8, of this Constitution. This
article does not grant the people of the United States the power to
propose amendments to this Constitution.
"SEC. 2. A law is proposed by presenting to the chief law enforcement officer of the United States a petition that sets forth the
text of the proposed law and contains signatures, collected within
the eighteen months prior to such presentation, of registered voters equal in number to three per centum of the ballots cast in the
last general election for President and which includes the signatures of registered voters in each of ten States equal in number to
three per centum of the ballots cast in the last general election for
President in each of the ten States. Within ninety days of such
presentation, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States
shall determine the validity of the signatures contained in such pe-
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tition through consultation with the appropriate States. Upon a
determination that such petition contains the required number of
valid signatures, he shall certify such petition. He shall then direct
that the proposed law be placed on the ballot at the next general
election held for choosing Members of the House of Representatives occurring at least one hundred and twenty days after such
certification. The Congress shall provide by law reasonable procedures for the preparation and transmittal of such petitions, and for
the certification of signatures on such petitions. For the purposes
of this section, the term 'State' shall include the District of Columbia.
"SEC. 3. A proposed law shall be enacted upon approval by a
majority of the people casting votes with respect to such proposed
law and shall take effect thirty days after such approval except as
otherwise provided in the proposed law. Any law enacted pursuant to this article shall be a law the same as any other law of the
United States, except that any law to repeal or amend a law enacted pursuant to this article during the two years immediately following its effective date must receive an affirmative rollcall vote of
two-thirds of the Members of each House duly elected and sworn.
No law, the enactment of which is forbidden the Congress by this
Constitution or any amendment thereof, may be enacted by the
people under this article.
"SEc. 4. The Congress and the people shall have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

